אליגוריות החוקים, ספר א ט׳Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis, Book I 9
א׳
1[21] “In the day in which God made the heaven and the earth and every green thing of the field before it appeared upon the earth and all grass of the field before it sprang up; for God had not sent rain on the earth, and there was no man to till the earth” (Gen. 2:4, 5). Above he has called this day a book, for he delineates the creation of heaven and earth as wrought in both: for by His own supremely manifest and far-shining Reason God makes both of them, both the original of the mind, which in symbolic language he calls “heaven,” and the original of sense-perception, to which by a figure he gave the name of “earth.”
ב׳
2[22] And he compares the original of the mind and the original of sense-perception to two fields; for they bear fruit, the mind all that is done in thinking, sense-perception all that is done in perceiving. What he means is something of this sort. As before the particular and individual mind there subsists a certain original as an archetype and pattern of it, and again before the particular sense-perception, a certain original of sense-perception related to the particular as a seal making impression is to the form which it makes; just so, before the individual objects of intellectual perception came into being, there was existing as a genus the ‘intellectually-perceptible’ itself, by participation in which the name has been given to the members of the genus; and before the individual objects of sense-perception came into existence, there was existing as a genus the ‘sensibly-perceptible’ itself, by sharing in whose being all other objects of sense have become such.
ג׳
3[23] “Green of the field,” then, is what he terms the “intellectually-perceptible” of the mind; for as in a field the green things spring up and bloom, even so the ‘intellectually-perceptible’ is a growth springing from the mind. Before, then, the particular ‘intellectually-perceptible’ came into being, the Creator produces the solely abstract ‘intellectually-perceptible,’ as a generic existence. This he rightly calls “all,” for the particular ‘intellectually-perceptible,’ being a fragment, is not all, but the generic is so, being a full whole.