בעיות הלכתיות עכשוויות, כרך ב, חלק ראשון, פרק א: שבת ומועדיםContemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol II, Part I, Chapter I Sabbath and Festivals
א׳
1Whosoever prays on Sabbath eve and recites "And the heavens and the earth were completed" (Genesis 2:1) is accounted by Scripture as if he became a partner to the Holy One, blessed be He, in the work of creation.
ב׳
2SHABBAT 119a
ג׳
3Diverse aspects of the Sabbath experience find expression in the various biblical texts which serve as the basis of this commandment. The Decalogue is recorded twice in the Torah. The first presentation of the Ten Commandments in Exodus 20 occurs in conjunction with the narrative concerning the receiving of the Torah at Mount Sinai; the second is contained in the valedictory of Moses and recorded in Deuteronomy 5. The two versions differ radically with regard to the formulation of the commandment concerning Sabbath observance. In Exodus 20:8 the Torah reports that the first tablet contained the exhortation: "Zakhor et yom ha-Shabbat le-kadesho—Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy." The underlying rationale of the commandment follows immediately: "Six days shall you labor and do all your work; but the seventh is a Sabbath unto the Lord your God…for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that is in them and He rested on the seventh day…." In this context Shabbat is firmly rooted in the creation of heaven and earth and it is the act of creation which we are bidden to remember through observance of the Sabbath. The word zakhor—remember—has a historical flavor, referring to events of the distant past; we are told to refer back to past history, to the six days in which God created heaven and earth. Thus the Sabbath stands as an eternal memorial to the very first Shabbat—Shabbat Bereshit—the Sabbath of creation.
ד׳
4In Deuteronomy 5:12 the admonition is couched in different terms. "Shamor et yom ha-Shabbat le-kadesho—Observe the Sabbath day to keep it holy." The rationale incorporated in this formulation is a completely different one: "And you shall remember that you were a servant in the land of Egypt and the Lord your God brought you out of there with a mighty hand and with an outstretched arm; therefore the Lord your God commanded you to keep the Sabbath day." Here the Torah bids us remember that we were once slaves in Egypt and emphasizes that it was to this end that God commanded us to institute the Sabbath.
ה׳
5The connection between Shabbat and our one-time slavery in Egypt is far from apparent. Passover is readily and obviously accepted as a festival of deliverance; other festivals are born of the peoplehood of Israel which became a reality at the heels of the pursuing Egyptian hordes and hence are properly referred to as "a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt." But in what sense are we to understand the Sabbath as a memorial to our enslavement in Egypt? Although there appears to be no intrinsic connection between the seventh day of the week and the Exodus, yet so fundamental is this relationship that the Gemara, Pesaḥim 117b, states that the clause "zekher li-zi'at mizrayim—a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt" is indispensable in the formula of the kiddush of Shabbat eve. Omission of this phrase is equivalent to nonrecitation of the kiddush and consequently one who has failed to make proper mention of the Exodus is deemed to be remiss in discharging his obligation with regard to recitation of kiddush. Surely, then, the Sages recognized an intrinsic relationship between Shabbat and the Exodus.
ו׳
6The continual recurrence of the Sabbath at the close of each seven-day cycle is a perpetual testimony not merely to the act of creation but, since creation presupposes a Creator, to the very existence of the Creator of the universe. For generations the Sabbath was imbued with this meaning alone and throughout the millenia preceeding the Exodus, Shabbat, in its simplicity, testified solely to the existence of the Deity. In subsequent ages, Shabbat was to serve as testimony to yet another principle of faith.
ז׳
7The Shabbat before Passover is commonly known as "Shabbat ha-Gadol—the Great Sabbath." One of the reasons given for this distinctive appellation is that in the year of the Exodus the tenth day of Nisan fell on a Shabbat. The Jews in Egypt were commanded to purchase animals to be used for the first paschal sacrifice. Although not to be slaughtered until the fourteenth day of the month, the animals were bought from the Egyptians four days previously. The purpose for which those animals were acquired was by no means a secret. Boastfully, the Jews taunted the Egyptians and demonstrated that the animals deified by Egypt were powerless to prevent their own slaughter. In the natural course of events the Egyptians might have been expected to rise to the occasion and to wreak havoc upon their tormentors. But miraculously they found themselves incapable of causing the slightest harm to the Jews in their midst. This miracle, and with it the miracle of the Exodus itself, began to unfold on the Shabbat preceding yezi'at mizrayim. From that day on, the day of the "great" miracle, divine providence was accepted as an empirical verity. Not only the Jewish people but all inhabitants of the world became aware of the truth of providence and with it of divinely bestowed reward and punishment. Until that moment the world could well accept the principle of Shabbat Bereshit and yet consider the Deity to to be a transcendental God who created the universe but who was no longer involved in, or concerned with, its daily activities. With the inability of the Egyptians to prevent the Jews from making active preparation to slaughter the animals deified by the Egyptians, it became publicly manifest that God has not withdrawn from the world and that He continues to exercise providence over His creatures.
ח׳
8In positing the doctrine of continuous creation the Sages affirm that in the absence of ongoing providence the world could not remain in existence. They describe God's activity by stating that "in His beneficence He renews continually each day the work of creation." "Ve-atah meḥayeh et kulam— You give life to all of them" (Nehemiah 9:6) is understood quite literally as acknowledging that God infuses His creation with life. God is constantly bestowing the very essence of existence upon everything in the universe. "Being" is portrayed as itself contingent upon divine being. The relationship between the Creator and the world is not analogous to the relationship between an artisan and the artifact which he has created. An artisan simply creates a vessel but does not enter into an ongoing relationship with it; qua artisan he neither manifests further interest regarding its ultimate disposition nor feels ongoing concern with regard to how it may fare when exposed to the vicissitudes of time. As far as the artifact is concerned it has no further need for the ministrations of the artisan. With God the opposite is true. God did not simply create the world in the beginning of time; rather He recreates the world every single moment and thus maintains the universe in existence. Without His continuous concern the world would be reduced to nothingness.
ט׳
9"Zakhor ve-shamor be-dibbur eḥad ne'emru," declares the Gemara, Rosh ha-Shanah 27a. The two formulations of the commandment concerning Shabbat were uttered simultaneously. Zakhor is impossible without shamor; they are two sides of the same coin. The world could not have remained in existence and its mode of creation could not be remembered for long if not for the fact that God constantly watches over it. This concept is embodied in the second formulation of the Ten Commandments and the "single utterance" was employed in order to teach man that the original creation and continuous creation are one and the same. Before the Exodus man was incapable of perceiving this verity. In any earlier period it would simply have been beyond his understanding. Only after man had perceived divine providence could he recognize the all-enveloping nature of this providence and that it guides not only his daily life but his very existence.
י׳
10Sabbath Candles for Young Girls
י״א
11The kindling of Sabbath candles is one of the most widespread of ritual observances and is even practiced in countless homes where observance of other ceremonies and rituals has lapsed. Indeed, the presence of Sabbath candlesticks is commonly recognized as a distinctive feature of a Jewish household.
י״ב
12Although every adult Jew, both male and female, is obligated to kindle Sabbath lights, in practice, the mistress of the house discharges this obligation on behalf of all who share her home and table. Indeed, the husband has no right to preempt this mizvah and deprive his wife of this privilege (see Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Hayyim 263:6). In contradistinction to the provisions pertaining to lighting the Chanukah menorah, it is not deemed an enhancement of the mizvah for each person individually to kindle Sabbath candles. The function of the Chanukah menorah is pirsumei nisa—publicization of the miracle. Accordingly, the greater the number of menorot kindled, the greater the publicization of the miracle. This consideration is absent with regard to Sabbath candles and hence individual kindling of Sabbath lights is not deemed to be of particular merit.
י״ג
13At no time was it common practice for unmarried girls living at home to kindle Sabbath candles in addition to those lit by the mistress of the house. Such a custom did, however, exist in some circles, particularly among members of the immediate families of a number of Hasidic rebbeyim. Of late, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, has repeatedly urged that this practice be adopted by all unmarried women. In public discourses he has stressed the importance of this mizvah as well as its pedagogical value and has dwelled upon the mystical ramifications of the kindling of Sabbath candles. Many have perceived yet another reason for this call. In recent years, the number of ba'alei teshuvah, persons "returning" to observance of the tenets of Judaism, has increased phenomenally. The vast majority of these ba'alei teshuvah are young men and women. The Lubavitch movement has been extremely active on campuses throughout the country and has been highly influential in augmenting the ranks of ba'alei teshuvah; many of these young people were raised in homes in which Jewish observances have been virtually nonexistent and, frequently, the lighting of Sabbath candles is one of the first observances introduced into the home by a daughter or son. It is, of course, entirely proper for an unmarried girl (or, for that matter, an unmarried boy) to kindle Sabbath candles in a home where the mother does not observe this practice. In such circumstances, the girl (or boy) is duty-bound to discharge her (or his) own obligation in this regard—and in doing so effects a fulfillment of this mizvah on behalf of the entire family. Moreover, in this way, Sabbath atmosphere is introduced into the home. Insofar as ba'alei teshuvah are concerned, lighting of candles by unmarried girls is applauded by all. Rabbi Schneerson, however, advocates that even in observant families girls be introduced to the practice at approximately the age of three.
י״ד
14Innovation, whether in law or custom, invariably poses questions of halakhic propriety. Kindling of Sabbath candles by unmarried girls is no exception. A number of these questions are briefly discussed by an adherent of Lubavitch, Rabbi Sholom Dov Ber Levine, in a pamphlet entitled Nerot Shabbat Kodesh. (The initial letters of this title, prominently high-lighted on the cover of the brochure, form the acronym neshek [ammunition], symbolizing the role ascribed to the Sabbath candles in the campaign for enhanced and expanded religious observance.) This innovation has been opposed by the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, whose views are expressed in a contribution to the Iyar 5735 issue of the Sephardic Torah journal, Or Torah, which also contains other contributions on this topic. A negative view is also voiced by Rabbi Meir Blumenfeld of Newark in the Shevat and Iyar 5735 issues of the same publication and in his commentary on Psalms, Sha'ar ha-Melekh, III, 191-195.1This innovation is also opposed by R. Benjamin Silber, Oz Nidberu, VI, nos. 67-68 and hashmattot, pp. 155-156; and ibid., VII, no. 3. Unfortunately, these items, which, for the most part, decry the innovation, generally fail to present a clear formulation of the questions involved and betray a lack of analytic clarity. A positive view is expressed by Rabbi Moshe Havlin of Ashkelon in a contribution to the Heshvan 5736 issue of Or Torah. Quite apart from his conclusions, Rabbi Havlin's discussion is, to date, the most precise and accurate analytic treatment of the issues posed.
ט״ו
15The mizvah of Sabbath lights is a rabbinic enactment designed to serve a practical end. In the absence of illumination people might easily "stumble over wood or stone." Since fire may not be kindled on the Sabbath it was necessary to ordain that light be kindled before the onset of Shabbat. This rabbinic decree imposes a two-fold obligation: 1) a personal obligation devolving upon every Jew to honor the Sabbath through the lighting of Sabbath lights; 2) an obligation requiring lights to be kindled in every dwelling in order to prevent stumbling over objects of "wood or stone." The two-fold nature of this obligation is evidenced by the regulation recorded in Oraḥ Hayyim 263:7 pertaining to married men who are away from home over the Sabbath. A wife lighting candles at home discharges the personal obligation both for herself and for her husband. The husband, spending Shabbat with an innkeeper, is not obligated to light candles. If, however, he has a private room for eating and sleeping, the husband must himself light candles because he is deemed to have established an independent domicile even though his personal obligation has been discharged by his wife's kindling. In the event that the wife for some reason does not light candles at home, the husband, even though he does not have private accommodations, is obligated to light candles himself, or to participate in the innkeeper's kindling of Sabbath lights by sharing the expense of the purchase of candles.
ט״ז
16Insofar as the lighting of candles by girls is concerned, it is clear that the obligation with regard to the "home" is fulfilled by the mother's candles. The question is, then, whether the unmarried daughter may choose to fulfill her personal obligation through her own kindling, rather than vicariously discharging her obligation through her mother. The crucial question is not whether she may light the candles (since such kindling, if it does not constitute the fulfillment of a mizvah, is simply a discretionary act of no ritual significance) but whether or not she may pronounce the blessing. If the kindling of Sabbath lights by the daughter does not constitute the fulfillment of a mizvah, the blessing is a brakhah le-vatalah, an improper invocation of the divine name, and is prohibited.
י״ז
17The locus of this question is to be found in a controversy betwen Shulḥan Arukh and Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 263:8. The question there concerns a situation in which two or more householders or families share a single dining room as is commonly the case when, for example, married children visit parents for Shabbat. Shulḥan Arukh cites two opinions, one of which maintains that only one of the women should pronounce the blessing prior to lighting the Sabbath candles. According to this opinion, the second woman is precluded from pronouncing the blessing. The reasoning is that since lights have already been kindled by the first woman there is no longer danger of stumbling in the dark and the second kindling is redundant in nature. A second view maintains that both women may pronounce the blessing since the enhanced illumination adds to the enjoyment of the Sabbath and hence does constitute a fulfillment of the mizvah. Shulḥan Arukh, after recording both conflicting opinions, concludes that since there is doubt with regard to the propriety of both women pronouncing the blessing it is proper that only one of the women pronounce the blessing. Rema, however declares that it is our custom for both women to kindle the Sabbath lights and for both to recite the blessing. Common practice (at least among Ashkenazic Jews) is indeed for each woman to kindle the Sabbath candles and to pronounce the blessing.
י״ח
18Several of the contributors to Or Torah argue that, in keeping with the view expressed by Shulḥan Arukh, although both mother and daughter may kindle Sabbath candles, they should not both recite the blessing. The situation of a mother and daughter both kindling is comparable to that of the "two householders" cited by Shulḥan Arukh. As these writers correctly note, this consideration is of particular significance to Sephardic Jews who, in the case of a dispute between Shulḥan Arukh and Rema, customarily follow the opinion of Shulḥan Arukh.
י״ט
19Rabbi Levine and Rabbi Havlin both point out that under contemporary conditions the Sabbath candles are not usually the only source of light. Ordinarily, electric lights are turned on before Shabbat and are already lit when the Sabbath candles are kindled. It may well be argued that, since according to those authorities who maintain that the "second householder" may not recite the blessing because his candles are not necessary to prevent "stumbling over wood or stone," it follows that no blessing should be recited in the event that electric lamps are already lit when the Sabbath candles are kindled. Under such circumstances the candles do not significantly enhance the degree of illumination. It is, nevertheless, common practice, among Sephardic Jews as well, to pronounce the blessing even under such circumstances. A prominent Sephardic authority, Kaf ha-Hayyim, Oraḥ Hayyim 263:56, reports that among many Sephardic Jews it was the custom for each of the "two householders" to pronounce the blessing, an indication that in this instance normative practice is at variance with the opinion of Shulḥan Arukh. Accordingly, no objection can be raised against the kindling of candles by unmarried girls on these grounds.2It may also be noted that Arukh ha-Shulḥan, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 263:6, is of the opinion that all authorities are in agreement that when both kindle simultaneously the blessing may be recited by each since both contribute equally to the generation of illumination. According to this latter view, the dispute would be obviated if mother and daughter were to light candles simultaneously.
כ׳
20Moreover, the question does not arise if the daughter lights Sabbath candles in a different room from the mother,3Indeed, this is the method advocated by Rabbi Silber; see above, note 1. especially if there is no other source of illumination in the room in which the daughter lights her candles. Rabbi Yosef's conclusions in this regard are most puzzling. Rabbi Yosef contends that even in such circumstances the daughter should not recite the blessing—he labels the situation an "unnecessary blessing." He compares the situation to the case of several people performing the pre-Passover search for leaven in a single house. All performing the search for leaven are required to be present together while the blessing is recited by one person on behalf of all. Those performing the search do not have the option of pronouncing the blessing individually. Similarly, argues Rabbi Yosef, even if the daughter lights candles in her own bedroom she should not pronounce the blessing herself. Rabbi Yosef fails, however, to note an obvious distinction. The search for leaven is a single mizvah incumbent upon the master of the house; others engaged in the search for leaven are simply his proxies and assist him in the fulfillment of his obligation. Since the cooperative efforts constitute the fulfillment of but a single mizvah only one blessing may be pronounced. The kindling of Sabbath candles, on the contrary, is an obligation incumbent upon every individual and, accordingly, it is logical to assume that each person fulfilling the mizvah personally may pronounce the blessing.4Cf., Rav Pe‘alim, II, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, no. 50.
כ״א
21Yet another complication arises from the fact that mother and daughter are not "two householders" but are members of the same family sharing a single domicile whose obligation is discharged through the kindling by a single member. The question is whether or not any member of the family may decline to fulfill his or her personal obligation through the kindling of another person and thereby obligate himself personally to kindle Sabbath lights. The usual rule is that no mizvah can be discharged contrary to a person's desire. Many authorities maintain that this is the case with regard to Sabbath lights as well. Accordingly, unmarried girls may renounce the option of discharging their obligation through the mother's kindling. They must then light candles themselves and pronounce the requisite blessing. In light of the militant advocacy of this practice on the part of Lubavitch, it is somewhat quixotic that the sole authority who explicitly states that different members of the household may not light Sabbath candles individually and pronounce the blessing is the founder of Habad or Lubavitch Hasidism, R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi. In his halakhic compendium, Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav, Kuntres Aḥaron, Oraḥ Hayyim 263:5, he states that the obligation of kindling Sabbath lights parallels the obligation with regard to the Chanukah menorah. The latter is fundamentally an ordinance requiring the kindling of a single light for each household. The Sages, however, further stipulated that those who seek optimum fulfillment of the mizvah may light individual menorot in order to effect greater publicization of the miracle. Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav argues that in the absence of that consideration the kindling of more than one menorah in each household would be devoid of ritual significance. Under such circumstances, it would follow that only the first person kindling the lights may pronounce the blessing. Since "publicization" does not apply to Sabbath candles, Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav rules that this rabbinic ordinance calls only for the kindling of a single light and, accordingly, it is not proper for different members of the same household to recite the blessing. For this reason, Rabbi Levine recommends that, in the case of a minor girl, the daughter kindle Sabbath candles before her mother does so. Thus, at the time of the mother's kindling, the mizvah has not yet been fulfilled. The child's act serves to fulfill a mizvah and therefore constitutes an act of ḥinnukh or training. Since, however, the mother (and other members of the family) cannot discharge their obligation through the act of a minor, the mother may kindle the candles subsequently and pronounce the blessing without question. Quite evidently, this procedure does not, however, obviate the problem in cases where the daughter is more than twelve years of age. Responding to a similar query but employing a somewhat different line of reasoning, a Sephardic authority, Rav Pe'alim, II, Oraḥ Hayyim, no. 50, required other persons desiring to light Sabbath candles to do so in a different room5See also Arukh ha-Shulḥan, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 263:7. and stipulated that this must be done before the mistress of the house kindles her candles.
כ״ב
22Despite the several divergent views cited, there is little question that insofar as normative psak halakhah is concerned, unmarried girls may readily be permitted to kindle Sabbath candles. At the same time it appears to many that there is no compelling reason for unmarried girls to kindle Sabbath candles if the mother does so.
כ״ג
23It has been argued that minor girls (below the age of twelve) be initiated into this practice for purposes of ḥinnukh or training. This, however, is not a compelling consideration. The normative obligation of ḥinnukh requires not that the father train the child in the performance of the action involved in the performance of a mizvah but that he cause the child to fulfill the mizvah. In the case of Sabbath candles the child, together with all other members of the family, fulfills the mizvah through the kindling of the mother and no further ḥinnukh is required.
כ״ד
24It is understandable that in the absence of a compelling reason many are reluctant to institute an innovative and hitherto uncommon practice. Tradition is itself a strong reason to retain unaltered the practices of previous generations. Nevertheless, no overriding halakhic objections to this practice have been advanced and some may wish to adopt the practice because they deem it to be of positive pedagogic value.
כ״ה
25Whether or not others emulate the example of Lubavitch in this matter, the campaign which they have mounted has certainly been of positive value. Information regarding the mizvah of Sabbath lights has received wide dissemination and the mizvah itself has become potent neshek in inspiring greater commitment to Torah observance.
כ״ו
26Paper Cups for Kiddush
כ״ז
27Modern technology has made available numerous time- and labor-saving devices. Among the oldest and most ubiquitous are inexpensive paper and plastic utensils which have achieved great popularity since their low cost allows them to be discarded after use. In the Elul 5734 issue of Ha-Ma'or, Rabbi Meir Ze'ev Goldberger addresses himself to the question of whether or not paper cups may be used for kiddush on Shabbat and Yom Tov.
כ״ח
28An earlier responsum dealing with this question is included by Rabbi Moses Feinstein in his Iggerot Mosheh, Oraḥ Hayyim, III, no. 39. Rabbi Feinstein is somewhat ambivalent in his answer. Shulḥan Arukh specifies that the kiddush cup must be unbroken and free of cracks. Furthermore, if the cup is attached to a pedestal, the pedestal must be intact as well. Rabbi Feinstein explains that a cracked pedestal disqualifies the utensil for use as a kiddush cup even though the portion serving as a vessel is unbroken because, since the kiddush cup is used in sanctification of the Sabbath, it must be "na'eh," an object of esthetic appeal. Applying this concept to the question at hand, Rabbi Feinstein finds that a kiddush cup designed to be discarded immediately after use cannot be used for purposes of kiddush because it is not held in regard. Nevertheless, concludes Rabbi Feinstein, where no other cup is available, "perhaps leniency is possible." The argument in favor of use of paper cups for kiddush, although not explicitly formulated in Iggerot Mosheh, is that since there is no halakhic requirement that the kiddush cup be possessed of any minimum financial value, or that it be fashioned of any particular material, an attractive cup made of paper may satisfy the halakhic requirements. The fact that the cup is discarded immediately and not preserved for reuse may not be a sign of its intrinsic lack of "value" but rather of the affluence of a society which places a higher premium on convenience than upon preservation of material goods.
כ״ט
29Rabbi Goldberger cites a responsum of another contemporary scholar, Rabbi Ya'akov Lifschitz, Mishnat Ya'akov, I, no. 6, sec. 8, in which the author rules against the use of paper kiddush cups on completely different grounds. Rambam, Hilkhot Kelim 5:7, rules that a utensil fashioned from a horn which is ordinarily discarded after use cannot become ritually impure. According to Rabbi Lifschitz, Rambam's reasoning is that an object designed to be discarded does not merit halakhic designation as a "utensil" (keli). Since only "utensils" are subject to defilement, the horn described by Rambam requires no purification. Similarly, argues Rabbi Lifschitz, since Jewish law prescribes that the kiddush cup must be a utensil, a paper cup which is designed to be discarded immediately after use does not meet the halakhic specification of "utensil" and, therefore, may not be used for this purpose.
ל׳
30Rabbi Goldberger refutes this contention by arguing that it is based upon a misunderstanding of Rambam's reasoning. Going back to the original source of Rambam's ruling, the Mishnah, Kelim 16:5, Rabbi Goldberger argues that an object designed to be discarded cannot become defiled, not because it fails to meet the conditions necessary for designation as a "utensil," but because of a consideration which is applicable only to the laws of defilement. An object designed for impermanent use, argues Rabbi Goldberger, is not deemed susceptible to defilement even though it qualifies as a "utensil." There are indeed other objects which are defined as "utensils" for other halakhic purposes, but are not subject to defilement, e.g., vessels made of stone. Accordingly, concludes Rabbi Goldberger, since paper cups satisfy the criteria of "utensils," they may be utilized for purposes of kiddush.6This is also the opinion of R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Am ha-Torah, no. 10, p. 6; R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Ẓiẓ Eli‘ezer, XII, no. 23; and R. Menasheh Klein, Mishneh Halakhot, VII, no. 111. Cf., the negative opinion of R. Joel Teitelbaum, the late Satmar Rav, cited by R. Zevi Kohn, Tevilat Kelim (Jerusalem, 5728), p. 57, note 10.
ל״א
31Of course, in the performance of mizvot not all that is permissible is optimal. The Sages interpret Exodus 15:2 as an exhortation to perform mizvot in as beautiful and aesthetic a manner as possible.7See also R. Moshe Stern, Teshuvot Be’er Mosheh, III, no. 55, and R. Benjamin Silber, Oz Nidberu, VI, no. 48, and hashmattot, pp. 144-145.
ל״ב
32Photosensitive Eyeglasses
ל״ג
33Photosensitive eyeglasses and sunglasses which darken when exposed to sunlight and lighten when removed from contact with the sun's rays have grown in popularity in recent years. The lenses used in these glasses contain particles which darken in the presence of ultraviolet rays causing the glass to assume either a gray or brown color. Such lenses are marketed by a number of manufacturers of optical lenses under various brand names. In the Heshvan 5738 issue of Or Torah, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, Israel's Sephardic Chief Rabbi, examines the question of whether or not such eyeglasses may be worn on Shabbat in view of the fact that in moving from a shaded area to a sunlit area while wearing such eyeglasses one automatically causes coloration of the lenses.
ל״ד
34Coloring, painting or dyeing constitutes one of the thirty-nine categories of "labor" which are forbidden on the Sabbath. However, Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat 9:15, codifies the provision stating that the biblical prohibition against these activities is limited to engaging in a process which creates a permanent bond between the coloring or dyeing agent and the substance to which it is applied. Processes which lead only to transitory coloration are not biblically proscribed. Accordingly, since the coloring effect of the sun's rays dissipates when the wearer enters enclosed or shaded areas, exposing photosensitive lenses to the sun's rays does not constitute a biblical transgression.
ל״ה
35However, temporary coloration is forbidden by virtue of rabbinic ordinance. This prohibition is exemplified in the ruling of Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 302:25, which forbids the application of rouge or lipstick on Shabbat. The permissibility of wearing photosensitive glasses on Shabbat is contingent upon the question of whether or not wearing such lenses constitutes an infraction of this rabbinic ordinance.
ל״ו
36Rabbi Yosef rules that the wearing of photosensitive sunglasses is permissible without question. The definition and delineation of all categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat is directly related to utilization of similar processes in construction of the Tabernacle and its appurtenances in the wilderness. The coloring or dyeing associated with construction of the Tabernacle involved the use of pigments. Hence the coloring or painting which is forbidden on Shabbat is limited to coloration which results from applying one material substance to another, e.g., purple dye upon wool and the like. Coloration caused by exposure to the sun's rays is not the result of application of a material substance and hence is permissible, particularly, since, in any event, the resultant change in color is not permanent.
ל״ז
37The use of photosensitive sunglasses is also permitted by Rabbi Moses Feinstein in a somewhat cryptic responsum published in his Iggerot Mosheh, Oraḥ Hayyim, III, no. 45.
ל״ח
38Pampers
ל״ט
39Disposable paper diapers (commonly referred to by the popular brand name, Pampers) which in some areas have all but displaced the traditional cloth diaper have proved to be a boon to mothers who hitherto had been forced to choose between spending considerable time in the tedious task of diaper washing or subscribing to a diaper service. The relatively inexpensive paper substitute is discarded immediately after use. An added convenience is the strip of gummed tape, already affixed to one side of the diaper, which is simply pressed firmly to the corresponding side after the diaper is in place. This effectively eliminates the use of safety pins and the attendant danger of piercing either the baby or the diaperer's own finger. It is the use of this tape on Shabbat which presents a halakhic question.
מ׳
40Sewing is one of the thirty-nine categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath. The end result and the purpose for which sewing is undertaken is the fusion of two previously distinct components into a single entity. Other procedures designed to achieve the same effect, when produced by a process other than sewing, are also forbidden as a derivative (toldah) of sewing. Thus, for example, Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat 10:11, rules that the pasting together of two or more pieces of paper or leather by means of glue is forbidden on Shabbat as a derivative of sewing.
מ״א
41The applicability of this principle to the use of disposable diapers on the Sabbath is examined by Rabbi Menasheh Klein, Rosh Yeshivah of Yeshiva Bais Shearim, in the Iyar 5733 issue of the Yeshiva's publication, Sha'arei Halakhot. Rabbi Klein cites Bet Yosef, Oraḥ Hayyim 317, and Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 317:3, who record two conflicting views with regard to whether or not the prohibition against sewing encompasses sewing of stitches which are not designed to be permanent in nature. Some authorities are of the opinion that the category of "sewing" includes only sewing of stitches designed to effect a permanent bond between the articles so joined; temporary stitches designed for subsequent removal do not create such a bond and hence do not fall under this prohibition. Other authorities are of the opinion that permanence is irrelevant and maintain that the act of stitching is forbidden under all circumstances. Since gluing or pasting is classified as an activity forbidden on Shabbat as a derivative of "sewing," it stands to reason that those authorities who view temporary stitching as permissible would also deem pasting for purposes of forming a temporary cohesion to be permissible. Rema rules in accordance with the lenient opinion but admonishes that such actions should not be performed in the presence of the untutored who are likely to be unaware of the distinction between permanent and temporary stitching. It would appear that the same restriction is also applicable with regard to pasting.
מ״ב
42However, Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 440:7, fails to make any distinction between permanent and temporary stitching, thereby implying that even the sewing of temporary stitches is forbidden on Shabbat. Rabbi Klein cites Tehillah le-David 440:6 who opines that this distinction applies only to the biblical prohibition, but that all forms of temporary sewing (and pasting) are rabbinically proscribed.
מ״ג
43Rabbi Klein also suggests a distinction between an act which by virtue of its nature is intrinsically temporary and an act which produces an effect which is permanent in terms of potential durability but is temporary only by virtue of intent. A truly temporary act of sewing (or pasting) he argues, is one which must necessarily become undone of its own accord. Pampers are removed not because the gummed tape becomes ineffective and cannot keep the diaper fastened over an extended period of time but because one desires to change the soiled diaper. The original fastening of the diaper, argues Rabbi Klein, may well be deemed "permanent" rather than temporary.
מ״ד
44Despite these considerations, Rabbi Klein recognizes that according to the opinion of a number of authorities the use of disposable diapers on the Sabbath is not objectionable. In his opinion, however, their use should nevertheless be discouraged because of the reasons indicated.
מ״ה
45Removal of a disposable diaper on Shabbat presents no halakhic problem. Since the diaper is not reusable, removal of the tape is preparatory to disposal of the diaper. Accordingly, since the effect is "destructive" in nature, the gummed strip may be removed in order to change the diaper.
מ״ו
46Automatic Banking Machines
מ״ז
47Many banks in Israel as well as in this country have installed automatic banking machines for the convenience of their customers. These machines, which are available for use twenty-four hours a day, accept deposits and also dispense cash. This makes it possible for a customer to perform banking chores at his convenience at any hour of the day without waiting for the services of a teller. The availability of these services on Shabbat presents a unique set of problems for a Jewish bank. The United Mizrachi Bank, desiring to make automatic banking machines available for the convenience of its customers, turned to the Chief Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Shlomoh Goren with a series of questions. Rabbi Goren's response is published in the 5741 issue of Shanah be-Shanah. The questions presented are:
מ״ח
481. Is it permitted to allow the machines to operate on Shabbat since they are likely to be utilized by non-observant Jewish clients?
מ״ט
492. Is there any prohibition against permitting a machine owned by a Jew to perform acts of labor on Shabbat? A prohibition against allowing the machines to operate on Shabbat would prevent making such machines available even were they to be used only by non-Jews.
נ׳
503. Is it permissible for the bank to charge interest on cash dispensed as a loan by the machines for the use of the money on the Sabbath day? Were the money to be dispensed one day later the interest charged would be computed on the basis of a period beginning one day later. Conversely, in accepting a deposit in an interest-bearing account is it permitted to pay the depositor the additional interest accruing to him for the deposit on the Sabbath? Were the money deposited a day later the depositor would receive interest beginning on the later day.
נ״א
51The problem presented in abetting non-observant Jews in engaging in forbidden financial transactions on the Sabbath is whether such action constitutes a violation of the biblical prohibition "You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). The paradigm discussed by the Gemara is the act of extending a cup of wine to a Nazarite. The Gemara, Avodah Zarah 6b, indicates that the biblical prohibition is operative only if the Nazarite and the wine are on opposite sides of a river. In such a situation it is impossible for the Nazarite to drink the wine without the assistance of the person placing the "stumbling block" before him. When both the Nazarite and the wine are on the same side of the river no biblical transgression is incurred in handing the wine to the Nazarite since he could readily have taken it himself. Rabbi Goren asserts that making banking machines available to non-observant Jews on the Sabbath is comparable to the situation in which both the Nazarite and the wine are on the same side of the river. Since the identical machines are provided by other banks, and presumably by non-Jewish banks as well, in allowing its machines to operate on Sabbath, the Jewish bank does not make possible a transgression which could not otherwise be committed. Nevertheless, Tosafot, Shabbat 3a, followed by other authorities including Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Hayyim 347:4, rule that, even when the transgression could have been performed without assistance, it is forbidden by virtue of rabbinic edict for a Jew actively to aid and abet a transgressor. Although there is disagreement among the authorities with regard to whether or not this rabbinic prohibition extends to rendering assistance to a non-Jew in violating Noachide prohibitions, Shakh, Yoreh De'ah 151:6, declares that all are in agreement that the prohibition includes rendering such assistance even to an apostate Jew.
נ״ב
52The second question, viz., whether or not a Jew is permitted to allow his utensils to be used for labor on Shabbat, is the subject of dispute in the Gemara, Shabbat 18a. The normative position, as recorded by Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat 6:16, and subsequent authorities is that a Jew may permit a non-Jew to use the former's utensils for labor which a Jew is forbidden to perform on Shabbat. Rabbi Goren nevertheless points to a specific provision of Jewish law which prohibits a Jew to allow his possessions to be used for purposes of transgression. The Mishnah, Shevi'it 5:6, declares that during the sabbatical year farming implements which are used exclusively for forbidden agricultural tasks may not be sold to a person suspected of engaging in such proscribed activities. Similarly, an automatic banking machine should not be made available to Sabbath violators. However, here again, the prohibition is not specifically against permitting use of one's property for "labor," but is the selfsame prohibition discussed earlier which forbids one to place a "stumbling block" before the blind or to assist a Jew in transgressing.
נ״ג
53The third problem, viz., whether interest may be charged or credited for withdrawals or deposits on the Sabbath is not an actual one. The prevalent banking practice is not to debit or credit an account for transactions made by means of an automatic machine until the next business day. Thus the problem of forbidden interest charges or payments for the Shabbat day does not arise.
נ״ד
54This response, however, merely begs the question, not simply because it fails to address the hypothetical question concerning a bank which does credit and debit an account on the same day that the automatic banking machine is used for a transaction, but because the identical question arises even if the transaction is completed on a weekday. Banks customarily calculate interest on all deposits and loans on a per diem basis. In doing so they pay and charge interest for use of money on the Sabbath-day even though the actual deposit or loan is made on a weekday. Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Hayyim 306:7, explicitly forbids acceptance of interest or dividends paid expressly for use of funds on the Sabbath.
נ״ה
55The problem posed by a per diem interest rate is discussed by R. Moses Feinstein in a responsum included in the most recent volume of his Iggerot Mosheh. In Iggerot Mosheh, Oraḥ Hayyim, IV, no. 59, Rabbi Feinstein observes that interest is commonly calculated on the basis of a twenty-four hour period beginning and ending at midnight. Hence the interest calculated for any given Saturday necessarily includes interest for a number of hours on Saturday evening subsequent to the conclusion of the Sabbath. Interest under such circumstances is permitted since payment is not specifically for use of money on the Sabbath but includes payment for the use of money on a weekday as well (be-havla'ah).
נ״ו
56Rabbi Feinstein also permits acceptance of interest for the two-day Yom Tov period since, in terms of biblical law, Yom Tov restrictions are limited to only a single day. Two days are observed in the Diaspora because of the doubt which existed before the promulgation of a fixed calendar regarding the day on which Yom Tov actually occurred. Hence, Rabbi Feinstein rules that interest may be accepted for both days since, in actuality, only one day is Yom Tov and interest is accepted for a twenty-four hour period which includes a number of hours which are not Yom Tov. The two days of Rosh ha-Shanah, however, are deemed to be a single "long day" (yoma arikhta) and hence Rabbi Feinstein rules that benefit may not be derived from the interest paid for the day of the civil calendar which falls entirely within the two-day period of Rosh ha-Shanah. For the same reason interest may not be accepted for a similar one-day period when Yom Tov occurs on a Friday or on a Sunday since, under such circumstances, one entire twenty-four hour period contains no segment of a weekday. Rabbi Feinstein advises that the interest paid for such days be anonymously contributed to a charity so that no benefit of any nature be derived by the depositor.
נ״ז
57Rabbi Feinstein's responsum is addressed to a depositor concerned with accepting interest and for that reason does not address itself to the propriety of interest charges on loans calculated in this manner by a Jewish bank. This problem may be obviated by including a clause in the hetter iska agreement stipulating that payments be deemed to accrue on a weekly rather than a daily basis. This would serve to eliminate the problem save for loans which fall due in full during the week following Rosh ha-Shanah or during the week following a Yom Tov which occurs on Friday or on Sunday.
נ״ח
58Elective Surgery Prior to Shabbat
נ״ט
59The Tammuz 5738 issue of Ha-Pardes features a transcript of an address by Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, in which he advises that elective surgery should not be performed during the three days immediately prior to Shabbat, i.e., Wednesday, Thursday or Friday, if it is anticipated that the patient will be hospitalized over Shabbat. The following issue, dated Tishri 5739, contains a statement by the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada announcing that its President, Rabbi Moses Feinstein, has similarly ruled that in matters involving no danger to life it is forbidden to schedule surgery on those days "in situations where it is possible to delay."
ס׳
60This position is based upon a number of considerations:
ס״א
611) Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 248:2, rules that one must not embark upon a sea voyage during this three-day period because the voyage will disrupt "Sabbath delight" (oneg Shabbat). There is no objection to embarcation earlier in the week because subsequent to three days of travel one becomes acclimatized to the motion of the vessel. Rabbi Schneerson argues that routine hospital procedures, not to speak of the pain and discomfort of surgery and post-operative therapy, cause at least as much disruption and discomfort as does a sea voyage and thereby disturbs the Sabbath repose of both the patient and his family.
ס״ב
622) According to many early authorities, sea voyages may not be commenced during this period because of the possibility that desecration of the Sabbath may subsequently become a necessity by virtue of danger to life which may arise. This consideration is germane even if the vessel is manned by non-Jews since a Jew may not normally permit a non-Jew to perform actions on Shabbat on his behalf which the Jew may not himself perform. Concern with regard to creating conditions of danger requiring subsequent suspension of Shabbat restrictions is mandated during the three days preceding Shabbat, but not earlier. This consideration is also cited by Shulḥan Arukh. As explained by Ba'al ha-Ma'or, Shabbat 19a, this prohibition is rooted in the consideration that a person undertaking such a journey appears to the onlooker as being unconcerned with the observance of Shabbat; such lack of concern is not apparent to the on-looker when the journey is undertaken during the early part of the week. This concern applies to surgery performed during this three-day period since post-operative care frequently entails acts ordinarily forbidden on Shabbat.
ס״ג
633) In the course of normal post-surgical care, many procedures are routinely carried out which have no bearing upon alleviation of danger to the patient. Patients frequently find themselves unable to insist that such procedures be postponed until after Shabbat.
ס״ד
64In a footnote appended to his statement, Rabbi Schneerson takes cognizance of the ruling of Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 248:1, to the effect that voyages for purposes of fulfilling a mizvah may be commenced even on Friday. According to Rabbenu Tam, cited by Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 249:4, all voyages other than purely pleasure trips are deemed to be undertaken "for purposes of a mizvah," and certainly preservation of health would be considered a mizvah. Shulḥan Arukh adds, however, than when such a permitted voyage begins within the three-day period it must nevertheless be stipulated in advance with the captain of the vessel that travel will be interrupted for the duration of the Sabbath. Rabbi Schneerson, citing Magen Avraham 248:1, argues that in the absence of such stipulation or in the event that the captain refuses to accept such a stipulation, the trip may not be undertaken. By the very nature of the situation "stipulation," is, of course, impossible with regard to medical treatment on Shabbat. It should be noted, however, that many authorities, among them Mishnah Berurah 248:3, indicate that while such stipulation is to be preferred its absence does not prohibit a Jew from undertaking a voyage "for purposes of a mizvah." Rabbi Schneerson, however, maintains that even according to these authorities such stipulation is not mandatory only in cases in which an opportunity to fulfill the mizvah presents itself for the first time during the three-day period, but did not exist earlier. When, however, the opportunity existed earlier the requirement concerning stipulation cannot be waived. Writing in the same issue of Ha-Pardes, Rabbi Yisrael Piekarski cites authorities who rule that permission to undertake a voyage for fulfillment of a mizvah during this three-day period is limited to situations in which the mizvah cannot be fulfilled at a later date.
ס״ה
65Rabbi Gedalia Felder, writing in the Heshvan 5739 issue of the same journal, cites an example of such an elective procedure which is the source of some controversy. A child dare not be circumcised so long as he is afflicted with any malady, but must be circumcised without delay as soon as he is medically and halakhically deemed to be out of danger. Jewish law provides that circumcision delayed beyond the eighth day may not be performed on Shabbat. But may a child deemed to be fully cured on Thursday be circumcised on that day in light of the fact that the third day, considered to be a day of pain as well as danger for the person circumcised, will fall on the Sabbath and hence it may be necessary to violate Shabbat restrictions on his behalf? Taz, Yoreh De'ah 262:3, cites the opinion of Tashbaz, I, no. 21, and rules that circumcision on Thursday is forbidden under such circumstances; Shakh, Yoreh De'ah 266:18 and Nekudat ha-Kesef 262, disagrees and permits the procedure even on a Thursday. However, even Shakh's permissive ruling is based upon the presence of an immediate, compelling mizvah; he would not have permitted circumcision if not for the halakhic requirement of avoiding delay.
ס״ו
66Of interest is the position of Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Hayyim 331:9. Magen Avraham permits a delayed circumcision to be performed on Thursday "in our day" since under contemporary conditions it is extremely unlikely that violation of Shabbat regulations will be necessary. Magen Avraham appears to be unconcerned with regard to the pain which will ensue on Shabbat.
ס״ז
67Rabbi Felder assumes that the circumcision of a proselyte on Thursday is forbidden even according to Shakh because of the absence of an immediately compelling mizvah and this, indeed, is the opinion of She'ilat Ya'avez, II, no. 95. However, Hakham Ẓevi, addenda, no. 14, permits even the circumcision of a convert on Thursday. The implication of Hakham Ẓevi's position is that such procedures are permitted during the three-day period prior to Shabbat for the sake of any mizvah including, of course, treatment of the sick and preservation of health.
ס״ח
68Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, Ẓiz Eli'ezer, XII, no. 43, also discusses the propriety of undertaking such procedures during the three-day period prior to Shabbat but limits his discussion to the question of surgical procedures for patients who are not presently in danger but whose lives will become endangered at some future time if the operation is not performed. Procedures that are entirely elective are not specifically discussed by Rabbi Waldenberg. Rabbi Waldenberg not only permits the procedures under discussion but urges that they not be delayed both because of possible unforseen dangers to the patient and because of possible need of the hospital bed for other patients. Rabbi Waldenberg argues that the majority of latter-day halakhic authorities have declined to rule according to the opinion of Tashbaz and that most authorities including Shulḥan Aruk ha-Rav 248:1, Hayyei Adam, Hilkhot Shabbat 4:1, and Mishnah Berurah 248:33 rule that the "stipulation" discussed earlier is preferable but not mandatory. Although he does not state so explicitly, Rabbi Waldenberg implies that if no element of danger at all is present the opinion of Tashbaz should be heeded since in the past his opinion was followed in many locales and delayed circumcisions were not performed on a Thursday.
ס״ט
69The argument advanced by Rabbi Schneerson serves to establish that elective surgery which can be planned in advance should be scheduled during the first three days of the week and even postponed in order to schedule surgery for a date early in the following week only "when it is possible to delay," as is carefully stated in Rabbi Feinstein's statement. However, this reasoning does not apply to a situation in which the surgeon regarded as the most competent available or in whom the patient has the greatest confidence is unable or unwilling to operate early in the week. The argument certainly does not apply to a situation in which delay may cause danger to the patient.
ע׳
70Carrying Nitroglycerine on Shabbat
ע״א
71Cardiac patients are often advised by their physicians to carry a supply of nitroglycerine capsules with them at all times. Patients are advised to ingest this medicine, which serves as a vasodilator, at the first sign of chest pain symptomatic of angina pectoris, in order to prevent heart problems of a more serious nature. Observant patients frequently ask whether they may carry this medication with them while going to, and returning from, the Synagogue or when taking a Sabbath stroll. Since the heart condition for which this medication is prescribed is life-threatening in nature, there is no question that, if necessary, Sabbath restrictions may be suspended for treatment of the medical problem. The question of carrying nitroglycerine requires careful investigation only because violation of Sabbath restrictions is not really necessary in order to safeguard the health of the patient: The patient has the option of remaining at home without compromising his health. The general rule is that Sabbath prohibitions may be suspended in cases of pikuaḥ nefesh only if the life-threatening danger cannot be eliminated in another manner.
ע״ב
72A similar question was raised early in the century with regard to carrying identity cards on Shabbat. Carrying identity papers upon one's person at all times was mandated by government decree in some countries, particularly in time of war. Failure to comply with this directive constituted an offense punishable by imprisonment. R. Samuel Engel, author of Teshuvot Maharash Engel, was asked whether it was permissible for Jews to carry these documents on the Sabbath or whether they must restrict themselves to their own homes during the Sabbath in order to avoid either transgression of Sabbath Laws or violation of civil law. Teshuvot Maharash Engel, III, no. 43, permits these documents to be carried on Shabbat, but only in an unusual manner, e.g., under a hat rather than in a pocket. R. Engel further stipulates that this mode of carrying may be utilized only if it is necessary to do so for purposes of fulfilling a mizvah such as communal prayer but may not be utilized in order to leave the house for purposes of a stroll or the like. He argues that "unusual" forms of carrying are forbidden by reason of rabbinic decree rather than by virtue of biblical prohibition. However, he admonishes that even this form of carrying is forbidden in an area which constitutes a public domain, according to the biblical definition of the term, even if failure to carry would prevent performance of a mizvah. According to this authority, carrying identity papers on Shabbat is permissible only if three conditions are satisfied: 1) the area in which carrying is to take place does not possess the criteria of a "public domain" in the biblical sense of the term; 2) the act of carrying is performed in an unusual manner; 3) the purpose of such carrying is the fulfillment of a mizvah. Thus Maharash Engel's permissive ruling does not apply to carrying in order to be able to go for a Shabbat stroll or to carrying in the streets of a major metropolis which, according to all authorities, constitutes a public thoroughfare. Other authorities dispute the permissiveness of even this limited ruling of Maharash Engel.8See R. Zevi Kinstlicher, Teshuvot Be’er Ẓevi, no. 10.
ע״ג
73Maharash Engel is cited by Rabbi Yekutiel Yehudah Greenwald, Kol Bo al Aveilut, II, no. 1, sec. 6, as a precedent for permitting a diabetic to carry sugar cubes on Shabbat for use in case of insulin shock. Rabbi Greenwald stipulates, however, that the sugar be sewn into the garment before Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, in a sharply-worded dissent which appears in the 5737 issue of Torah she-be-al Peh,9Subsequently included in Ẓiẓ Eli‘ezer, XIII, no. 34. argues that the issue to which R. Engel addresses himself does not constitute a paradigm for carrying medicine on Shabbat. Rabbi Waldenberg demonstrates that a careful reading of the responsum in Teshuvot Maharash Engel shows that R. Engel permits the carrying of identity papers under the conditions indicated only because such carrying is in the category of a melakhah she-einah zrikhah le-gufah, i.e., the act of carrying serves no intrinsic need, but serves only to obviate an extrinsic contingency, in this case, possible arrest and imprisonment. Insofar as Sabbath restrictions are concerned, the biblical prohibition against any of the forbidden categories of labor applies only when the intended benefit is derived directly from the forbidden act itself, but not when the purpose is essentially extraneous to the act which is forbidden. However, in the case of sugar cubes or nitroglycerine capsules, the benefit which is derived from the act of carrying is a direct one.
ע״ד
74Rabbi Waldenberg peremptorily dismisses Rabbi Greenwald's suggestion that a sick person sew objects needed for health reasons into the lining of a garment before Shabbat. Carrying in this manner is forbidden by rabbinic decree as is evident from the ruling recorded in Oraḥ Hayyim 301:33. A patient having the option of remaining at home would thus not be permitted to carry in this manner. Rabbi Waldenberg adduces further evidence in showing that a person must remain at home rather than carry medication on the Sabbath. The Sages did permit the wearing of an amulet of demonstrated efficacy, a fact which is cited by Rabbi Greenwald in support of his leniency with regard to carrying sugar. Rabbi Waldenberg argues that this citation is not germane: Such amulets were permitted to be worn because they were deemed "adornments" but were not permitted to be carried by hand. According to Rabbi Waldenberg, carrying sugar or medicine would thus not be permitted even if the only alternative for the patient would be to remain at home during the course of the entire Sabbath day.
ע״ה
75However, a recently published compendium dealing with questions of medical Halakhah, Lev Avraham (Jerusalem, 5737), authored by Dr. Abraham Sofer Abraham, cites a number of conflicting views. Lev Avraham 6:83 cites Rabbi Waldenberg's negative opinion (in fact, Rabbi Waldenberg's contribution to Torah she-be-'al Peh is in the form of a responsum addressed to Dr. Abraham) as well as the permissive view of Rabbi Joshua Neuwirth, author of the popular Shmirat Shabbat ke-Hilkhatah together with a caveat of Rabbi Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach.
ע״ו
76Although Dr. Abraham's comments are cryptic it would seem that, for him, the most cogent ground for permitting a cardiac patient to carry nitroglycerine is that denying him social intercourse on Shabbat is itself a form of pain. Tosafot, Shabbat 50b, opines that isolating oneself from people because of embarrassment is a form of pain and that a person in such a state has the status of a sick person suffering from a nonhazardous malady.10See She‘arim ha-Meẓuyanim be-Halakhah 80:81. Sabbath restrictions which are rabbinic in nature are suspended for a person suffering from a nonhazardous sickness. Therefore, runs the argument, carrying in an unusual manner, which involves a rabbinic rather than a biblical transgression, is permissible in order to obviate the discomfort of isolation over the entire Sabbath.
ע״ז
77Rabbi Neuwirth is quoted as permitting the carrying of nitroglycerine in an unusual manner, but not for the reason advanced by Dr. Abraham. According to Rabbi Neuwirth, medication may be carried in this manner solely for purposes of fulfilling a mizvah.
ע״ח
78Rabbi Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach is quoted as advising the patient carrying medicine in this manner not to come to a stop in the course of walking through a thoroughfare, but to carry directly from one private domain to another without stopping in order to minimize the severity of the restriction which must be suspended for reasons of health. If the patient does come to a stop in the street, Rabbi Auerbach advises that, if possible, the medication should be placed on a ledge higher than ten handbreadths above the ground and then removed by the patient before he continues on his way. Rabbi Auerbach reasons that since, in terms of Halakhah, there exists no "domain" above the height of ten handbreadths, the object is not deemed to have been removed from a "public domain" and the infraction is thus minimized insofar as possible.
ע״ט
79Caffeine Suppositories on Fast Days
פ׳
80An interesting item dealing with alleviation of certain types of headache associated with fasting appears in the February 1977 issue of the New York State Journal of Medicine. The authors, Dr. Morris Shorofsky and Rabbi Norman Lamm, cite medical studies which indicate that a significant number of both heavy and moderate caffeine users experience unpleasant symptoms when caffeine is withdrawn. The most significant symptom is the headache produced by sudden withdrawal of caffeine. Some individuals may also experience nausea, vomiting, mental depression, drowsiness, irritability, and lethargy. The onset of these symptoms occurs approximately twelve to sixteen hours after the last dose of caffeine has been ingested. Subjects commonly reported experiencing lethargy in the morning and headaches beginning early in the afternoon and reaching a peak three to six hours later.
פ״א
81These unpleasant withdrawal symptoms can be avoided in various different ways. One researcher has reported that for some persons headaches can be prevented by a single dose of 150 milligrams of caffeine administered the previous evening. An ordinary cup of coffee contains 100 milligrams of caffeine. Another effective method is to undergo a weaning period prior to the fast. Over a period of one week prior to the fast, coffee consumption should be reduced gradually so that by one or two days prior to the fast no coffee is consumed. A third method involves the use of a suppository containing 150 milligrams of caffeine (300 milligrams of citrated caffeine). The suppository should be used on the morning of the fast.
פ״ב
82The halakhic questions associated with the use of suppositories have been discussed by Rabbi Ya'akov Breisch, Helkat Ya'akov, II, no. 83. It has been established by Teshuvot Maharsham, I, no. 123, and Teshuvot Aḥi'ezer, III, no. 61 that even use of a suppository containing nutrients does not constitute a breach of the fast. Thus there is no question concerning the permissibility of using such suppositories on any of the communal fasts, including the Ninth of Av. However, use of suppositories on Yom Kippur poses a problem of an entirely different nature. Use of medicaments on Shabbat for illnesses which are not serious is forbidden by virtue of rabbinic decree. The consideration underlying this edict is the fear that biblical prohibitions may be transgressed in preparing the medicine. This rabbinic edict prohibits the use of medication on Yom Kippur as well as on the Sabbath. The prohibition does not, of course, apply in situations in which the illness may pose a danger to the patient. Moreover, the prohibition against taking medication does not extend to cases of severe discomfort affecting the "entire body" (i.e., to illnesses in which the person experiences such discomfort that he takes to bed or is incapacitated). Accordingly, rules Rabbi Breisch, caffeine suppositories may be utilized on Yom Kippur only if the headache is extremely severe. Oraḥ Hayyim 328:49 stipulates that when suppositories are used on Yom Kippur they must be inserted gently and by means of a shinuy (i.e., in an unusual manner such as by holding the suppository between two fingers rather than between the thumb and the forefinger).
