על שכל אדם ישר הוא בן חורין ט׳Every Good Man is Free 9
א׳
1IX. [58] I have now said all that appeared to me necessary to prove the proposition, but just as physicians regularly use a greater multiformity of treatment to cure multiform diseases, so when statements regarded as paradoxical are put forward, their unfamiliarity renders it necessary to apply a succession of proofs to bear upon the subject. For some can only be brought to understand under the impact of a continued series of demonstrations.
ב׳
2[59] Thus the following argument is well to the point. He who always acts sensibly, always acts well: he who always acts well, always acts rightly: he who always acts rightly, also acts impeccably, blamelessly, faultlessly, irreproachably, harmlessly, and, therefore, will have the power to do anything, and to live as he wishes, and he who has this power must be free. But the good man always acts sensibly, and, therefore, he alone is free.
ג׳
3[60] Again, one who cannot be compelled to do anything or prevented from doing anything, cannot be a slave. But the good man cannot be compelled or prevented: the good man, therefore, cannot be a slave. That he is not compelled nor prevented is evident. One is prevented when he does not get what he desires, but the wise man desires things which have their origin in virtue, and these, being what he is, he cannot fail to obtain. Further, if one is compelled he clearly acts against his will. But where there are actions, they are either righteous actions born of virtue or wrong actions born of vice or neutral and indifferent.
ד׳
4[61] The virtuous actions he performs not under constraint but willingly, since all that he does are what he holds to be desirable. The vicious are to be eschewed and therefore he never dreams of doing them. Naturally too in matters indifferent he does not act under compulsion. To these, as on a balance his mind preserves its equipoise, trained neither to surrender to them in acknowledgement of their superior weight, nor yet to regard them with hostility, as deserving aversion. Whence it is clear that he does nothing unwillingly and is never compelled, whereas if he were a slave he would be compelled, and therefore the good man will be a free man.