מסיני לאתיופיה, הקדמה, בין התלמוד ליהודי אתיופיהFrom Sinai to Ethiopia, Introduction, Ethiopian Jewry and Talmudic Law
א׳
1Ethiopian Jewry and Talmudic Law
ב׳
2The Model of the Jerusalem Talmud
ג׳
3Since the early days of the Ethiopian aliyah, the topic of religious tension between Orthodoxy and Ethiopian Jewry has been painful and loaded. Since then, the community’s spiritual leaders have felt unable to express their opinion on halakhah and tradition. The tension still exists today as well, and it seems that as time goes on, the anger and conflict increase. On the other hand, we also find understanding and rapprochement between the two worlds.
ד׳
4One year when Yom Kippur fell on Shabbat, the kesim ruled that members of the community should make Kiddush and even take a small bite to eat, in honor of the sanctity of the Shabbat. In doing so, they attempted to compromise between two conflicting halakhot. On one hand, the Beta Israel work the Tataza Sanvet (Laws of Shabbat), which is based on the book of Jubilees, specifies that any individual who fasts on Shabbat is liable for the death penalty; on the other, one who eats on Yom Kippur is liable for karet (untimely death or eternal excommunication). Yet the local religious council was quick to accuse the kesim: “Your acts are leading the public to sin,” “This ruling is an act of heresy.”
ה׳
5I will give another example of tensions surrounding halakhah. In Ethiopian culture, it is acceptable for men and women to exchange greetings by shaking hands or kissing the cheek. Many parents have difficulty adjusting to the fact that their male children who have become religious no longer greet women in these ways, even within the family. The parents scorn this practice and consider those who follow it to be uncultured. Many parents do not understand it, not only because it is opposed to their cultural world, but also because it does not follow the spirit of the Torah, whose “ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace” (Proverbs 3:17).
ו׳
6But in my opinion, the most shocking issue is the debate about giving money for charity during the prayer services on Shabbat. According to Ethiopian tradition, during the morning services on Shabbat, the congregants place bills and coins on the synagogue platform. This is the custom practiced today in a synagogue in Kiryat Gat. According to the kes of the synagogue, Kes Barhan, this practice is based on the principle of not coming to the synagogue empty-handed – “every man shall give as he is able” (Deuteronomy 16:17). Yet this practice has led to complaints, anger, and degradation of the kesim. I have heard people say, “They’re goyim,” “It’s like eating pork,” “I’m embarrassed to pray there,” “They are defiling the sanctity of Shabbat,” and other harsh criticisms.
ז׳
7What will lead to a change in the attitude of the rabbinic establishment toward the Ethiopian community and its leaders? What will lead to an attitude of respect toward their customs and leaders?
ח׳
8I believe that the root of this intense conflict between the rabbis and the kesim lies in their differing worldviews, which may be compared to the worldview expressed in the Babylonian Talmud as opposed to that presented in the Jerusalem Talmud. Many sources in the Talmuds point to differing attitudes toward the nature of the individual. While the Babylonian Talmud adopts a suspicious, skeptical approach toward the individual, as in the first half of the verse in Psalms 34:15, “shun evil,” the Jerusalem Talmud promotes a positive attitude and believing in others – as in the second half of the same verse, “do good.” Below we will give several examples in support of this distinction.93My friend Rabbi Avraham Blas assisted me greatly in locating the sources in the Jerusalem Talmud.
ט׳
9The first example addresses the issue of sleeping in the sukkah. Both Talmuds debate the law regarding taking a nap (sheinat arai) outside the sukkah. The Babylonian Talmud completely forbids napping outside the sukkah, even if one appoints a guard whose job is to prevent one from falling into a deep sleep, if one should happen to fall asleep at all.94Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 26a.
י׳
10The Jerusalem Talmud reaches the same halakhic conclusion, but not out of doubt. Rather, its position is that “taking a nap” cannot be defined, since a person might be refreshed after sleeping for only a short time.95Jerusalem Talmud, Sukkah 2:53, column 1, halakhah 5.
י״א
11Another example is the issue of blowing the shofar on Rosh Hashanah when it falls on Shabbat. In Temple times, they blew the shofar even when Rosh Hashanah fell on Shabbat. But after the Temple was destroyed, the Sages ruled that we should not blow shofar on Shabbat. Why? The Babylonian Talmud cites the likelihood that a person who is not proficient in blowing the shofar might carry it to one who is proficient in blowing, in order to learn. He thus might be tempted to carry it four cubits in the public domain, which would be a violation of the Shabbat.96Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 29b. But the Jerusalem Talmud forbids blowing the shofar on Shabbat for another reason:
י״ב
12They taught that on the holiday of Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat, they would blow in the Temple but not elsewhere . . . Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai taught, “You shall sacrifice”(Leviticus 24:25) – [this means] the place where the sacrifices are made.97Jerusalem Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 4:59, column 2, halakhah 1.
י״ג
13Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai is addressing the question of whether it is permitted to make a sacrifice outside the Temple. Based on the biblical citation, he rules against this – one may sacrifice only in the Temple. The Jerusalem Talmud applies the same principle to blowing the shofar on Shabbat – it is permitted only in the Temple. According to the Jerusalem Talmud, blowing on Shabbat depends on the existence of the Temple and sacrificial worship, and not on the suspicion of a possible violation, as in the Babylonian Talmud.
י״ד
14Another example of the differing attitudes is found in the discussion of the sotah (a woman accused of betraying her husband). According to the Torah, the sotah must be taken to the Temple, where her husband’s accusation is verified in a special ceremony. The Mishnah describes the process:
ט״ו
15They bring her [the sotah] . . . to the entrance of Nicanor’s gate, where they gave the sotah the water to drink, where they purified the women who had given birth and purified the lepers. A priest seizes her garments – if they tear, they tear, and if they shred, they shred – until he uncovers her bosom and undoes her hair. Rabbi Judah says: If her bosom was beautiful, he did not uncover it, and if her hair was beautiful, he did not undo it.98Mishnah, Sotah 7a.
ט״ז
16The Babylonian Talmud explains that the basis for Rabbi Judah’s statement is the suspicion of arousing impure thoughts. In the Jerusalem Talmud, however, in the discussion of waving the meal offering of the sotah, we encounter a different approach:
י״ז
17The priest places his hand under hers and waves it [the meal offering], but this is unseemly. He brings a cloth, but it does not properly conceal. Then he brings an elderly priest. You may even say that they bring a youth who is not drawn by desire at that time.99Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 3:1.
י״ח
18According to the biblical text, the priest must wave the meal offering together with the accused woman. The Jerusalem Talmud states that this may even be done by a young priest, for “ein yetzer hara matzui le-sha’ah” ([he] is not drawn by desire at that time). That is, because he is involved in performing a mitzvah, there is no fear that he will stray from the goal. There is no need to worry that a person who acts for the sake of heaven will wander into forbidden territory. Likewise, it is not an assumption that a man has no desire for women that makes a woman feel secure that her husband will not be unfaithful; rather, it is the love and trust between them that fosters this faithfulness. In the same way, the Jerusalem Talmud trusts that the priest will not stray because his love for and fealty toward God and the mitzvot overrides any other desire.
י״ט
19According to Rabbi Avraham Blas, this is additional evidence for the significant difference between the two Talmuds: while the Babylonian Talmud reveals a suspicious attitude toward the worshipper of God, the Jerusalem Talmud expresses full trust in the world of the faithful.
כ׳
20A good example that sharpens our understanding of the difference between the two Talmuds is the issue of the beautiful female prisoner of war:
כ״א
21[When you go out to war] . . . and see among the captives a woman of goodly form, and you desire her, and would take her as a wife, then you shall bring her home to your house; and she shall shave her head, and pare her nails; and she shall put the raiment of her captivity from off her, and shall remain in your house, and bewail her father and her mother a full month; and after that you may go in unto her, and be her husband, and she shall be your wife. (Deuteronomy 21:11–13)
כ״ב
22Is it possible that the Torah permits a soldier to take a foreign woman, even though she may be already married? Yes, the Torah permits this, as “The Torah only provided for man’s evil inclination.”100Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 21b. The question is, at what point was the beautiful woman permitted? Rashi writes (based on the Babylonian Talmud): “beautiful – because his evil inclination desires her for her beauty, the Torah permits it to him, but grudgingly, since it is preferable for Israel to eat flesh of animals about to die, yet ritually slaughtered, than flesh of animals which may not have been ritually slaughtered.”101Ibid. According to the Babylonian Talmud, the beautiful woman is permitted on the battlefield, because “The Torah only provided for man’s evil inclination.” The Jerusalem Talmud, on the other hand, does not permit this:
כ״ג
23Rabbi Yochanan sent to the rabbis over there [in Babylonia]: Two things you say in the name of Rav and they are not so. You say in Rav’s name: “A beautiful captive woman – permitted in her case is only the first act of sexual relations.” But I say that it is neither the first nor any later act of sexual relations that is permitted, except after all the required preparations have been carried out – as specified, “After that, you may be intimate with her and possess her” – that is, after the specified deeds.102Jerusalem Talmud, Makkot 2:6, trans. Jacob Neusner.
כ״ד
24As opposed to the Babylonian Talmud, which permits intercourse with the beautiful woman during battle, the Jerusalem Talmud forbids the practice entirely. According to the Jerusalem Talmud, it is completely forbidden to have relations with a beautiful war captive. Only after one month, after the prisoner has made all efforts to become repulsive to the man who captured her, if he decides that he still wants her, then he is permitted to take her. A fundamental controversy lies at the root of this issue. One approach is that man is weak in character, and if the beautiful woman is not permitted to him, he will go to her when she is forbidden, and therefore we will permit it – this is the educational approach of the Babylonian Talmud, which considers how to protect man. In contrast, the approach of the Jerusalem Talmud is revolutionary, and expresses powerful faith in man’s powers. This approach asserts that even though the prisoner is in the man’s hands, he can overcome his sexual desire during battle and even afterward, for an extended period. Human beings have strong spiritual powers, and we believe in them.103Avraham Hacohen Blas, Otzarot ha-Yerushalmi [Treasures of the Jerusalem Talmud] (Jerusalem, 5768/2008), 133–34.
כ״ה
25Through the distinction we have identified between the two Talmuds, we can now argue that the Ethiopian halakhah is based on a principle similar to that of the Jerusalem Talmud, as opposed to the rabbinic establishment, which supports the Babylonian model. This is no controversy between institution and gender, between hegemony and the fringes of society, between strong and weak. Rather, it is a controversy between two Talmuds, found on the same shelf in the beit midrash. According to the Jerusalem approach, we can understand why a man greeting a woman with a kiss on the cheek is not shocking. This is also the way to understand a person who makes Kiddush on Yom Kippur that falls on Shabbat without suspecting him of eating plentifully (I am not arguing that the Jerusalem Talmud permits eating on Yom Kippur that falls on Shabbat). This is also the key to understanding a person who gives charity on Shabbat because he believes that this is a mitzvah, without suspecting him of engaging in commerce, because the money is used only for sacred purposes. The Ethiopian community, like the Jerusalem Talmud, believes in humanity’s goodwill, and that his intention in both cases is to serve God. I am not arguing that we should adopt the Jerusalem Talmud instead of the Babylonian Talmud in a wholesale manner, but we can and should use the Jerusalem Talmud’s approach as an example of how we may relate to differing opinions.
כ״ו
26Many rabbis assert that the approach of the Jerusalem Talmud is appropriate for our generation, the generation of the redemption.104Avraham Hacohen Blas, Orot ha-Yerushalmi [Lights of the Jerusalem Talmud] (5770/2010), 26–27. In this book, I will present a method for building a civilized world founded on the experience of the Jerusalem Talmud.
כ״ז
27Can the Ethiopian Jews Continue Their Customs?
כ״ח
28Usually, when halakhic questions arise, we refer to halakhic works such as the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah or Rabbi Yosef Caro’s Shulhan Arukh. But a posek halakhah, a rabbi who makes halakhic decisions, cannot rely on texts alone.105D. Sperber, Minhagei Yisrael, vol. 1, “Le-makor tokef ha-minhag” [The origin of the validity of custom], 20; ibid., “Mahut ha-minhag u-tokpo” [The significance of custom and its validity], 1. See also Rabbi Yehuda Amichai, “Eikh poskim ka’asher ein masoret mesuderet shel pesika?” [How do we rule when there is no organized tradition of ruling?] in Kumi ori [Rise, awake] (Shevat 5767/2007); ibid., “Ha-pesharah ba-minhag” [Compromise in customs], 23; ibid., “Hisardutam ve-he’almutam shel minhagim” [Survival and disappearance of customs], 227; ibid., part 3, “Al ma’amado shel minhag etzel miktzat gedolei ha-Aharonim” [The status of custom according to some great Aharonim], 3. Reality is complex, and in order to find the appropriate answer he must use good judgment, as we find in the responsa literature. Sometimes, this is not enough, and he must proceed to a third stage in order to answer the question. At this point, rabbis rely on certain fundamental halakhic principles, such as et la-asot le-Hashem heferu Toratekha,106“Time to act in the name of the Lord, because they violate Your Torah” (Psalms 119:126). Under this principle, rabbis may make innovations in halakhah under unique circumstances when Torah law as a whole is endangered. For example, after the destruction of the Second Temple, the rabbinic leadership used this principle to overturn the law forbidding transcription of the Oral Law. kavod ha-briyot,107Mishnah, Avot 4:1, and elsewhere. This concept permits exceptions to rabbinic decisions under circumstances that would lead to an undignified situation. For example, rabbinic prohibition forbids carrying any object across a private property line on Shabbat, but the Talmud records that the rabbis created an exception for carrying as many as three small stones if needed for wiping oneself in a latrine, on the basis of kavod ha-briyot (Shabbat 81b, 94b). mutav she-yehu shogegin,108Babylonian Talmud, Beitzah 30a, specifies that it is preferable not to protest against someone who is sinning unintentionally, if the listener will not heed rebuke, as by doing so one transforms the listener into an intentional transgressor. and ein gozrim.109“Ein gozrim gezerah al ha-tzibbur ela im ken rov ha-tzibbur yeholim la-amod bah” (We do not enact a decree upon the community unless a majority of the community is able to comply with it), Baba Batra 60b and elsewhere. This means that a posek must take into account the entire range of sources in order to find the necessary balance between universal morality and the halakhah, which is based on defined principles. This is particularly true for issues concerning communities that have immigrated to Israel, such as the Beta Israel community. The final result, the practical halakhic decision, may seem like an exception. But on a deeper level, we find that it derives from one root. A person who reads the halakhah with this awareness will understand that the halakhic decisions of Ethiopian Jewry, whether strict or lenient rulings, come from a recognized source and are all firmly founded on the Torah, the Talmud, and the decisions of the Rishonim.
כ״ט
29The path I propose is influenced by the Ethiopian values and traditions I absorbed from my grandfather, Abba Gideon (Dejen) Mengesha, of blessed memory. This is the way of all halakhah. For example, the halakhic decisions of the religious Zionist rabbis are influenced by their study of faith and their openness to Western culture, and thus are different from the decisions of the haredi rabbis. Sometimes, cultural difference influences the choice of sources and arguments, and sometimes the interpretation of sources may differ. How is the personal aspect expressed in the halakhic decision? In my view, the answer is, kabbalat ol malkhut shamayim, “accepting the yoke of Heaven.” Where there is yirat shamayim, fear or awe of God, there is room for the personal aspect, because the individual wants to do God’s will. When we see the faithful of Beta Israel, we find that they are rich in awe of God. The existence of varying traditions among the Jews is not a sign of weakness, but rather of greatness – the greatness of a living people.
ל׳
30In the Shulhan Arukh, Rabbi Yosef Caro (the Beit Yosef) attempted to outline a single body of halakhah that drew from a variety of traditions. In his book, he set out the rules that he used to determine halakhah:
ל״א
31The Jewish people rely on three major teachers as the pillars of their instruction – Rabbi Yitzhak Alfasi (the Rif), Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon (the Rambam), and Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel (the Rosh), of blessed memory. I have decided that when two of them agree on one point, the law should follow their opinion, except in the few areas where all or most of the Jewish sages disagreed with that opinion, and so the opposite tradition became popular. . . . When we do not have an opinion from these three pillars, we will follow the well-known sages who did write opinions on that particular law. This is the correct path of compromise that avoids the likelihood of failure. If in some countries the Jews prohibited some acts, even though we decide the opposite, they should continue to follow their customs, because they have already accepted the sages’ decision to forbid, and so they may not permit it.110Introduction to Tur, Orah Haim.
ל״ב
32Rabbi Moses Isserles (the Rema)111Introduction to Darkhei Moshe. objected to Rabbi Yosef Caro’s methodology in deciding halakhah according to the majority opinion of two out of three. According to the Rema, one should decide halakhah according to the traditions that developed after the time of the Rif and the Rambam, based on the principle of halakhah ke-batrai (following the later decisor), since the Aharonim (rabbinic authorities after the Shulhan Arukh) were aware of the practices of the Rishonim (eleventh to sixteenth centuries, following the Geonim and preceding the Shulhan Arukh), but ruled against them. According to Rabbi Yehoshua Volk Katz, z”l, the source of the controversy lies in the geographic and cultural differences between the Rema and Rabbi Yosef Caro.
ל״ג
33Rabbi Yosef Caro lived in Arab countries, where the Jews followed the rulings of the Rif and the Rambam, who agreed on one opinion except for minor details of the law. For this reason, he wrote that we must follow two out of three, so that the residents of those countries would continue to follow their traditions. In contrast, the Jews of Ashkenaz [central Europe], Poland, and Russia, who followed the sages of Ashkenaz and France, did not accept the decisions of the Rif or the Rambam, and so Darkhei Moshe specifies the customs of the Ashkenazic Jews.112Introduction to his books Perisha and Derisha.
ל״ד
34The two central branches of contemporary Judaism grew out of this controversy. The Sephardic Jews follow the opinion of the Beit Yosef, while Ashkenazic Jews accept the halakhic decisions of the Rema.113See Shem ha-gedolim, s.v. “Beit Yosef,” Sde Hemed Klalei ha-Poskim, part 6, 13:31, 14:18. Each community followed its own customs and did not deviate from the customs that developed over history.
ל״ה
35At this point we ask whether acceptance of the decisions of a certain posek by a community obligates their descendants to follow these practices as well. The Torah commands us to go “to the judge that shall be in those days” (Deuteronomy 17:9); each generation should follow the rabbinic authorities of its time. We must distinguish between two types of customs: those related to location and those related to community.114Amichai, “Eikh poskim ka’asher ein masoret mesuderet shel pesika?” Regarding geographically dependent customs, the Talmud relates115Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim 50b. that the citizens of Beyshan were accustomed not to travel from Tyre to Sidon on Shabbat eve, even though Friday was market day in Sidon, so as not to interrupt Shabbat preparations. Their children wanted to annul this custom, as they were not as wealthy as their parents. They went to Rabbi Johanan, but he forbade them from annulling it, based on the verse, “Hear, my son, the instruction of thy father, and forsake not the teaching of thy mother” (Proverbs 1:8). The custom of the citizens of Beyshan applied to the local residents, and therefore their descendants were also obligated to follow it.116Shu”t havat Yair [Responsa of Rabbi Shimon Yair Bacharach], par. 126. Another type of decree that obligates descendants is the acceptance of Talmudic authority. As the Rambam writes:
ל״ו
36Everything in the Babylonian Talmud is binding for all the people of Israel; and every city and town is required to observe the customs observed by the Talmud’s sages, their restrictive legislations and their positive legislations. For all those matters in the Babylonian Talmud received the assent of all of Israel. All of Israel’s sages, or a majority of them, are the ones who enacted the positive and negative legislations, enacted binding customs, made the rulings, and found that a certain understanding of the Law was correct. It was they who received the traditions of the Oral Law concerning the fundamentals of the whole Law, in unbroken succession back to Moses Our Teacher, may he rest in peace.117Introduction to Mishneh Torah, Yad ha-hazakah [trans. based on Mechon Mamre website].
ל״ז
37After the Jews were exiled, they could no longer unite in one place, and thus they split into numerous communities. Just as all Jews were obligated to accept Talmudic authority, each community was obligated to follow the decrees of its own sages: “The laws that a community accepts are binding for them and their descendants.”118See Nachum Lamm, Halakhot ve-halikhot [Laws and customs] (Jerusalem, 5750/1990), 144. As Rabbi Yitzhak bar Sheshet decreed, “Every law accepted by the community obligates them and their descendants.”119Shu”t Ribash [Responsa of Rabbi Yitzhak bar Sheshet], par. 399. In other words, when a community accepts a law, this is comparable to a communal vow that cannot be annulled. In this manner, Ashkenazic Jews have accepted the leadership of the Rema, while Sephardic Jews have accepted the teachings of the Beit Yosef. The acceptance of the law of these authorities applies to them and their descendants, and cannot be exchanged. But when a Jew from one community goes to another community, how should he behave? This question arose when Ashkenazic Jews came to Eretz Yisrael, where they encountered Sephardic communities that had lived there for many years. Rabbi Avraham ben Yehiel Michael Danzig wrote, “Regarding those who come to Eretz Yisrael, I think that if they settle in a city that has a minyan, even though the newcomers are numerous, they should follow one law. They must follow the stringencies of their new location. The stringencies that they followed in their home location are no longer valid.”120Hokhmat adam, Sha’ar mishpatei ha-aretz 11:23.
ל״ח
38There are many points of friction between the customs of the Ethiopian community and the Talmudic-rabbinic world. This book attempts to carve a path through the thicket of halakhic sources, sometimes relying on an individual opinion, which will lead to acceptance of the Beta Israel as a legitimate, normative stream within the Jewish people. Acceptance of the community is a sign that there are poskim who accept the strength of the Jewish people, and are thus willing to open the door to this community, not as an act of sympathy but through recognition of their right.
ל״ט
39The first way to do this relies on theological-philosophical arguments that justify changes and developments in the world of religious philosophy and halakhah. Another way is to attempt to act through the mechanisms of halakhic decision making. There are additional principles according to which we can accept changes in halakhah on a certain point, and in parallel, we can attempt to find halakhic precedents. Even if these precedents were written in a completely theoretical manner at the time, they enable us to formulate new models of religious behavior that can reduce the gap between these two groups. Halakhic decision making is not just a deductive process of reaching practical decisions based on textual study. Alongside the intellectual pursuit that relies on books stand fundamental values that guide the posek on his path. Based on these values, the posek can find an opening and address every problem that arises in the context of its time and place.
מ׳
40I come from within the world of Ethiopian tradition, which I absorbed from the khanokh (spiritual leaders of the Ethiopian community), as well as from my grandfather and family. I am aware of the spiritual needs of this community in the most profound sense. In light of the problems arising among the second generation, I intend to offer a response to the spiritual distress of today, out of respect and deep appreciation. Any person who did not grow up within the world of Ethiopian halakhah, but through study and patience is able to see the positive sides of this world, is graced with greatness of soul.
מ״א
41I hope that in this manner, I will succeed in raising the tradition of Ethiopian Jewry to the level of the “royal table,” and to grant it the status it deserves.
מ״ב
42Respect for Particularity
מ״ג
43Recently, I had the opportunity to listen to a Torah lesson given by a great rabbi who argued that today’s halakhic reality of multiple customs and traditions is an ex post facto reality. His ideal was conformity of halakhah, in which everyone would accept the halakhah of the great sage of Eretz Yisrael, the Beit Yosef, as recorded in the Shulhan Arukh. In his opinion, Jews from other Middle Eastern countries should change their ancestral customs and adapt them to the laws of the Shulhan Arukh. Ashkenazic Jews should also accept the rulings of the Shulhan Arukh. As for the work of changing customs, the rabbi left this for the Messiah. This approach, which aspires toward a monolithic world of halakhah, left me astonished and angry, for it is likely to plunge us deep into the halakhic politics that led to the destruction of the Second Temple.
מ״ד
44During another class given by a young yeshiva scholar, one of the listeners, a woman who had emigrated from Morocco, asked a question about her mother’s custom of lighting Shabbat candles first and then reciting the blessing. The yeshiva scholar replied decisively and with excessive brutality: “Your mother’s practice is based on a mistaken custom, and so you must cease this practice immediately. You should follow the Shulhan Arukh and the decision of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef – first recite the blessing and then light the candles.” I could not remain silent over such an answer. I told the woman that she could continue to follow her mother’s custom, because several traditions exist on this issue. The yeshiva scholar attacked me and dismissed everything I said with a wave of his hand, asserting that I did not understand anything. I deeply lament such incidents. In this context, I would like to cite an interview with Rabbi Uri Sherki, who addresses the attempt to enforce a monolithic halakhic world:
מ״ה
45I am from Algiers, which is not in the Middle East at all. In general, I think that one of the central factors in the cultural decline of Sephardic Jewry is the halakhic uniformity imposed on it in the spirit of the expression “Eastern Jews,” or if you will, the spirit of the Shulhan Arukh alone. . . .
מ״ו
46This is a crime against how I grew up, against the tradition of my ancestors and rabbis over generations. My beit midrash includes Rabbi Judah Halevi, the Rambam’s Guide for the Perplexed, and the traditions of my ancestors, who were scholars of Kabbalah, philosophy, halakhah, and poetry – and not just liturgical poetry! Rabbi Judah Halevi or Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra wrote poems, and I’m not sure whether they would allow someone in a yeshiva today to write such things. They would probably banish such a person from the yeshiva. This is a very rich world, and the attempt to create uniformity instead of unity has destroyed it.
מ״ז
47The Sephardic Jews did not have the polarity of religious versus secular that we find today in the Ashkenazic world. I grew up in a European country, in France, and I knew the terms religious and secular from French. I did not know they existed in Judaism. I knew all kinds of Jews, and I knew there were some who kept many mitzvot, and others who kept only a few. Only when I came to Israel did I discover that Jewish society lived according to such codes.
מ״ח
48In the Ashkenazic world, you have to define yourself by a certain ideology. For example, an Ashkenazic Jew who does not wish to follow the mitzvot punctiliously has to define himself as Conservative. For the Sephardic Jews, this need was never felt, because every Jew was accepted for what he was, and therefore a Jew who traveled on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur to the synagogue felt he belonged in the synagogue. . . .
מ״ט
49Once Rabbi [Shlomo Zalman] Auerbach was asked whether it would be permitted to conduct an aliyah seminar outside of Israel, even though some of the participants would arrive on Shabbat, and they would push children in strollers without an eruv [a boundary that encloses a large area and makes it into a single domain, to avoid transgressing the prohibition against carrying objects from one domain to another on Shabbat]. He answered, “A woman is drowning in a river, and you’re asking questions?!”
נ׳
50Rabbi Auerbach also thought that halakhah should be decided according to tradition. When he was asked if it was permitted to prepare egg salad on Shabbat – as this involved many actions that might be forbidden – he answered, “It is permitted, because my grandmother used to make egg salad on Shabbat.” He added, “Even if I don’t find a satisfactory halakhic explanation, it will still be permitted, because my grandmother did so.” Such a position is unique in today’s halakhic landscape, as today halakhic decisions are made by the book, not according to tradition, and what your grandmother did is no longer relevant and [is considered] halakhically incorrect.121Hagit Bartov and Shraga Bar-On, “Normaliut Sefardit” [Sephardic normalcy], Kippah, November 16, 2010, http://www.kipa.co.il/jew/41133.html.
נ״א
51Rabbi Sherki notes that Sephardic Jews used to follow this custom when the Torah scroll was removed from the ark: “The women would kiss it. Even further, in many Sephardic communities outside Israel, on Yom Kippur, during the priestly blessing of the concluding Ne’ilah service, the women would go into the men’s section and stand under their husbands’ tallitot. Feeling deep emotion at the conclusion of the holy day, the family wanted to be together, and the rabbis chose to overlook this. Today no rabbi would permit such a thing.”
נ״ב
52Shulhan ha-Orit was written out of faith in Jewish law and tradition. I live and breathe the entire Jewish people, with all 248 limbs and 365 sinews of my body. I view each stream within the Jewish people as part of one heterogeneous family, and each in its own way is created in God’s image.
נ״ג
53No matter what kind of society we have, if alongside the laws and halakhah that it legislates, natural morality is overrun – such a society cannot endure.
