על הנטיעה, נספח והערותConcerning Noah's Work as a Planter, Appendix
א׳
1APPENDIX TO DE PLANTATIONE
ב׳
2§ 3. Mr. Whitaker had left “ride upon” for ὀχεῖσθαι, and this is the natural meaning of the word; but the sequel shows that the fire rides upon the air, and the earth contains the water in its hollows (§ 10). At the same time the translation here substituted, “be held by,” is not quite satisfactory. Probably ὀχεῖσθαι is corrupt. Some word indicating juxtaposition (ὅμορον κεῖσθαι?) seems to be needed.—F. H. C.
ג׳
3§ 6. Perfect parts. Cf. Quod Det. 154 and note, in which the dependence of this thought on Timaeus 32 c was pointed out.
ד׳
4§ 10. Masterpiece of literature. Or perhaps “literature.” It seems to the translators doubtful whether Mangey, whom Wendland followed, was justified in substituting φωνῆς. The phrase ἐγγ. φωνή, cf. De Agr. 136, means speech which is capable of being analysed into the sounds which are represented by the γράμματα, and ἐγγ. μουσική will mean the same, except that while φωνή contemplates the letters as used for speech in general, μουσική contemplates them as used for the higher purpose of literary expression. The thought is enriched by the word: the action of the Logos in creating out of discordant στοιχεῖα the harmony of the Cosmos is compared with the way in which the στοιχεῖα of sound combine to form the medium by which we express our highest thoughts.
ה׳
5§ 29. The insertion of εἰς will no doubt make the construction easier, if we may assume that αἰσθήσεις can mean the organs of sense. But this seems doubtful (the passages in L. & S. 1927 quoted for it seem rather to mean the senses themselves as localized). Without εἰς the passage can be translated “taking our body, like some deep-soiled plot, as tree-beds, he made the senses for it,” though it is true that we should have expected δεξαμενήν.—F. H. C.
ו׳
6§ 33. To say nothing of the fact, etc. This sense can no doubt be obtained by excluding τῷ. But the combination in a single sentence of two such disparate thoughts, as (1) that the cause cannot be contained in the caused, (2) that the trees do not bear fruits, is odd. As there is admittedly some corruption, perhaps we may extend that corruption a little further and suppose that a fresh sentence and subject begins after περιέχεσθαι. It has been shown that God does not dwell in gardens; we now go on to show that He does not need the fruit. As a guess one might suggest φῶμεν δὲ for τῷ μηδὲ, i.e. “And are we to say forsooth that the trees (as they would if they were really trees) bear yearly fruit?” Who then will eat them?—F. H. C.
ז׳
7§ 41. That is to say … irrational creatures. The MS. text and also the suggestions of Cohn and Mangey involve making the ἀσκήσεις καὶ χρήσεις the recipients of the privilege denied to the irrational creatures. But clearly the ἀσκήσεις καὶ χρήσεις represent the tilling of the garden and themselves constitute the privilege. The reading adopted brings out this meaning with no more departure from the manuscripts than the transplacement of ἐστιν and the omission of οὖν. Wendland’s proposal of αἱ γοῦν ἀρετῆς δεκτικαὶ φύσεις, for αἱ οὐν ἀσκήσεις τε καὶ χρήσεις, would give much the same sense, but with more drastic alteration, and the phrase ἀσκήσεις καὶ χρήσεις has every appearance of being genuine.
ח׳
8§ 61. For separation. Or “for dismissal” as R.V. in margin. Mr. Whitaker had intended to correct his translation in Leg. All. ii. 52 from “averter of evil” to this, though that is the usual meaning of the word. Whatever the LXX actually meant, the interpretation which follows here (cf. also De Post. 72) seems to show that Philo took the word in this passive sense, and to this he would be guided by the parallel phrase in Lev. 16:10 ὥστε ἐξαποστεῖλαι αὐτὸν εἰς ἀποπομπήν.—F. H. C.
ט׳
9§ 73 ff. The curious distortion of the story of Genesis which follows has this much excuse, that the accusative after φυτεύω would naturally mean the thing planted, whereas the LXX uses it for the soil, which again would naturally be expressed by the dative following ἐπί. The A.V. has “grove” in place of the LXX “field” or “hide”; the R.V, has “tamarisk tree.”
י׳
10§ 76. 10,000 is the end. Apparently because Greek has no name for higher numbers, except such as are compounded with μυρίοι or lower numbers.
י״א
11Ibid. If we adhere to the line of progress, etc. Literally “according to the first arrangement (or “series”).” The word “first” is obscure. Possibly it may mean the series 1, 2, 3, etc., other secondary series being 1, 3, 5, etc., and 2, 4, 6, etc. The former would not reach 10,000, and the latter does not start from 1.
י״ב
12§ 93. Though by special grace, etc. An afterthought; no such reservation is made in 79–84.
י״ג
13§ 94. Natural duties. Or, as it has been rendered in earlier passages, “simple” or “common” or “daily” duties.
י״ד
14§ 95. Its crop. In 137, however, Philo seems to take αὐτοῦ as referring to the Lord, i.e. “what He has produced.” But it would be quite in his manner to regard it as having both meanings.
ט״ו
15§ 100. Indifferent. Or “belonging to the lower or preliminary stage,” as in 94. For the phrase cf. De Sacr. 43.
ט״ז
16§ 101. Debtors or slaves. I e. if anyone, slave or freeman, has entrusted a friend with some piece of property, he should retain it, if otherwise it will be seized by the master of the former, or the creditor of the latter. Heinemann would read χρεώστας ἢ δούλους, but it is improbable that slaves were entrusted in this way and surely impossible that debtors should be. For the remarks that follow cf. note on Quod Deus 101.
י״ז
17§ 106. A desire that good, etc. A verbatim quotation of the Stoic definition of εὔνοια, see S. V.F. iii. 432.
י״ח
18§ 110. Philo oddly perverts the story of Jacob and the rods. It looks as if he took the words which follow the text which he quotes καὶ ἐφαίνετο τὸ λευκὸν ποικίλον to mean “the spotted appeared white” instead of the opposite.
י״ט
19§ 111. By way of leaving behind us bodily concerns. The case of κατά is strange, and the thought, though in itself quite Philonic, seems alien to the context. Perhaps read κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος μετάβασιν <τοῦ ποικίλου> τὸ ποικίλον, κτλ., i.e. “Just as the variegatedness leaves the body of the leper, so we,” etc.
כ׳
20§ 118. The soul’s chiefest good, etc. This passage, like De Op. 53, is evidently dependent on the eulogy of light in Timaeus 47 A, see particularly, “Day and night … and months and years and the revolution of the years have created number … and from these we have derived philosophy, than which no greater good has come … to mortal men” (Archer-Hind’s translation).
כ״א
21The correction ἀγαθόν for the senseless ἀπάτη has been universally accepted. But such a foolish corruption is strange. Is it possible that ἄκος ἀπάτης or some such phrase may have stood originally?
כ״ב
22§ 123. “All” or “totality.” A Pythagorean idea, cf. Aristot. Met. i. 5, 968 a, “ten is thought to be perfect and to embrace the whole nature of number”; see Zeller, Pre-socratic Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 428. What applies to 10 applies to 4 also, since 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10. Philo is also probably thinking of the words πᾶς ὁ καρπός in his text from Leviticus.
כ״ג
23§ 129. The family of the Muses, etc. Philo seems to be giving a spiritualized form of the legend in Hesiod, Theog 50 f., where Zeus lay for nine nights with Mnemosyne, who after a year bore the Nine Muses at a birth. πάμμουσον frequently means “very musical” but one can hardly help supposing that here there is an allusion to “all the Muses.”
כ״ד
24§ 137. His products. See note on “its crop,” § 95.
כ״ה
25§ 139. And concerning the number 4. The sense given in the translation can no doubt be obtained by merely omitting the καὶ before ἃ, and taking συνεκροτεῖτο in a rather unusual sense. But the phrasing is odd. The genitive τῶν ἄθλων cannot be governed by φερομένης, and must be taken as partitive, “those of the prizes which.” If we retain καὶ, we might perhaps translate “and about the things which were enjoined,” but the genitive τῶν ἄθλων then is unintelligible, as Wendland felt, who suggested for it <τὰ πρεσβεῖα> τῶν ἀριθμῶν.
כ״ו
26But there is another possibility. The treatise up to now has consisted of three parts; the husbandry of God (1–73), the husbandry of the wise man (74–92), and the husbandry of the ordinary (progressing) man (93–138). In this last the number four was merely incidental. It seems possible that φερομένης like ἑπομένης agrees with γεωργίας, and that the meaning is the “husbandry which wins the prize assigned to four.” No doubt some corruption must be assumed to get such a meaning, but the following might be tentatively suggested: τῆς φερομένης τετράδος τὸ ἆθλον, ἣ κατά, κτλ. The last words will then mean “the husbandry which was trained (or “worked”) according to the injunctions and directions of the law.” This would give quite a usual sense to συνεκροτεῖτο, The “working” or “training” has been described in 100 ff.—F. H. C.
כ״ז
27§ 142. Cf. Plutarch, De Garrulitate 4 (= 503) F. καὶ μήποτε τὸ ζητούμενον παρὰ τοὺς φιλοσόφους λύων ὁ ποιητὴς οἰνώσεως καὶ μέθης διαφορὰν εἴρηκεν, οἰνώσεως μὲν ἄνεσιν μέθης δὲ φλυαρίαν … οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι καὶ ὁριζόμενοι τὴν μέθην λέγουσιν εἶναι λήρησιν πάροινον· οὕτως οὐ ψέγεται τὸ πίνειν, εἰ προσείη τῷ πίνειν τὸ σιωπᾶν· ἀλλʼ ἡ μωρολογία μέθην ποιεῖ τὴν οἴνωσιν. (Ibid. 504 B.)
כ״ח
28“We may, indeed, believe that these lines of the poet give the solution of the question discussed in the philosophic schools as to the distinction between mellowness and intoxication: mellowness produces unbending, but drunkenness foolish twaddling.
כ״ט
29“In fact the philosophic definition of intoxication calls it ‘silly talk in one’s cups.’ The blame, therefore, is not for drinking, if one can drink and yet at the same time hold his tongue. It is the foolish talk that converts mellowness into drunkenness” (Tucker’s translation).
ל׳
30§ 145. “The others.” I.e. those described in 143. Arnim would render “others,” making a third class w ho are distinguished from the first, in that they regard drunkenness as venial in the exceptional circumstances described in 146. But all that is stated there is that the wise man may be occasionally forced to relax his general rule of avoiding all occasions of heavy drinking, and this is not incompatible with the view stated in § 143.
ל״א
31§ 163. “After sacrificing.” This derivation is ascribed to Aristotle by Athenaeus, Epit. ii. p. 40 c.
ל״ב
32§ 165. Etymology. Arguments like this and the preceding one were a recognized method of proof both in philosophy and rhetoric. Cf. Cicero, Topica 35 and Academica i. 32 (with Reid’s note). The first proof, though of a very similar kind, would perhaps have been classed rather as an argument “from definition.”
ל״ג
33§ 171. Right feelings. Arnim takes this Stoic term (εὐπάθειαι) as supporting his contention that the disputant is a Stoic. But apart from the fact that the word is a favourite with Philo, Arnim himself notes that much of the Stoic “jargon” had become common property.
ל״ד
34§ 172. Arnim connects this argument with the strict Stoic view (a) that every good thing has its opposite evil; (b) that all good things belong solely to the wise man, and all bad things to the fool: (c) that what is neither good nor bad (ἀδιάφορον) is shared by both, and therefore its opposite must be shared by both. From this he argues that the ascription of this statement to οἱ πρότεροι shows that the disputant is a Stoic, since a member of an opposite school would not use such a form of words (“our predecessors”). If, however, it is assumed that the writer is a free lance, the argument seems doubtful. Moreover, the phrase ὡς ὁ τῶν προτέρων λόγος only applies to the statement that good and bad share soberness, and Arnim adduces no proof that this is Stoic.
ל״ה
35§ 173. Inartistic. Cf. Aristot. Rhetoric i. 15. So called because “they are not due to the artist’s inventive skill, but are supplied to him from the outside, as it were, of his art” (Cope). The other four are laws, documents, questions by torture, oaths.
ל״ו
36§§ 176 ff. This argument is stated by Seneca in Ep. 83 as having been put forward by Zeno, and Seneca refutes it in exactly the same way as it is refuted here. He proceeds to deal in the same way with another defence of Zeno’s argument, propounded by Posidonius, and then lays it down that the true way of proving the folly of drunkenness is to show its evil consequences—the loss of mental and bodily control, and the grave mischief which history shows that it has so often caused. If the suggestion made in Note (p. 211) to the Introduction is right, viz. that another speech followed, putting the case from the point of view of one who held that “the wise man will not get drunk,” it may very possibly have followed these lines.