בעיות הלכתיות עכשוויות, כרך ב, חלק ראשון, פרק ב: ברכות ומנהגיםContemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol II, Part I, Chapter II Blessings and Rituals
א׳
1From [the manner of] a person's [recitation of] blessings it can be recognized whether or not he is a scholar.
ב׳
2BERAKHOT 50a
ג׳
3"Mizvot were given solely in order to purify mankind," declares the Midrash (Bereshit Rabbah 44:1; Va-Yikra Rabbah 13:3). Fulfillment of a divine commandment is certainly not to be construed as a boon to God. As so eloquently expressed by the Sages, "What difference is it to God whether one performs the ritual of slaughter upon the throat or upon the nape of the neck?" The midrashic metaphor is chosen with precision. The term "le-zaref," meaning "to purify," is the Hebrew term employed to describe the refining or "purification" of precious metals. Man's personality combines a curious mixture of the noble and the base, the spiritual and the animal, the precious and the dross. Precious metals were not created in a pure state. In nature they exist only in tandem with base substances. The precious metal is obtained in a pure state only as the end product of the process of smelting and refining. "The word of God is pure" (Psalms 18:31) and acts as a purging and purifying agent. Commandments and rituals are designed to refine human character, to purge man of base traits and to allow human spirituality to shine forth.
ד׳
4This purpose is, at times, achieved by means of the intrinsic nature of the mizvah and, at times, simply by virtue of the discipline imposed by the observance of the mizvah, i.e., in fulfilling the divine command man must bridle his own desires and submit to the will of God. To be sure, mere perfunctory performance of mizvot is not likely to effect a moral or spiritual transformation in human nature. In order to achieve the requisite effect, the mizvah must be accompanied by reflection and introspective awareness of the deficiencies to be remedied. Blessings are designed to serve as one step in this process.
ה׳
5The blessing pronounced prior to performance of a mizvah is an expression of gratitude, an acknowledgment that in being bidden to perform a mizvah the Jew has been granted a rare privilege. God has indeed "sanctified us through His commandments" (be-mizvotav), for it is fulfillment of the commandments that enables man to achieve a state of sanctity.
ו׳
6The various blessings are not at all blessings in the conventional sense, i.e., prayers for, or invocations of, bounty. Understood in that sense, a blessing bestowed upon God by man is entirely devoid of rational meaning. God, as the very essence of perfection, has no lack or deficiency. God, then, suffers from no deprivation which man might seek to remedy. As an absolute Unity, eternal and unchanging, God could in no way be effected by man's blessing. Unaffected by accident, His essence remains constant both prior to the blessing and subsequent thereto. What, then, does man seek to accomplish in pronouncing the blessing?
ז׳
7R. Chaim of Volozhin, Nefesh ha-Hayyim, sha'ar 2, chapter 4, dispels any possible misconception by explaining that the phrase "barukh atah ha-Shem," which appears in the formula of the blessing, is neither a prayer nor a pious wish for the future, but a simple declaration of fact. The phrase "barukh atah ha-Shem" is properly rendered in translation as "blessed are You" rather than as "blessed be You." God is described as "blessed" simply in the sense that He is the source of all blessing. God, as King of the universe, causes all manner of blessing to be channeled toward man. Man is called upon to acknowledge this fact and to proclaim God as the source of all blessing whenever he derives tangible benefit from God's creation. The benefit derived from performance of a mizvah is no less real than the benefit derived from food and drink and demands identical acknowledgment.
ח׳
8No less significantly, the blessing, when pronounced with kavanah and concentration, is itself performative and self-fulfilling. It serves to prepare man to receive the sanctity conveyed through fulfillment of the mizvah. By attuning him to the nature and purpose of the mizvah to be performed, the blessing serves to make man receptive to the curative power of the mizvah as a vehicle for achieving sanctity and holiness.
ט׳
9Haftorah from a Braille Text
י׳
10It is now customary in most synagogues to accord a Bar Mitzvah the honor of reading the haftorah on that auspicious occasion. The Bar Mitzvah reads the prophetic portion either from a printed text or, in some synagogues, from a parchment scroll. Frequently, the Bar Mitzvah also chooses himself to read maftir, the final verses of the weekly Torah reading, rather than have the Torah reader chant them on his behalf.
י״א
11A blind person cannot, of course, read in the usual sense of the term. A blind Bar Mitzvah boy, however, may well be able to commit his haftorah to memory or to read it from a Braille text. Whether or not a blind Bar Mitzvah boy, or for that matter, any other blind person, may read the haftorah in this manner is the subject of a responsum published in booklet form by Dayan Abraham Rapoport. This booklet, Be-Inyan Kri'at ha-Haftorah be-'al Peh, was published in 1961 as the eighth in a series of publications of the London Bet Din. A shorter treatment of the same topic by Rabbi Nachum L. Rabinovitch, principal of Jews' College in London, appears in the Tishri 5738 issue of Ha-Darom.
י״ב
12There is a general prohibition against the reading of even a single word of the Written Law from memory (Gittin 60b; Rambam, Hilkhot Tefillah 12:8; Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 53:14; and Yoreh De'ah 139:3). The Written Law may be read or studied only from a written text. Even though Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Hayyim 49:1, indicates that this restriction is relaxed in the case of a blind person who would otherwise be prevented from studying Torah, the public reading of the Torah on prescribed occasions requires that the appropriate portion be read from a Torah scroll and not be recited from memory. The Torah scroll must be written in the prescribed manner and, hence, a Braille text may not be used for this purpose. Nevertheless, Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 139:3, rules that a blind man may be called to the reading of the Torah since it is our custom that the person called to the reading of the Torah does not read from the Torah scroll itself, but rather the portion is read on his behalf by a reader. A blind person may, therefore, pronounce the blessing and listen attentively as the Torah portion is read on his behalf.
י״ג
13It follows, therefore, that a blind Bar Mitzvah boy called to maftir may not read the final sentences of the Torah reading from the Torah scroll. The question requiring clarification is whether he may recite the prophetic selection from memory or from a Braille text.
י״ד
14It should be noted that for some authorities the haftorah must be read from a scroll of the Prophets, just as the Torah portion is read from a Torah scroll. Both Magen Avraham 284:1 and Taz 284:2 cite the opinion of the Levush to the effect that a parchment scroll containing the entire prophetic work from which the haftorah is selected must be used for this purpose. Although Magen Avraham and Taz disagree with the position of the Levush, the latter's opinion is vigorously affirmed by Arukh ha-Shulḥan, Oraḥ Hayyim 284:2-6. Hayyei Adam, however, asserts that, even according to Levush, a single scroll containing only the haftorah selections is sufficient. It was also the practice of the Gaon of Vilna to use a parchment scroll for the reading of the haftorah. Mishnah Berurah 284:1 states that, optimally, parchment scrolls on which the prophetic books are written in a manner similar to a scroll of the Torah should be used for the reading of the haftorah and praises those communities which follow this practice. In Sha'ar ha-Ẓiyun 284:4, the same author indicates that this practice has fallen into disuse in some communities because of the relatively high cost of acquiring a complete set of scrolls of the Prophets. He concludes with the wry comment that "in our day," when huge outlays of money are made for various adornments of the synagogue "which are not so very necessary," funds should certainly be set aside for acquiring scrolls of the Prophets.
ט״ו
15Of course, according to the authorities who maintain that the haftorah must be read from a scroll of the Prophets, it may not be recited from memory or from a Braille text. The Bar Mitzvah may, however, pronounce the blessings and have the Torah reader read the prophetic portion on his behalf. The question of whether a blind person may read the haftorah must, however, be analyzed according to the opinions of those who maintain that a parchment scroll is not required for this purpose—particularly since most synagogues, at present, do not use scrolls of the Prophets.
ט״ז
16Both Rabbi Rabinovitch and Dayan Rapoport show that the resolution of this question is contingent upon an analysis of a ruling of the Gemara, Gittin 60a. The Gemara asserts that, in transcribing any of the prophetic works, any single book of the Prophets must be written in its entirety, i.e., the writing of a partial book is forbidden. In this context the Gemara refers to a Sefer Aftarta, a book of haftorot, written on parchment in the manner of a Torah scroll, but containing only the prophetic selections read on the Sabbath to the exclusion of the remainder of the text of the books of the Prophets. Rabbah and Rav Yosef forbade not only the writing, but also the use, of such scrolls on the Sabbath. The Gemara, however, concludes that it is permissible to use such scrolls, explaining that since not every community can afford a set of complete scrolls, the requirement that only complete books be written is suspended. Rabbinic hermeneutics found sanction for this practice in Psalms 119:126 which was interpreted by the Sages as meaning, "At a time when it is necessary to work for the Lord, make void Thy law." The Sages understood this verse as granting dispensation to abrogate the prohibition against transcribing incomplete books of the Bible.
י״ז
17The readily apparent analysis of this discussion is that the only requirements which are suspended are the requirements that a prophetic book be committed to writing only in its entirety and that public reading of the haftorah be only from a complete scroll. If these are the only requirements which are suspended, it follows that the prohibition against reading or studying the Written Law other than from a written text remains in effect. However, another interpretation is also possible: Only complete scrolls are endowed with the sanctity of scrolls of the Written Law. Thus selections from prophetic works, even if written in the appropriate manner on parchment, do not enjoy this sanctity. Accordingly, reading from a scroll composed of such selections is tantamount to recitation from memory. If the latter analysis is correct, then, in permitting the use of the Sefer Aftarta, the Sages, in effect, permitted what is tantamount to the study or recitation of the Written Law from memory.
י״ח
18Some evidence substantiating the latter analysis may be derived from the fact that the Gemara draws a parallel between use of the Sefer Aftarta and the fact that other Amoraim made use of written compilations of sections of the Oral Law. It was originally forbidden to commit the Oral Law to writing. This prohibition was later suspended because of the difficulties involved in preserving the tradition orally. If, in permitting use of the Sefer Aftarta, it is the prohibition against studying the Written Law other than from a properly written scroll which is suspended, the parallelism is precise.
י״ט
19The latter analysis is explicitly formulated by Ritva while, argues Dayan Rapoport, Me'iri's explanation of this discussion tends toward the former. Rabbi Rabinovitch endeavors to demonstrate that each of these divergent analyses is espoused by a different Tosafist as recorded in Tosafot, Temurah 14b. He further cites a responsum authored by Rambam, and cited by Bet Yosef, Oraḥ Hayyim 143, in which Rambam permits oral recitation not only of prophetic selections but of the Pentateuch as well.
כ׳
20Both authors further maintain that Levush, who insists upon written parchment scrolls for the reading of the haftorah, understands Gittin 60a as permitting only the use of an incomplete scroll, but not oral recitation of the haftorah. Use of a printed paper text, in contradistinction to a hand-written parchment scroll, is the equivalent of oral recitation and hence, according to Levush, is prohibited. Those who disagree with the opinion of Levush understand use of the Sefer Aftarta to be tantamount to oral recitation and hence permit use of a printed text as well.
כ״א
21Accordingly, both Dayan and Rapoport and Rabbi Rabinovitch permit a blind child to read the haftorah from memory or from a Braille text in synagogues which do not follow the practice of reading the haftorah from a parchment scroll. Dayan Rapoport prefers that the reader repeat the haftorah prior to the recitation of the final blessings by the Bar Mitzvah, or that he read it before the Bar Mitzvah does so subsequent to the pronouncement of the blessing preceding the haftorah.
כ״ב
22Dayan Rapoport's concern is based upon the opinion of Tosafot, Temurah 14b, to the effect that the prohibition against the study or reading of the Written Law from memory applies only to situations in which such reading is for purposes of enabling others to discharge their ritual obligations. Since the blind Bar Mitzvah boy is in the position of reading from memory not only on his own behalf but on behalf of the entire congregation as well, Dayan Rapoport prefers that the reader repeat the haftorah on behalf of the congregation. This consideration does not, however, appear to be a compelling one. Indeed, it is questionable whether the members of the congregation can at all discharge their obligation simply by listening to the haftorah as it is read from a printed text. Hayyei Adam 31:40 implies, and Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, Oraḥ Hayyim, no. 68, states explicitly, that members of the congregation cannot discharge their responsibility simply by listening to the reading of the haftorah without themselves reciting the haftorah unless it is read from a parchment scroll. Moreover, on the basis of the sources cited, reading from a printed text is in any event tantamount to reading without any text at all but, nevertheless, is permissible in the case of the haftorah because of the reason cited in Gittin 60a, "At a time when it is necessary to work for the Lord, make void Thy law."
כ״ג
23Cantorial Repetition
כ״ד
24The historical functions of the cantor include leading the congregation in prayer and (particularly in olden times) recitation of the prayers on behalf of unlettered persons unable to do so themselves. Such persons may discharge their obligation by listening attentively to the cantor's rendition. As a representative of the congregation beseeching God through prayer, the cantor was expected to be a person of piety and erudition. Jewish law specifies that in the appointment of a cantor a person blessed with a pleasing and melodious voice is to be sought in order that the congregation be inspired to proper concentration upon the service. Piety and scholarship are, however, of more fundamental importance. Thus Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 53:5, rules that when no person can be found who is endowed with all cantorial desiderata other considerations should be overlooked in the quest for a person of learning and wisdom.
כ״ה
25With the passage of time it became common practice for cantors to embellish the prayers with musical renditions designed to exhibit musical accomplishment. These exhibitions of cantorial vanity, when designed to impress the congregation or to provide esthetic gratification rather than to arouse spiritual fervor, were decried by so early an authority as R. Solomon ben Adret in the 13th century as recorded in Bet Yosef and Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 53:11. Subsequently, the eighteenth-century authority, R. Alexander Schorr, Bekhor Shor, Ta'anit 16b, inveighed against such practices and caustically described them as more objectionable than theatrical performances.
כ״ו
26In later times, cantors began to repeat words and phrases which occur in the liturgy as part of their musical arrangements. This practice has been censured by a host of authorities including Maharam Schick, Oraḥ Hayyim, no. 31; Pekudat Elazar, no. 25; Eshel Avraham, no. 51; R. Joseph Engel, Ben Porat, II, no. 7; Sedei Hemed, asifat dinim, ma'arekhet hefsek, sec. 9; and Iggerot Mosheh, Oraḥ Hayyim, II, no. 22.
כ״ז
27Recently, in the course of his highly popular "Ask the Rabbi" program broadcast on Israeli radio, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef responded to a closely-related question: In singing portions of the prayer service may students (or others) repeat verses of hallel or of the psalms included in the prefatory section of the morning prayers? Rabbi Yosef's answer appears in the Kislev 5737 issue of Or Torah.
כ״ח
28Repetition of words and phrases is prohibited for a number of reasons. In addition to marring the solemnity of prayer and generating an aura of a concert performance rather than of divine worship, such repetition frequently seriously distorts the cognitive meaning of the words of the liturgy and may, at times, even impart a ludicrous meaning to the text of the prayer. Another consideration raised by the authorities who address themselves to this question is that unauthorized words or phrases may constitute a hefsek or "interruption" which, in the case of blessings, has the effect of invalidating the prayer.
כ״ט
29Repetition of complete verses of the psalms is, however, significantly different in nature. The meaning of the sentences uttered is not distorted by means of repetition. Since the psalms are not blessings, but are designed to extol the praises of God, repetition does not appear to constitute a hefsek. Indeed, the verses of Psalms 118:25-29 are regularly repeated in the course of hallel for reasons advanced by Rashi, Sukkah 38a. Similarly, Psalms 150:6 is repeated in the daily morning service to indicate that it constitutes the final verse of the section referred to in Shabbat 118b as "hallel."
ל׳
30Rabbi Yosef cites Orḥot Hayyim, hilkhot pesukei de-zimra, no. 31, and Yeshu'ot Ya'akov, no. 51, sec. 111, who maintain that, these distinctions notwithstanding, other verses of psalms should not be repeated. On the other hand, Rabbi Yosef points to a number of authorities, cited by Bet Yosef, Oralḥ Hayyim 61, who maintain that the verses of kri'at shema, with the exception of the very first verse, may be repeated. All agree that the first verse of kri'at shema may not be repeated lest such repetition be interpreted as a confession of dualism. However, the authorities who permit repetition of the ensuing verses of kri'at shema are apparently of the opinion that, apart from the considerations of possible dualistic misinterpretation which is present only in repetition of kri'at shema, there is no objection to repetition of biblical verses. Accordingly, Rabbi Yosef rules that, while in general, it is not permitted to repeat words and phrases of the liturgy, repetition of verses of psalms (or, less preferably, of complete phrases) is not forbidden.
ל״א
31Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, in a letter published in the Cantorial Council of America Bulletin of November, 1965, expresses an opposing view in ruling that repetition is forbidden in the recitation of any biblical verse as well as in hallel and the statutory prayers. This view is presumably predicated upon the rule expressed by the Gemara, Megillah 22a and Ta'anit 27b, which states, "Any verse which was not divided by Moses, we may not divide," i.e., it is forbidden to recite a truncated or incomplete verse. Repetition of a portion of a verse is a form of division.
ל״ב
32Birkat ha-Hammah: An Alternative Date?
ל״ג
33Each twenty-eighth year becomes the occasion for the publication of monographs and articles dealing with a blessing recited only once in twenty-eight years—Birkat ha-Hammah, or the Blessing of the Sun. Immediately thereafter the topic recedes from memory to be recalled only when the dawn of the next twenty-eight year cycle appears on the horizon.
ל״ד
34Birkat ha-Hammah in 5741, which marked the beginning of the 206th twenty-eight year solar cycle, was a singular event in Jewish religious life. Unprecedented numbers of Jews both in Israel and in the United States gathered for impressive public observances of this ritual. The zeal with which Birkat ha-Hammah was observed was reflected in the extraordinary number of scholarly publications dealing with this observance to which but a brief paragraph is devoted in the Shulḥan Arukh. Many more monographs and articles devoted to this subject were published in conjunction with the recent observance of Birkat ha-Hammah than had been published in conjunction with all such previous events combined. The most comprehensive work to be published on this topic is Sefer Birkat ha-Hammah ke-Hilkhatah by a Jerusalem scholar, R. Menachem Gerlitz which includes an appendix containing relatively inaccessible halakhic discussions, responsa and homilies of earlier scholars. Another comprehensive and valuable work is Birkat ha-Hammah by Rabbi Zevi Cohen, author of Tevilat Kelim and Hag'alat Kelim.
ל״ה
35A brief compendium, Birkat ha-Hammah, was also published by R. Moshe Sternbuch. Another pamphlet dealing with this observance, Barah ke-Hammah was published by R. Shlomoh Schweitzer of Spring Valley, N.Y. R. Yehoshua Heschel Deutsch of Los Angeles compiled a booklet entitled Kuntres Berakhah ve-Yeshu'ah. A major portion of a hitherto unpublished work, Davar be-Itto, authored by R. Akiva Schlesinger (known as the Lev Ivri) deals with the Blessing of the Sun. Edited by R. Moshe Nachum Shapiro, this work contains additional responsa authored by the editor as well as by R. Shmuel Wosner and R. Yitzchak Weisz.
ל״ו
36Many works published in conjunction with earlier observances of Birkat ha-Hammah were also republished. Of particular interest to bibliophiles is the photo-offset publication by Mr. Abraham Schischa of a limited edition of the London 5601 reprint of R. Jacob Meldola's Boker Yizraḥ, the earliest booklet containing the liturgy and laws of Birkat ha-Hammah. A valuable new edition of R. Yechiel Michal Tucatzinsky's informative and authoritative Tekufat ha-Hammah u-Birkhatah was widely disseminated. This work first appeared fifty-six years ago, was republished with additions twenty-eight years later, and now has been republished by the author's son with the addition of a number of important notes. Also republished is R. Pinchas Zelig Schwartz' Yizraḥ Or which may be familiar to many readers as a result of its wide circulation in the United States in 1953. Two classic works, Boker Yizraḥ by R. Yekutiel Aryeh Kamelhar and Or ha-Hammah by R. Meir Dan Hertzberg, were reprinted in a single paperback edition together with Kuntres ke-Ẓet ha-Shemesh by R. Gavriel Zinner. This volume was published by Yeshiva Machazikei Hadas of Belz. Rabbi Zinner's Kuntres ke-Ẓet ha-Shemesh was also published separately by the student organization of Yeshiva Kehilath Yakov of Pupa. Supplementary discussions by Rabbi Zinner, entitled Kuntres ke-Ẓet ha-Shemesh Mahadura Tinyana, appear as an appendix to his Milei de-Pisḥa.
ל״ז
37Particularly noteworthy is a booklet entitled Ke-Ẓet ha-Shemesh published by Mesifta Maharam Schick in Jerusalem containing important responsa and source material. Also of interest is a collection of articles and responsa, Tovim Me'orot she-Bara, compiled by R. Samuel Isaac Roth. Another pamphlet, Tizraḥ ha-Shemesh, contains material gleaned from the writings of R. Naḥman of Braslav.
ל״ח
38A number of items also appeared in English, including this writer's ArtScroll publication, Seder Bircas haChammah, and an interesting article by a mathematician, Charles Elkin, which appears in the Proceedings of the Associations of Orthodox Jewish Scientists, vol. VI (1980). Elkin presents much intriguing information regarding the Jewish calendar in general and the astronomical premises which form the basis of Birkat ha-Hammah. Also of interest is A Blessing for the Sun: A Study of Birkat ha-Hammah from Early Time until the Present by Nehemia Polen and Yiroucho Im Shemesh by R. Avraham Blumenkrantz as well as The Blessing on the Sun published by Yeshivat Dvar Yerushalayim.1Articles in the periodical literature discussing various aspects of Birkat ha-Ḥammah include R. Zevi Sloucz, Shevilin, Kislev 5741; R. Moshe Nachum Shapiro, Moriah, Shevat 5741; R. Eliyahu Baruch Kepetsh, Ha-Ma‘ayan, Nisan 5741; Nehemia Polen, Tradition, Spring 1981; R. J. David Bleich, Ha-Pardes, Adar 5741 and Bet Yiẓḥak 5742. A document describing Birkat ha-Ḥammah in Cologne, Germany, in the year 5545, despite difficult weather conditions, was published by Manfred R. Lehmann in the Tishri-Ḥeshvan issue of Sinai. A translation of the sermon delivered by R. Jacob Ettlinger of Altona, Germany on the occasion of the Blessing of the Sun which occurred on the second day of Passover, 5601, appears in Jewish Studies, a publication of Yeshivat Dvar Yerushalayim, no. 30 (Spring 5741) as well as in The Blessing on the Sun.
ל״ט
39Birkat ha-Hammah is a blessing praising God, "who makes the work of creation" and is recited on the occasion of the return of the sun to the position in the heavens which it occupied at the moment of its original creation when that event occurs on the day of the week and at the hour of the day which correspond to the day and hour of the creation of the sun. Genesis 1:14-19 records that the sun was created on the fourth day of the week. According to rabbinic tradition the sun was created at the very beginning of the day and was affixed in the sky in the position occupied at Tekufat Nisan, i.e., the vernal equinox. Thus Birkat ha-Hammah is recited whenever the vernal equinox occurs at the very beginning of the fourth day of the week. At the time of the equinox day and night are equal in duration, each being twelve hours in length. Since in the Jewish calendar each day begins with nightfall the beginning of the fourth day is 6:00 P.M. Tuesday evening.
מ׳
40According to the dictum of Samuel, Eruvin 56b, the solar year is reckoned as exactly 365 days and 6 hours in length. Given the premise that the sun was created on Tuesday evening at 6:00 P.M. and that this event also marked the first vernal equinox, it may be determined by means of simple arithmetic calculation that the vernal equinox will recur at 6:00 P.M. on a Tuesday evening only once in twenty-eight years. Hence the recitation of Birkat ha-Hammah at twenty-eight year intervals.
מ״א
41The reader may readily associate the 365 and a quarter day year of Samuel with the identical basis of the Julian calendar and may recall that the Julian calendar was replaced by the Gregorian calendar in 1582 because the solar year is simply not 365 and a quarter days long. It has been determined astronomically that the earth completes its orbit around the sun in 365 days, 5 hours, 48 minutes and 46 seconds. Thus the date assumed for the tekufah, or equinox, advances steadily to a date later and later than the true solar equinox.
מ״ב
42According to our calendar Tekufat Nisan occurs on April 8 throughout this century. Yet the astronomical phenomenon marking the vernal equinox occurs on March 21, some eighteen days earlier. How then can Birkat ha-Hammah, which ostensibly marks the vernal equinox, be recited on a day which in fact does not coincide with this phenomenon? Indeed, it is readily demonstrable that the true astronomical equinox has never recurred on Tuesday evening at 6:00 P.M.
מ״ג
43A number of proposals have been advanced suggesting alternative dates for Birkat ha-Hammah which would be in close conformity with astronomical phenomena. Various dates are suggested by J.D. Eisenstein in his Ozar Yisra'el, X, 189; in an article contributed by him to the Jewish Encyclopedia, XI, 591; and in Ha-Do'ar, August 8, 1952. His various proposals are, however, contradictory and not consistent with any calendrical theory. Moreover, Eisenstein fails to recognize that Birkat ha-Hammah is recited pursuant to a rabbinic edict and any modification thereof must perforce be promulgated in accordance with procedures governing rabbinic legislation.
מ״ד
44A much more carefully formulated proposal was advanced by Dr. Arthur Spier in an article which appeared in Jewish Life, January-February 1953. Spier forthrightly states that no change can be made in the regulations governing Birkat ha-Hammah other than by a properly constituted rabbinic synod. Accordingly, his proposal is presented in the form of a suggestion "addressed to a future Sanhedrin for possible consideration." Spier, the author of a meticulous work, The Comprehensive Hebrew Calendar (New York, 1952) suggests that March 20, the date on which the astronomical spring equinox frequently occurs, be selected as the date for Birkat ha-Hammah. The blessing would be recited at roughly twenty-eight year intervals beginning in 1885. During the course of the next several hundred years March 20 occurs on a Wednesday each twenty-eighth year, except in transition from the twenty-first to the twenty-second and the twenty-second to the twenty-third centuries. In those instances Spier recommends a twenty-nine year interval.
מ״ה
45Spier states quite candidly that on those dates the astronomical tekufah will not occur "at six o'clock Jerusalem time, the beginning of Wednesday, because the Tekufoth do not follow such a periodic rule" and that his proposal does not constitute "a perfect solution."
מ״ו
46In point of fact, this suggestion probably would not be entertained by a future Sanhedrin because of one crucial consideration. It must be recognized that the occurrence of the tekufah on a Wednesday (even if the astronomical equinox were always to occur on March 20, which it does not) is not, in itself, sufficient reason to occasion Birkat ha-Hammah. Indeed, were this so, the original tekufah would have provided for Birkat ha-Hammah five times in each twenty-eight year cycle since, according to the reckoning of Samuel, Tekufat Nisan occurs on a Wednesday with the frequency of five times in twenty-eight years. Birkat ha-Hammah was, however, ordained only once in every twenty-eight year cycle because it is only once in twenty-eight years that the tekufah occurs on the eve of Wednesday at 6:00 P.M. This time is described by the Gemara, Berakhot 59b, as the hour at which Saturn is in the ascendancy and, according to rabbinic tradition, is the hour at which the sun was created. The statement of the Gemara that the blessing is pronounced only when the tekufah occurs on the evening of the third day going into the fourth when Saturn is in the ascendancy is a detailed exposition of the configuration of events which occasions the blessing. It is evident that only recurrence of the tekufah at a time which coincides with both the day and hour of the original creation of the sun is sufficient cause to warrant the blessing. Furthermore, were Spier's suggestion accepted and the hour of the tekufah to be ignored, there would no longer be any reason to limit recitation of Birkat ha-Hammah to once every twenty-eight years. Following Spier's recommendation, it would be logical to ordain Birkat ha-Hammah in every year in which the vernal equinox falls on a Wednesday. This occurs with a much greater frequency than once in twenty-eight years. Hence, adoption of the dates recommended by Spier would appear to be precluded.
מ״ז
47Yet there remains an obvious discrepancy between the rationale underlying recitation of Birkat ha-Hammah and the astronomical facts. In order to understand the nature of Birkat ha-Hammah it is necessary to draw attention to what appears to be an anomaly in the calendar itself. The Jewish calendar is lunisolar, i.e., the months are calculated according to the moon, while the years are reckoned according to the sun. The length of each lunar month approximates the period of time which it takes the moon to complete its rotation around the earth. Twelve lunar months equal approximately 354 days, or approximately 11 days less than the length of a solar year. Thus, in a lunar calendar the months would retrograde through the four seasons, i.e., each year every lunar month would occur about 11 days earlier in the solar year than it occurred in the previous solar year. Hence, the various Holy Days would, over the course of years, occur in each of the four seasons. However, the Torah declares, "Preserve the month of Aviv and observe Passover to the Lord your God" (Deuteronomy 16:1). The commandment requires that Passover occur in the month of Aviv, i.e., in the spring. This is accomplished by periodic intercalation of an additional month in order to assure that Passover will occur after the vernal equinox. The Jewish calendar provides for the addition of seven such months in each cycle of 19 years. This method of reconciling lunar months and solar years is known as the "tekufah of Rav Adda." Rav Adda calculated that 19 solar years are exactly equal to 19 times 12 lunar months plus seven additional, intercalated months. Rav Adda's solar year is equal to 365 days, 55 minutes and 25 27/57 seconds. Rav Adda's calculation is much closer to the length of the solar year than the 365 and a quarter day solar year assumed by Samuel.
מ״ח
48This presents somewhat of a paradox. The essence of the calendar promulgated by Hillel II and in use by us assumes a solar year of 365 days, 5 hours, 55 minutes and 25 27/57 seconds in length as postulated by Rav Adda. Yet for purposes of commencement of the tal u-matar prayer in the Diaspora as well as for recitation of Birkat ha-Hammah the length of the year is reckoned in accordance with the somewhat lengthier calculations of Samuel.
מ״ט
49This paradox was noted by many early authorities, including Ibn Ezra, Sefer ha-Ibbur, p. 8, R. Isaac Israeli, Yesod Olam, Fourth Treatise, chapter 15, and R. Ovadiah ben David in his commentary on Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Kiddush ha-Hodesh 10:1. In explaining the reason for this discrepancy a number of scholars point out that the calendrical calculations were determined by the members of the Bet Din which was responsible for proclaiming the New Moon. These individuals were quite capable of making the mathematical calculations necessary to reconcile the lunar and solar years in accordance with the formula of Rav Adda. Such calculations are, however, too cumbersome for persons lacking proficiency in mathematics. Since every individual is required to pray for rain, some relatively simple way had to be found to enable the common man to determine the approximate date marking the beginning of the rainy season. Samuel's reckoning of the solar year as being 365 and a quarter days in length makes it possible to calculate each of the four seasons without resorting to complicated formulae. Hence Samuel's calculations were widely disseminated and the discrepancy between that reckoning and the solar year was ignored by most people.
נ׳
50The comments of Hazon Ish, Oraḥ Hayyim 138:4, are helpful in elucidating this point. Hazon Ish is renowned for his independent investigations in establishing precise shi'urim (measurements and sizes) for halakhic purposes and is known to have stressed the necessity for meticulousness in such matters. Nevertheless, he recognized that in some areas of Halakhah the Sages did not ordain measurements and calculations in precise terms. In discussing the lack of precision in Samuel's calculations, Hazon Ish points to the fact that some of the mathematical formulae employed in rabbinic writings are simply approximations. He notes that, at times, "the Halakhah was designed on the basis of approximate calculation, for the mizvot were given solely to purify people and [that they] be meticulous in [fulfilling] His commands, may He be blessed in acceptance of His kingship…. For all of these purposes nothing is lost if the limits delineated be approximate so that even those of imperfect wisdom be capable of fulfilling performative commandments." These comments may also cast light upon the role of Samuel's calculations in establishing Birkat ha-Hammah.
נ״א
51The blessing "who makes the work of creation" is clearly a birkat hoda'ah, a blessing of thanksgiving. It is recited not only on the occasion of Birkat ha-Hammah but also upon beholding various wondrous phenomena. However, it would appear to this writer that, as recited on the occasion of Birkat ha-Hammah, this blessing is different in nature from the identical blessing as recited upon beholding the wonders of creation. On the latter occasions the blessing is an emotional response expressing thanksgiving for the marvels of nature. However, nothing spectacular is perceived on the occasion of the return of the sun to its original position in the heavens. Indeed, were empirical observation its sole means of discovery, this event would unquestionably pass without notice.
נ״ב
52The blessing on the occassion of Birkat ha-Hammah, it would appear, is not responsive but rather evocative in nature. It is designed to reinforce belief in the doctrine of continuous creation. In his discussion of the first of his Thirteen Principles of Faith, Rambam affirms that God did not simply create the universe by means of a single act for all of eternity but that He constantly recreates the universe. The Sages sought a means of emphasizing this teaching. The return of the sun to its original position and the beginning of a new solar cycle symbolize the continuous and ongoing recreation of the universe. Accordingly, in ordaining Birkat ha-Hammah, the Sages seized upon the 365 and a quarter day year of Samuel which had gained popular currency. Whether or not this assumption was astronomically correct was not a matter of significance to them. Important was the instrumental validity of Samuel's calculations which had been accepted for purposes of recitation of tal u-matar. Acceptance of Samuel's calculations results in a pattern of solar years which repeats itself in twenty-eight year cycles. In such solar cycles Tekufat Nisan unfailingly recurs at the beginning of a Wednesday every twenty-eight years. Regardless of its empirical accuracy, this perceived verity serves to dramatize a cosmological and theological truth of independent validity, namely, the doctrine of continuous creation. The Sages ordained the blessing of Birkat ha-Hammah in order to cause people to reflect upon this fundamental teaching.
נ״ג
53Whatever the theory or theories which may be advanced every twenty-eight years when the difficulties associated with Birkat ha-Hammah become a matter of concern in current halakhic periodical literature, the very attempt to determine the accuracy of the calculations may, in and of itself, constitute the fulfillment of a mizvah. The mizvah of Kiddush ha-Hodesh (which, according to Rambam, includes the obligation to add an intercalary month when necessary) requires that the Bet Din be proficient in both the halakhic and astronomical considerations governing the establishment of twenty-nine or thirty day months and leap years. Thus the study of astronomy was certainly obligatory upon members of the Bet Din. At least one authority maintains that such study and the mathematical determination of the calendrical system is, in our day, mandatory for every individual.
נ״ד
54R. Zevi Elimelech Schapiro of Dynow, Derekh Pekudekha, no. 4, sec. 10, presents the remarkable view that, with the lapse of monthly sanctification of the New Moon by the Bet Din, proficiency in calendrical calculations became the responsibility of each individual. Each person must himself determine which months are "full," i.e., thirty days in length, and which are "deficient," i.e., twenty-nine days in length, as well as which years are leap years and which are common years. Although a fixed calendar has been promulgated and is not subject to change, Derekh Pekudekha maintains that every individual is obliged personally to calculate the length of months and years.
נ״ה
55Although he does not state this thesis explicitly, Derekh Pekudekha presumably maintained that the Bet Din did not exercise jurisdiction in these matters as a judicial body but as the agents of all individual Jews. Since at present, there is no longer a Bet Din to serve as agent, the obligation becomes an individual one and hence the antecedent calculations are also a personal obligation. In order to fulfill the minimal requirement, declares Derekh Pekudekha, an individual must know the time of the molad (appearance of the nascent moon) and personally calculate the time of the next molad. Furthermore, one must know the precise order of leap and common years in the nineteen year cycle as well as the position in the cycle of the year which is current. An individual will thus have at least a minimal awareness of the reason why a given year is a common or a leap year.
נ״ו
56Immersion of Disposable Aluminum Utensils
נ״ז
57Utensils which are acquired from a non-Jew and are designed for use in the preparation or serving of food require immersion in a mikveh prior to use. This requirement is derived from Numbers 31:23 and is viewed as biblical in nature by the overwhelming majority of authorities.
נ״ח
58Among modern conveniences available to housewives are disposable aluminum baking pans and trays used for cooking or warming pre-cooked foods. These utensils are sometimes reused a limited number of times but are most frequently discarded after their initial use. Rabbi Elimelech Bluth, writing in the Summer 5733 issue of Le-Torah ve-Hora'ah, published by Mesivtha Tifereth Jerusalem, examines the status of these utensils with regard to the requirement of immersion.
נ״ט
59The first question examined by Rabbi Bluth is whether any utensil made of aluminum need be immersed prior to use. Tiferet Yisra'el, Yevakesh Da'at, sec. 44, cites the opinion of the R. Elijah of Vilna, who maintains that the biblical obligation with regard to immersion of utensils is limited to vessels made of the six types of metal enumerated in Numbers 31:23; viz., gold, silver, copper, iron, tin and lead. Since aluminum is not among the enumerated substances, it follows that, according to R. Elijah of Vilna, there exists no biblical obligation with regard to the immersion of aluminum utensils even if they were to resemble other metal utensils in every other respect. Nevertheless, argues Rabbi Bluth, aluminum utensils require immersion for three reasons:
ס׳
60(1) Many authorities maintain that all metal utensils require immersion, not merely those fashioned from the biblically enumerated substances.
ס״א
61(2) Aluminum utensils customarily contain an admixture of other metallic substances added as alloys. The entire utensil thus requires immersion because of the other metals of which it is composed.
ס״ב
62(3) Even according to the opinion of R. Elijah of Vilna there exists a rabbinic obligation with regard to the immersion of utensils made of other substances, just as there exists a rabbinic obligation with regard to the immersion of glass utensils. Avodah Zarah 75b indicates that any vessel which can be repaired by a smelting process must be immersed prior to use by virtue of rabbinic decree. Aluminum utensils are clearly among the vessels which satisy this description.
ס״ג
63The second question examined by Rabbi Bluth is whether disposable utensils, regardless of the material from which they are fashioned, require immersion. This question is also the subject of earlier discussions by R. Yitzchak Ya'akov Weisz, Minḥat Yizḥak, V, no. 32, sec. 1, and R. Ya'akov Breisch, Helkat Ya'akov, III, no. 115.2See also R. Nachum Rabinovitch, Ha-Darom, no. 35 (Nisan, 5732), pp. 129-130. Rabbi Breisch's responsum focuses upon the necessity of immersing paper plates covered with silver foil and concludes that immersion is not necessary since such utensils are discarded immediately following use. Rabbi Weisz reaches an identical conclusion with regard to disposable aluminum utensils "since they are not fit for permanent use." Rabbi Bluth, in a more detailed analysis, demonstrates that the fact that these aluminum utensils are customarily discarded after a single use does not effect their status with regard to the statutory requirements of immersion. The Tosefta, cited by Rabbenu Shimshon in his commentary on the Mishnah, Kelim 17:15, distinguishes between two categories of utensils. Utensils fashioned from hollowed-out turnips, citrons and gourds, are not deemed to have the status of "vessels" with regard to laws of ritual impurity. Utensils fashioned from pomegranates, acorns and nuts are deemed to have the status of "vessels" with regard to laws of ritual impurity. Tosafot, Shabbat 66a, explains that utensils of the first category are not durable, presumably because they are made of materials which decay rapidly, whereas utensils of the second category, even though customarily discarded, could well be retained for use over a significant period of time. The distinguishing factor with regard to laws of ritual impurity is not the number of times the utensil is used but the utensil's potential for sustained use.
ס״ד
64Rabbi Bluth does, however, find another reason for exempting some disposable utensils from immersion. A utensil which is used only once because of its flimsy composition is, in his opinion, not to be considered a "vessel" but rather the "shell" or protective covering of the food. As such, the aluminum in which the food is contained is deemed an appendage of the food rather than a "vessel" possessing independent status.3See also R. Zevi Cohen, Tevilat Kelim (Jerusalem, 5738) 1:7.
ס״ה
65Rabbi Moses Feinstein, in an addendum appended to this article, apparently questions whether these considerations are applicable with regard to aluminum utensils currently in use. Rabbi Feinstein opines that aluminum utensils which cannot possibly be used more than "two or three times" do not require immersion prior to use. However, he recognizes the possibility that, in point of fact, such utensils might well be reused a greater number of times, but are discarded only because they are inexpensive and hence are replaced simply to avoid bother. When this is indeed the case, concludes Rabbi Feinstein, such utensils require immersion prior to use.
ס״ו
66Rabbi Menasheh Klein, Mishneh Halakhot, VII, no. 111, disputes the basic contention that utensils designed for immediate disposal do not require immersion. Rabbi Klein rules that immersion is required even for utensils designed to be used on but a single occasion.
ס״ז
67Immersion of Toasters
ס״ח
68Utensils purchased by a Jew from a non-Jew require immersion in a mikveh prior to use in conjunction with the preparation or eating of food. The relevant halakhot are recorded in Yoreh De'ah 120. The immersion of an electrical utensil such as a toaster presents a practical problem since contact with water may cause damage to the appliance.
ס״ט
69In responsa published in Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De'ah, I, nos. 67 and 68, in discussing immersion of electrical appliances in general, without specific mention of a toaster, Rabbi Moses Feinstein rules that only that portion of the appliance used for cooking need be immersed. Rabbi Feinstein rules that the portion used for cooking should be immersed in the mikveh and covered with water, but that the portion in which the electrical wiring is housed need not come into contact with the water. Rabbi Feinstein reasons that the appliance is, in effect, composed of two separate utensils: one in which cooking or baking takes place and a second which serves as a housing unit for the electrical wiring. The latter utensil does not come into contact with food and hence does not require immersion.4Cf., R. Ya‘akov Breisch, Ḥelkat Ya‘akov, II, no. 61, and R. Yitzchak Ya‘akov Weisz, Minḥat Yiẓḥak, II, no. 72, who maintain that electrical appliances must be completely immersed. See also R. Shmuel ha-Levi Wosner, Shevet ha-Levi, Yoreh De‘ah, I, no. 57, sec. 3 and R. Zevi Cohen, Tevilat Kelim (Jerusalem, 5738) 11:51.
ע׳
70More recently, in the sixth issue of Am ha-Torah, (5737), a publication sponsored by the Zeirei Agudath Israel, Rabbi Feinstein addresses himself specifically to the question of whether or not toasters require immersion at all. Rabbi Feinstein rules that toasters, as distinct from other electrical appliances, do not require immersion. Rabbi Feinstein argues that a toaster is not included in the category of "utensils used in conjunction with a meal" because bread is perfectly edible without benefit of toasting.5Ḥelkat Ya‘akov, I, no. 126, and II, no. 61, sec. 3, argues that such utensils are exempt from immersion because they are “attached to the ground” by means of an electrical cord. See also R. Isaac Liebes, Teshuvot Bet Avi, I, no. 114. This view is rejected by R. Weisz in Minḥat Yiẓḥak, II, no. 72, and Ha-Ma’or, Av 5716; R. Meir Amsel, Ha-Ma’or, Iyar 5716 and Tammuz 5716; Shevet ha-Levi, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 57, sec. 3; and Tevilat Kelim, chap. 1, note 16, and chap. 11, note 46. See also R. Ephraim Grunblatt, No‘am, VI (5723), 291. This argument is advanced despite the fact that the vessels used for the heating of water require immersion even though water is certainly potable without cooking. Rabbi Feinstein distinguishes between the two cases by stating that hot water is a matter "of great necessity for all people" while this is not the case with regard to toasted bread.
ע״א
71This ruling is sharply challenged by Rabbi Menasheh Klein in the Kislev 5738 issue of Sha'arei Halakhot, a publication of Yeshiva Bais Shearim.6Similarly, Tevilat Kelim 11:52, citing R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach and R. Shmuel ha-Levi Wosner, rules that toasters require immersion. Hatam Sofer, Yoreh De'ah, no. 120, presents an analysis of the concept of "utensils used in conjunction with a meal." The obligation with regard to the immersion of utensils acquired from a non-Jew is derived from Numbers 31:23. The Bible commands that implements seized as spoils of war in the course of the battle against Midian be kashered, i.e., purged of nonkosher matter absorbed by the utensils, by means of burning in fire or boiling. The obligation to immerse the vessels in a mikveh, in addition to the obligation with regard to kashering, is derived by the Gemara, Avodah Zarah 75b, from a pleonasm in the text. Hatam Sofer indicates that the obligation concerning immersion is coextensive with the obligation concerning kashering, i.e., any utensil which requires kashering prior to use for its designed purpose also requires immersion. Thus the obligation is limited to "utensils used in conjunction with a meal" since only eating implements need be kashered, although such utensils must be immersed even though they are not used for hot foods. Rabbi Klein shows that this analysis of the nature of the obligation concerning immersion is also formulated by Ritva in his commentary on Avodah Zarah 75b and by Issur ve-Hetter, sha'ar 58, no. 83, and may be inferred from Rashi's comments, Avodah Zarah 75b, as well.
ע״ב
72According to this analysis, a toaster clearly requires immersion, argues Rabbi Klein. A used toaster which is acquired from a non-Jew certainly must be kashered since the appliance could readily have been used to toast bread baked with nonkosher shortening or sandwiches containing nonkosher foods. Thus, according to the explanation advanced by Hatam Sofer, a toaster requires immersion in a mikveh as well.
ע״ג
73Rabbi Klein makes no reference to the question of whether the entire toaster need be immersed. However, applying the criteria formulated by Hatam Sofer, it would appear that the entire appliance requires immersion. This is so even if one accepts Rabbi Feinstein's contention that a toaster is, from the point of view of Halakhah, two "vessels" rather than one. According to Hatam Sofer, any implement which requires kashering, ipso factor requires immersion. In a nonkosher appliance, the unit housing the electrical components, unless it is entirely discrete and not physically continguous with the cooking portion proper, would require kashering. The principles governing kashering, which are based upon empirical considerations, render that process a necessity for the entire utensil whenever it is fashioned out of a single piece. This is so despite the fact that in other areas of Jewish law, e.g., laws of ritual defilement, the implement may, on the basis of conceptual considerations, be regarded as two separate vessels. On the basis of Hatam Sofer's analysis it may be argued that since, in the case of a nonkosher toaster, the entire appliance requires kashering, it then follow that, when purchased from a non-Jew, the entire appliance requires immersion in a mikveh. This, of course, is true not only of toasters, but applies with equal cogency to any electrical appliance used in the preparation of food.
ע״ד
74Rabbi Moshe Stern, the Debrecyner Rav, in his Be'er Mosheh, IV, no. 100, assumes without question that electric toasters require immersion but offers a practical suggestion in order to circumvent this requirement.7For additional suggestions see Tevilat Kelim 11:51. Hokhmat Adam 73:13 rules that when immersion of an oversized utensil proves to be too cumbersome a hole may be made in the vessel sufficiently large to render the utensil unusable and thereafter the vessel should be repaired by a Jewish workman. Perforation of the utensil has the effect of nullifying the utensil's status as a "vessel." Since, upon repair, the utensil regains status as a "vessel" through the workmanship of a Jew it is exempt from the requirement for immersion. Rabbi Stern suggests that the toaster be taken apart in a manner that will require a repairman to put it together again. A disassembled utensil which requires the skill of an artisan for reassembly also loses the status of a "vessel." Following reassembly by a Jewish workman the toaster no longer requires immersion in a mikveh.
ע״ה
75Rabbi Stern also reports that he has been advised by electricians that if the toaster is not used for a period of two days following immersion no damage will occur. This period should be sufficient to allow for the drying of electrical wires and the evaporation of any remaining drops of water.
ע״ו
76Netilat Yadayim by Soldiers
ע״ז
77The State of Israel's need to maintain a large standing army in a constant state of preparedness has raised questions pertaining to the applicability of various provisions of Jewish law dealing specifically with soldiers engaged in battle. Such questions arise with regard to many diverse facets of personal and military life governed by halakhic regulations. The Tevet 5736 issue of Ha-Ma'ayan features an article by Rabbi Shiloh Raphael in which he examines a ritual question; viz., the obligation of washing the hands before meals as it applies to members of Israel's armed forces.
ע״ח
78The Mishnah, Eruvin 17a, enumerates four provisions of Jewish law from which dispensation is granted to soldiers engaged in warfare. The washing of hands before partaking of bread is, in ordinary circumstances, mandated by virtue of rabbinic decree. Such washing of the hands is, however, one of the enumerated obligations from which soldiers are exempted. The question to be resolved is whether this exemption is limited solely to personnel engaged in combat or whether the exception is more inclusive in nature.
ע״ט
79Rabbi Raphael maintains that the exemption is a broad one and bases his contention upon two considerations. In the first place, the Mishnah, in delineating these exceptions, speaks of a maḥaneh, or camp. While many early authorities maintain that the exemption applies only to soldiers, Maggid Mishneh, Hilkhot Eruvin 1:3 and Bi'ur ha-Gra, Oraḥ Hayyim 168:8, demonstrate that at least several authorities are of the opinion that the term "camp" employed by the Mishnah encompasses not only military camps but any type of encampment in which dwellers are deprived of the usual amenities of developed areas. Secondly, Rabbi Raphael demonstrates that, according to all authorities, soldiers are exempt not only when actually engaged in military action but also when preparing for military activity. Accordingly, Rabbi Raphael concludes that these provisions apply not only to combat soldiers but also to border patrols and other paramilitary units as well.
פ׳
80This cogent conclusion notwithstanding, not every soldier is exempt from the obligation with regard to washing the hands. Rabbi Isaac ha-Levi Herzog, Heikhal Yizḥak, Oraḥ Hayyim, no. 47, states that members of the armed forces assigned to urban centers or quartered in permanent camps in areas where there is no tension are not included in this exemption. Dispensation from washing the hands is occasioned by the hardship encountered in military camps and does not apply to situations in which usual amenities are readily available.
פ״א
81Rabbi Raphael also discusses a further limitation upon this exemption. The exemption from the obligation with regard to washing the hands applies only to a "camp," but not to individual soldiers. The term "camp," by definition, refers to a group of not less than ten individuals as indicated by the Palestinian Talmud, Eruvin 1:10. Hazon Ish, Eruvin, Likkutim 112:6, asserts that the ten persons who constitute the "quorum" for a camp must be located within a geographical area of not less than approximately 71 ells. Thus, soldiers enroute to their units are not covered by the statutory exemption until they reach their camp. Moreover, declares Hazon Ish, qualifications for inclusion in the "quorum" of ten are identical with those for inclusion in a minyan for purposes of prayer. It would thus follow that, according to Hazon Ish, female units are not exempt from this obligation. An interesting question which merits further investigation is the question of whether or not female personnel serving together with a unit consisting of at least ten males are also exempt from this obligation.
פ״ב
82Even when soldiers are exempt from the ritual of washing the hands it would appear that, according to Mishnah Berurah 158:36, they are obligated to wear gloves or to wrap their hands in a cloth, if available, in order to avoid touching food with unwashed hands. According to Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 163:1, both hands must be covered, while according to Rema, loc. cit., the only requirement is that the hands do not touch the food. Thus, according to Rema, only the hand which touches the food need be covered or, alternatively, food may be eaten with a fork. However, Arukh ha-Shulḥan, Oraḥ Hayyim 168:14, asserts that the exemption from washing the hands is all-encompassing and that soldiers are not obligated even to cover unwashed hands with a cloth. This appears to be the opinion of Bet Yosef, Oraḥ Hayyim 163, as well.
פ״ג
83When, however, water is readily available within the camp, Perishah, Oraḥ Hayyim 168:8, maintains that soldiers are required to wash the hands in the usual fashion. Rabbenu Yonatan, in his commentary on Eruvin 17a, indicates that soldiers are obligated to perform this ritual even in situations in which there is no water within the camp itself but in which water is available within a radius of a mil. Following Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 459:2 and Yoreh De'ah 69:6, Rabbi Raphael defines a mil as the distance which can be traversed by an average person within a period of 18 minutes. However, some authorities assert that a mil is to be measured as the distance covered in 22.5 minutes, while others state that the correct time measurement is 24 minutes. Mishnah Berurah, Bi'ur Halakhah 459:2, rules that normative halakhic practice is in accordance with the opinion that a mil is measured as the distance traversed in 22.5 minutes. Rabbi Raphael raises one further consideration. He suggests that, according to the view of Rabbenu Yonatan, the distance to be measured should be calculated as that which can be travelled within the specific period of time by a motor vehicle, if available. Thus, if water could be brought from a distance of 22.5 minutes travel-time the exemption would not be operative. Rabbi Raphael himself rejects this position and argues that soldiers are obligated to wash their hands before eating only if water is available within the camp itself, but that they are not obligated to journey even a minimal distance by car or by foot for this purpose.
פ״ד
84Ẓizit for Nylon and Polyester Garments?
פ״ה
85Modern technology has devised a host of synthetic fibers which to a large extent have replaced natural materials in the manufacture of clothing. Garments made of these materials are often lighter, cooler, cheaper, and more easily laundered than clothes made of natural fibers. The selfsame advantages have prompted purveyors of religious items to utilize manmade fibers in the manufacture of the four-cornered tallit katan. Indeed, a tallit katan of polyester is at present more readily available than one of cotton. There are, however, those who question whether four-cornered garments made of such synthetic materials require zizit. If not, the blessing may not be pronounced upon donning the garment and such a tallit katan, since it is worn solely in order to enable the wearer to fulfill a mizvah, serves no purpose. The question whether nylon or polyester may be used as a tallit katan is examined in detail by Rabbi Benjamin Silber of Bnai Brak in two articles which appeared in the Heshvan and Adar II-Nisan 5736 issues of the Israeli journal, Ma'ayan ha-Torah, published by the Pressburg Yeshiva, Shevet Sofer. The Elul 5735-Tishri 5736 and Adar I 5736 issues of this journal also feature articles by Rabbi Nathan Gestetner and Rabbi Zevi Domb dealing with this question. The matter is also discussed by Rabbi Silber in his commentary on Hayyei Adam, Bet Barukh, no. 11, p. 230, as well as in his Oz Nidberu, VII, nos. 52-54. Earlier discussions of this question appear in Rabbi Zevi Pesach Frank, Har Ẓevi, Oraḥ Hayyim, I, no. 9; Rabbi Yonatan Steif, Teshuvot Mahari Shteif, no. 27; Rabbi Moses Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Oraḥ Hayyim, II, no. 1; and Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, Ẓiz Eli'ezer, XII, no. 3.
פ״ו
86It is clear that not all materials require zizit. The Gemara, Menaḥot 40b, specifically excludes leather garments from this obligation. Levush 10:4 explains that only a "begged" or "garment" requires zizit. In terms of its halakhic definition, a begged must be made of woven cloth; a four-cornered item of clothing made of solid, unwoven material such as leather is not considered to be a begged, and is, therefore, exempt from zizit. Accordingly, Rabbi Frank rules that a nylon garment may be used as a tallit katan provided it is made of cloth woven from nylon thread, as is usually the case. Rabbi Frank states, however, that should such a garment be made of a single sheet of unwoven nylon it would be exempt from zizit as is a garment of leather.
פ״ז
87Rabbi Feinstein presents an opposing view in ruling that all garments made of synthetic materials are exempt from zizit. In his view, all such garments are comparable to leather garments by virtue of the fact that these materials can be synthesized in the form of solid sheets which can then be cut and sewn as garments without need for weaving. Garments made of solid, unwoven material are, according to Rabbi Feinstein, certainly exempt from zizit. Rabbi Feinstein argues that garments made of synthetic fiber are exempt even if a solid bolt of man-made material is produced as the product of the manufacturing process and is only subsequently cut into threads and then woven into cloth.
פ״ח
88As evidence he cites the statements of Rashi and Bertinoro in their respective commentaries on the Mishnah, Kelim 27:1, pertaining to garments fashioned of thin, woven strips of leather. Such leather garments, declare Rashi and Bertinoro, are not subject to the ritual defilement associated with "woven" garments. Since the weaving process is not essential in light of the fact that the garments could be fashioned from the original whole piece of leather, the process of cutting the leather into strips and later weaving the strips into a garment does not give it the status of a "woven" garment. This line of reasoning applies to garments made of synthetic materials as well, argues Rabbi Feinstein. Since, when such materials are used, weaving is not essential to the making of the garment, the garment— even when in fact it is woven—is exempt from zizit. Moreover, argues Rabbi Feinstein, the garment is exempt from zizit not only in cases in which the material is synthesized in large pieces which are then cut into thread from which cloth is woven but also when the original product is synthesized in the form of thread at the very beginning of the production process and subsequently woven into cloth. Rabbi Feinstein opines that since the material could have been synthesized in sheet form rather than as thread, a garment made of such material is not to be considered a "begged."
פ״ט
89Rabbi Gestetner adduces sources in an endeavor to show that a "begged" must, by definition, be fashioned from materials derived from either vegetable or animal matter. Materials composed of inorganic matter are, according to this thesis, excluded from the category of "begged." Rabbi Silber disputes this conclusion and contends, arguendo, that if such a distinction were valid it would be limited to a definition of "begged" for matters of ritual impurity but entirely irrelevant to the concept of a "begged" which requires zizit.
צ׳
90Rabbi Yonatan Steif advances a rather curious argument in support of the position that garments made of synthetic materials are exempt from zizit. Menaḥot 39b cites specific biblical references to linen and wool as the materials of which "garments" are woven. The Gemara then proceeds to query, "Whence can garments of camel hair or rabbit hair, or goats' hair, or of raw silk or floss-silk or fine silk be added?" In answer, the Gemara cites the redundant phrase "or a garment" (Lev. 13:47). It is usually assumed that the materials enumerated by the Gemara are simply common examples of materials used in weaving garments but that that list is by no means exhaustive. Rabbi Steif, however, maintains that the enumerated materials exhaust the category of begged; other materials are not mentioned because they are not beggadim. According to this position, even other natural fibers not recorded in this list are exempt from zizit.
צ״א
91This argument might perhaps be entertained if it is ruled that materials other than wool and linen require zizit only by virtue of rabbinic ordinance; the Sages may then have included in their decree only materials in common use at the time and may have done so by the process of enumerating only specific materials with the intention of excluding all others. However, if the materials enumerated in Menaḥot 39b require zizit by virtue of biblical law, as Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 9:1, does rule, the argument is difficult to fathom. The materials which are listed are not specifically enumerated in Scripture but require zizit because they are considered to be within the category of begged by virtue of a pleonasm which is general in denotation. There is no reason to assume that the reference is to one type of material and not to another, provided, of course, that such materials possess the stated characteristics of begged.
צ״ב
92Rabbi Silber takes issue with the position of both Rabbi Feinstein and Rabbi Frank and maintains that garments made of synthetic material require zizit no less than those made of natural fibers. He recognizes no distinction between garments made of synthetic thread and those cut directly from sheets of synthetic material.8This is also the position of Rabbi Y. E. Henkin, Am ha-Torah, no. 10, p.7. Rabbi Henkin offers a somewhat different explanation for the exclusion of leather from the obligation of ẓiẓit. The arguments of those who disagree, Rabbi Silber points out, are based primarily on the phraseology of the Levush who states that a "begged," by definition, must be made of woven material. Rabbi Silber cites Mishnah Berurah 10:11 which omits any reference to weaving in citing Levush. According to Rabbi Silber, "weaving" is not a necessary condition of what constitutes a begged but is simply a generalization used to exclude materials which do not constitute a begged. Leather is exempt, argues Rabbi Silber, because by its nature it does not generate warmth. Since it is not generally used for the making of clothing it is not deemed to be a "begged" even if it is fashioned into an article of clothing. This is so even if the leather is first cut into strips and then woven into a garment. That leather is not considered to be a begged is manifest from the phrase "a garment or leather" (Leviticus 11:32). Reference to a "a garment (begged) or leather" as separate entities demonstrates that leather, by definition, is not deemed to be a begged. Since synthetic fibers do provide warmth and are commonly used in the manufacture of clothing, a garment made of synthetic material, argues Rabbi Silber, should be considered a begged and such a garment requires zizit if it is four-cornered in shape. Furthermore, argues Rabbi Silber, since synthetic cloth is manufactured by a process which causes separate particles to adhere to one another, this process is comparable to weaving cloth out of individual strands of thread. Such materials are significantly different from leather which comes into being as a single entity. The term "woven" as used by Levush, argues Rabbi Silber, is intended simply to exclude that which is fashioned from a single piece, e.g., leather. According to Rabbi Silber, nylon or polyester may be used in the making of a tallit katan.
צ״ג
93The basic contention that the term "begged" does not refer exclusively to a garment made of woven material is borne out by Rambam's ruling, Kelim 1:11, to the effect that cloth made of pressed or matted (but unwoven) materials is considered to be in the category of begged "for all purposes." This is also stated explicitly by Rabad in his commentary on Torat Kohanim, Parshat Shemini 6:8.9See also Ḥatam Sofer, VI (Likkutim), no. 81 and sources cited by R. Yitzchak Ya‘akov Weisz, Minḥat Yiẓḥak, IV, no. 118, which indicate that, practically speaking, paper cannot be made into a garment but were it possible to do so—as indeed is the case at present, for example, with regard to disposable swimming suits and the like—a paper garment would be deemed a begged for purposes of ritual impurity.
צ״ד
94Rabbi Waldenberg maintains that only leather is excluded from the obligation of zizit and requires that zizit be affixed to garments made of synthetic materials. He further states that this is most certainly the case when the synthetic material is produced in the form of thread which is then woven into cloth.
