גריי מאטר א, הלכות שבת, חליבה בשבת ב׳Gray Matter I, Laws of Shabbat, Milking Cows on Shabbat 2
א׳
1Milking in Unusual Manners
ב׳
2Milking Onto Foods
ג׳
3The Gemara (Shabbat 144b) teaches that "one may milk a goat into a pot [filled with solid food] but not onto an [empty] plate." Rashi (s.v. Letoch) explains that the Gemara is speaking of squeezing the milk into a pot to improve the taste of food inside the pot. He permits this activity "since one does not need the milk as a liquid per se, rather as food (a component of a solid food). This is not the manner of mefareik and resembles separating food from food." In other words, mefareik does not apply when separating one solid food from another, and here the milk is considered solid food being removed from a cow (which is viewed as beef).1For an explanation of why the cow is considered food despite the fact that it may not be slaughtered on Shabbat, see Rashba, Shabbat 144b s.v. Veha.
ד׳
4It appears from Rashi that this leniency applies on both Shabbat and Yom Tov, for squeezing milk onto solid food is never defined as an act of mefareik. On the other hand, Rabbeinu Tam (Tosafot s.v. Choleiv) believes that permission to milk onto food applies only on Yom Tov. He notes that milking onto food is permitted because the milk is considered "food (based on its destination) being removed from food (the cow)." Only on Yom Tov, however, is the cow considered "food," because only on Yom Tov can an animal be slaughtered and eaten.2Even on Yom Tov, there may be a distinction between different types of cows. Clearly, a cow that might be slaughtered and eaten on Yom Tov is considered food. Some cows, however, are designated for a purpose other than eating, such as cows that are designated specifically to produce milk. It is questionable whether such cows may be considered "food," as their owners surely do not intend to eat them. For a discussion of the permissibility of milking cows designated for such a purpose on Yom Tov, see Mishnah Berurah (505:1,4). On Shabbat, reasons Rabbeinu Tam, a cow is not food. Thus, even if one milks a cow onto food, he is separating "food" (milk) from something inedible, a violation of mefareik.
ה׳
5The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 305:20 and 505) appears to rule in accordance with the strict opinion of Rabbeinu Tam. The Shulchan Aruch also emphasizes that the permission to milk onto food applies only when the food absorbs most of the milk. It certainly does not apply if one squeezes a large volume of milk onto a few crumbs of bread (see Teshuvot Achiezer 4:8 and Techumin 1:7-8). Consequently, milking into food is undoubtedly not a practical option for dairy farmers.
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6Milking to Waste with Milking Machines
ז׳
7The most viable option for religious dairy farms in the earlier part of the century was milking to waste, but downside of this procedure was that all of the milk was lost. With the advent of milking machines in Israel, however, milking to waste without actually losing the milk appeared possible. The machine could be set to send the milk down the drain, attached to the cow, and adjusted after the first drops of milk to send the subsequent milk into storage containers. The human act of milking (attaching the cow to the machine and squeezing the first drops)3See Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchatah (27 note 159) regarding the need for the first drops of milk to flow before readjusting the machine. sends the milk to waste, while no further squeezing of the udders (by humans) is necessary to redirect the milk.
ח׳
8Theoretically, it seems entirely permissible to use milking machines in this manner. Nonetheless, the Chazon Ish (O.C. 38:4) finds this procedure objectionable, drawing an analogy between it and a loophole discussed in the Gemara (Shabbat 8b). The Gemara states that one may carry on Shabbat from a reshut harabim (public domain) to a mekom petur (neutral domain) and from a reshut hayachid (private domain) to a mekom petur, whereas one may not carry from a reshut hayachid to a reshut harabim or vice versa. One could seemingly circumvent this prohibition by carrying from a reshut harabim to a reshut hayachid via a mekom petur. Nevertheless, the Gemara forbids this loophole. Although each step is permissible (i.e., carrying to and from a mekom petur), the net result of the actions is carrying from a reshut harabim to a reshut hayachid, so Chazal forbade it.
ט׳
9Similarly, the Chazon Ish reasons, one may not first set up the milking machine to milk to waste and subsequently adjust the machine to send the milk into storage containers.4Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited in Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchatah 27 note 159) suggests having one person attach the cow to the milking machine and another person readjust the milking machine to store the milk. However, Rav Shlomo Zalman limits his proposal to situations where the person who attached the machine did not know that his colleague was going to redirect the milk flow. Accordingly, Rav Shlomo Zalman's suggestion cannot be used as a standard procedure for dairy farms. Nonetheless, the Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchatah (27, note 159) records that even the most scrupulously observant farm settlements engaged in this practice. Moreover, prominent rabbis (cited there) report that none other than the Chazon Ish sanctioned this practice in case of great financial loss.5Presumably, "great loss" means that the economic survival of the kibbutz depends upon not losing the milk. See Techumin (7:172 note 15).
י׳
10How can we reconcile the contradiction between the written ruling of the Chazon Ish and the oral ruling he reportedly gave religious farmers? One might suggest that even the Chazon Ish fundamentally permits the action of switching from the drain to storage containers. Despite the cogency of his analogy to carrying via a mekom petur, it seems to contradict two axiomatic rules regarding post-Talmudic rulings. The first is that one cannot necessarily extrapolate from one rabbinical prohibition or leniency to another (see Tosafot, Chullin 104a s.v. Umina, and Maggid Mishnah, Hilchot Shabbat 6:9). Additionally, the Rosh (Shabbat 2:15) writes that we may not create new rabbinical prohibitions after the Amoraic period. Thus, the Chazon Ish's ruling essentially was a chumra (stringency), which could be waived in case of great need.
י״א
11Milking Through Grama
י״ב
12During the mid-1980s, the Zomet Institute developed machinery that solves the Chazon Ish's objection to using milking machines for storing all but the first few drops. Zomet's invention switches the milk machine from the drain to storage receptacles indirectly. The Gemara (Shabbat 120b) teaches that doing a forbidden act directly is biblically prohibited, whereas doing it indirectly (grama) is biblically permitted.6It should be noted that Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (cited in B'ikvei Hatzon 7:4) defined grama in a somewhat stricter manner than many of his contemporaries. Accordingly, Rav Soloveitchik might prohibit some of the grama machinery developed for Shabbat in consultation with other authorities. For example, the Mishnah (Shabbat 120a) describes how one may indirectly extinguish a fire on Shabbat.7The Mishnah actually records a dispute regarding this issue. We have only cited the accepted view (Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 12:4). One may put barrels of water in the path of the fire, so that when the fire eventually reaches the barrels, it will cause them to explode, and the water will extinguish the fire. Grama is not totally permitted, though. The Rama (O.C. 334:22) rules that we may violate Shabbat through grama only in cases of great economic loss (see Biur Halachah, O.C. 334:22 s.v. D'gram)
י״ג
13The Gemara (Sanhedrin 77a) describes another classic grama situation. One person ties up another in the desert at night. The next day, the sun appears and the bound individual dies of sunstroke. Rashi (s.v. Sof) explains that one who kills in this fashion does not receive the death penalty, as he killed indirectly. The killing agent, the sun, was not present at the time of the killer's actions and only showed up later (sof chama lavo).
י״ד
14Many of the grama products of the Zomet Institute (such as its famed Shabbat telephone) are based on the sof chama lavo model. The user turns on a switch with no immediate result. In a few seconds, an electronic eye detects a change in the switch's position and effects the desired result (see Techumin 1:515-524). The electronic eye parallels the sun in the aforementioned murder case. When one turns the switch, no action results immediately. The electronic eye that brings about the desired action is not present when the switch is turned on, and, like the sun, it only appears later. It consists of an electric impulse that checks at regular intervals (six to twelve seconds) to see if the switch has been moved. When it detects that the switch has moved, it reacts accordingly.
ט״ו
15The Zomet Institute applies this principle to redirecting milk from the drain to storage containers through grama.8For a more detailed discussion of how this works from both halachic and engineering perspectives, see Techumin 7:144-173. No person directly moves the machinery from waste to storage. Instead, a person moves a faucet, causing no immediate result. Several seconds later, an electronic eye discovers that the faucet has moved and causes the machinery to switch the milk flow from waste to storage.
ט״ז
16While the Rama (O.C. 334:22) permits grama only in case of great financial need, here grama is being utilized routinely. Nonetheless, there are two reasons to permit its implementation on dairy farms. One can argue that this is a case of great financial need, as losing a day's worth of milk every week would deliver a major economic blow to any dairy farm. Furthermore, grama is employed merely to accommodate a concern which, even according to the Chazon Ish, may only be a stringency. Accordingly, there would be room to rule leniently even without pressing financial need.9Regarding whether it is preferable to milk via grama or hiring a non-Jew, see Teshuvot Minchat Shlomo (2:24) and Rav Yaakov Ariel's essay in Techumin (19:343-348).