גריי מאטר ב, ענייני משפחה, טבילה וחציצהGray Matter II, Family Matters, Chatzitzot and Tevilah

א׳

1Part I: General Discussion

ב׳

2This chapter begins our discussion of tevilah, proper immersion of one’s body in a mikvah (ritual bath).¹The laws of constructing a mikvah will be addressed in five later chapters of this book. We focus on the laws of chatzitzot, obstructions between one’s skin and the water, which have the potential to invalidate the tevilah (immersion). Due to their complexity, many of these issues require the attention of a major halachic authority if they arise.

ג׳

3Talmudic Background

ד׳

4While describing the purification of a man who ejaculated semen, the Torah (Vayikra 15:16) teaches, “He shall immerse all of his flesh in water and remain unclean until the evening.” The Gemara (Eruvin 4b) derives from the words “all of his flesh” that nothing may separate between the person’s flesh and the water.²For analysis of the requirement that all one’s flesh immerse in the water, see Rav Elyakim Krumbein’s essay in Alon Shevut (140-141:92-101). The Gemara limits this problem of separating flesh from water to objects that meet two conditions: they must cover a majority of the body, and the person must object to their presence there (rubo umakpid).³“Objecting” to something’s presence means that one is bothered by its presence while engaging in normal activities, such as working, bathing, or shopping. If, however, one worries about its presence only at the time of tevilah (due to one’s piety), then the object is not a chatzitzah (see Rav Binyomin Forst’s The Laws of Niddah 2:274). It adds, however, that the Rabbis legislated to invalidate a tevilah even when only one of these conditions exists, lest people erroneously permit chatzitzot that meet both conditions. If an object touches only less than half of the body and one does not mind its presence (mi’ut ve’eino makpid), then it does not even constitute a chatzitzah on a rabbinic level since it meets neither condition.

ה׳

5Mi’ut Ve’einio Makpid

ו׳

6Nevertheless, the Rama (Yoreh Deah 198:1) writes that one preferably should not immerse even with a chatzitzah that the Rabbis did not forbid (such as mi’ut ve’eino makpid). Although this stringency has no source in the Gemara, it has been adopted it as a minhag (custom). However, both the Chochmat Adam (119:3) and Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 198:9) comment that in a situation of great need, a woman need not adhere to this stringency and may immerse with an object covering less than half of her body, provided that its presence does not bother her.

ז׳

7If one is not bothered by an object’s presence, Rashi (Eruvin 4b s.v. V’she’eino) explains that it does not constitute a chatzitzah because “it becomes an inherent part of the body,” rather than an external addition. Over the past two centuries, authorities have debated for how long a foreign object must be attached to the body in order for it to become part of that body. The Chelkat Yoav (Yoreh Deah 1:30) asserts that if the obstruction is intentionally kept on the body for more than seven days and is only a chatzitzah on a rabbinic level - such as cotton placed in the ear - it is considered an integral part of the body and is not a chatzitzah (even rabbinically). He bases his ruling on the laws of Shabbat, where, according to many authorities, a knot that remains in place for more than seven days is considered “permanent” (shel kayamah) on a rabbinic level (Rama, Orach Chaim 317:1).⁴The Rama also cites a second opinion, which considers a knot “permanent” on a rabbinic level even if it lasts only for one full day. Similarly, the Chelkat Yoav argues that a foreign object is considered permanently attached to a person if it remains in place for more than seven days, so it does not invalidate immersion as a chatzitzah unless it meets the Biblical criteria for a chatzitah (covering a majority of the body and bothering the person).

ח׳

8The Chelkat Yoav’s opinion has generated much discussion. The Avnei Neizer (Yoreh Deah 262) contends that a foreign object loses its status as a chatzitzah only after being attached to the body for longer than six months. He explains that the Rabbis legislated rabbinic chatzitzot lest one accidentally immerse while covered by a Biblical chatzitzah. Accordingly, if we permit tevilah with an object that has been present for seven days, then people might immerse while covered by a Biblical chatzitzah, erroneously believing that even a Biblical chatzitzah becomes a part of the body after seven days.

ט׳

9In all of his responsa about chatzitzot, Rav Moshe Feinstein does not accept any variation of the Chelkat Yoav’s opinion. Indeed, Rav Moshe even writes in one place that he does not understand why a chatzitzah should lose its status after a set amount of time if the Gemara does not stipulate an amount of time for this purpose (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe, Y.D. 1:97:1). Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited in Nishmat Avraham, Yoreh Deah 198:1) adopts a compromise approach. He notes that poskim generally base their rulings on what seems to be the standard of the Beit Yosef (Orach Chaim 317), that if a knot is tied for more than thirty days, it is viewed as permanent (at least on a rabbinic level). Similarly, a foreign object is not considered a chatzitzah if it is attached for more than thirty days.

י׳

10Objective vs. Subjective

י״א

11The Rishonim debate whether to define hakpadah, objection to the presence of a foreign object, subjectively or objectively. The Rambam indicates that if the individual immersing does not object to the item’s presence, even if others would find it objectionable, it is considered eino makpid (not objectionable).⁵Hilchot Mikva’ot 2:15, as interpreted by the Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah 198. On the other hand, the Rashba (Torat Habayit 7:7) and the Tur (Yoreh Deah 198) rule that if most people would object to an item’s presence, then they set an objective standard for hakpadah; an individual’s own preferences are nullified by the majority’s perceptions (batlah da’ato eitzel rov bnei adam).

י״ב

12In practice, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 198:1) adopts the opinion of the Rashba and the Tur. The Shach (198:2) rules that we must act strictly in accordance with the views of both the Rambam (as interpreted by the Beit Yosef) and Rashba. Thus, an item constitutes a chatzitzah either if most people would object to its presence or if this individual finds it objectionable.

י״ג

13An Object that Comes Off by Itself

י״ד

14A question often arises regarding whether something is considered a chatzitzah if it normally falls off by itself. Rashi (Shabbat 15b s.v. Bichli) writes that people do not object to the presence of items that fall off by themselves, so they do not constitute chatzitzot (on less than half of the body). Contemporary authorities discuss possible applications of Rashi’s principle to contemporary situations, such as stitches that come off “automatically” by dissolving.⁶Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv and Rav Nissim Karelitz (cited in Mar’eh Kohein p. 115) reportedly consider dissolving stitches to be a chatzitzah (also see Rav Eliashiv’s Kovetz Teshuvot 88 regarding stitches in general). On the other hand, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (letter printed in Mar’eh Kohein p. 183), Rav Moshe Shternbuch (Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:508:36) , and Rav Shmuel Wosner (letter printed in Mar’eh Kohein p. 186, Shiurei Sheivet Halevi 198:11:3) rule that dissolving stitches do not constitute a chatzitzah, although Rav Wosner adds that they would be considered a chatzitzah if their presence bothered the woman (which they should not). In another example, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Teshuvot Har Tzvi, Yoreh Deah 163) rules that iodine that has discolored one’s skin is not a chatzitzah because it dissipates by itself.⁷See Rav Frank’s responsum for additional reasons that he provides for his ruling. Also see Chochmat Adam 119:16. Rav Binyomin Forst (The Laws of Niddah 2:292) points out that many iodine and ink stains can be removed with vinegar, lemon juice, or bleach, thereby eliminating any possible problem. It is always advisable to consult experienced rabbis regarding such issues, as they know practical suggestions, such as these forms of stain removal, in addition to their knowledge of Halachah.

ט״ו

15Beit Hasetarim and Balua

ט״ז

16A foreign object can constitute a chatzitzah even on some parts of the body that are not normally exposed to the mikvah waters. These areas, known as batei hasetarim (Nidah 66b), include the outer ear canal and inside the nose and mouth. Although the mikvah waters need not actually come in contact with the batei hasetarim, the Gemara nonetheless requires that no intervening substance preclude the theoretical possibility of such contact.

י״ז

17The Rishonim (commenting on Kiddushin 25a) debate whether the rules of batei hasetarim are Biblical or rabbinic in nature. Tosafot (s.v. Kol) detail how these laws can be derived from verses in the Torah, implying that they are Biblical. On the other hand, the Ramban, Rashba, and Ritva believe that they are rabbinic; on a Biblical level, they maintain that water does not even need the theoretical ability to enter batei hasetarim. The Acharonim disagree concerning which opinion to follow. The Avnei Neizer (Yoreh Deah 260) rules like Tosafot that they are from the Torah, whereas Rav Akiva Eiger (Teshuvot, Mahadura Kama 60) rules that they are actually rabbinic. One’s ability to rule leniently concerning questionable areas of chatzitzot in the areas of batei hasetarim depends on this dispute.⁸For example, the status of a chatzitzah that remains for more than seven days depends on the Chelkat Yoav’s aforementioned lenient ruling. A poseik might be more likely to permit immersing with such a chatzitzah in a beit hasetarim if he rules like the Ramban, Rashba, and Ritva. If the chatzitzah is situated in a beit hasetarim, there is considerable room to be lenient assuming these rules are only rabbinic (see, for example, Nishmat Avraham, Yoreh Deah 198:12).

י״ח

18Many Acharonim discuss precisely which body parts qualify as batei hasetarim. Rav Akiva Eiger (198:7 s.v. Liflof) writes that these halachot apply only to “places that sometimes are exposed,” such as the eyeballs or mouth.⁹The Rashba (Kiddushin 25a s.v. Ha) seems to agree with this assertion. Places that are never exposed, however, such as the inner recesses of the ear and nose, do not even need the theoretical possibility of touching the water. Rav Yechezkel Landau (Teshuvot Noda Biy’hudah, Yoreh Deah 1:64, cited by Pitchei Teshuvah 198:16) presents a similar approach to that of Rav Akiva Eiger.

י״ט

19Refuyah - Looseness

כ׳

20In order to invalidate the tevilah, a chatzitzah must cling to the body, whereas an object that is loosely attached (refuyah) does not constitute a chatzitzah (see Mikvaot 8:5 and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 198:28). Thus, a woman may theoretically immerse while wearing loose-fitting clothing (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 198:46 and Shach 198:56).¹⁰Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer, Y.D. 1:19) writes that a female convert may immerse with a sheet beneath her head that does not allow the members of the beit din (rabbinical court) to see beneath her head. Rav Gedalia Schwartz (speaking at a convention of the Rabbinical Council of America) reported that prominent American authorities (such as Rav Avraham Steinberg, who headed the RCA Beth Din for many years) agreed to this ruling (also see Shulchan Aruch, Y.D. 268:2). A competent rabbinical authority should be consulted should a need arise to rely on this ruling, as it is often difficult to determine the precise definition of the term “loose.”

כ״א

21Earplugs

כ״ב

22Acharonim have suggested several ways to allow tevilah for women who cannot expose their ear canals to water. The outer part of the ear canal is considered a beit hasetarim. Thus, based on the criteria described above, water must theoretically be able to enter the canal, but it need not actually do so during her immersion. Dr. Avraham S. Avraham (Nishmat Avraham 198:12) reports that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach permitted placing loose-fitting cotton in the ear. It does not constitute a chatzitzah, based on the concept of refuyah described above. Following the immersion, the cotton should immediately be removed in order to prevent the entry of water into the ear canal. Of course, an ear, nose and throat specialist should be consulted to determine that this procedure does not endanger the individual in question.

כ״ג

23Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Teshuvot Har Tzvi, Yoreh Deah 170) writes that the cotton should be placed so deep within the ear that its location will not even be considered a beit hasetarim. In this deep position, the cotton will be balua (completely absorbed within the body), so the tevilah will be valid even if water cannot possibly reach that part of the ear.¹¹See Nishmat Avraham (Yoreh Deah 198:12) for application of balua to catheters and intrauterine devices (I.U.D.), which require competent rabbinical and medical consultation regarding their use. Also, he requires the woman to place the cotton in her ear for a week before the tevilah so that it is considered “non-objectionable” (eino makpid). The cotton should remain in her ear for a few days after the tevilah, as well, further showing that she does not object to its presence.

כ״ד

24It should be noted that Dr. Yisrael Bramma (an Israeli ENT specialist) warns that, from a medical perspective, it is not advisable to keep cotton in one’s ear for an extended period of time (Techumin 5:227). A competent specialist should therefore be consulted should this situation arise.

כ״ה

25Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:98-103) presents a solution that he defends at length. He permits immersing immediately after inserting cotton somewhat deeply within the ear canal, without waiting a week between the cotton’s placement and the tevilah. Rav Moshe (Y.D. 1:98) proves that cotton in an ear cannot constitute a chatzitzah, from the Mishnah (Shabbat 64b), which permits a woman to wear a small piece of cotton in her ear when she walks into the public domain on Shabbat. The Gemara prohibits wearing chatzitzot in public domains on Shabbat, so apparently a piece of cotton is not a chatzitzah.

כ״ו

26Although Rav Moshe’s proof seems textually compelling, it appears to contravene the principles that we have presented for batei hasetarim. After all, we have already noted that water must be able to theoretically enter batei hasetarim, such as the ear canal. Does the cotton not preclude this possibility and thus invalidate the tevilah? Rav Moshe solves this difficulty by distinguishing between two types of chatzitzot. Some items, such as nail polish, actually attach themselves to the nail, whereas others, such as cotton in the ear, remain separate from the skin while still preventing contact between the skin and water.

כ״ז

27Although the presence of either type of chatzitzah on the body invalidates a tevilah, Rav Moshe suggests that only the former type presents a problem when found in batei hasetarim. He explains that when a chatzitzah is not physically attached to the body, it could theoretically be moved to allow water to enter. Accordingly, if someone immerses with cotton in his ear canal, the canal was theoretically fit for water to enter. Although no water will actually touch the canal’s skin, a tevilah is effective as long as water has the theoretical possibility to enter the batei hasetarim. Of course, if the cotton were on the outside of the body, it would invalidate the tevilah because water must actually touch all exposed skin.

כ״ח

28In order to prove his distinction, Rav Moshe develops an original interpretation of the rule that one may close one’s mouth and eyelids during tevilah, provided that one does not close them too tightly.¹²See Nidah (67a and Tosafot s.v. Patchah) and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 198:38-39). Logically, we would expect closing the mouth to invalidate the tevilah, for the water needs the theoretical ability to enter the mouth (a beit hasetarim). Closing the lips and eyelids blocks the water’s path to these batei hasetarim. Rav Moshe’s approach provides a rationale for this law. Closed lips are the type of chatzitzah that does not seal off the beit hasetarim, because the person could theoretically open his mouth.¹³If the lips are tightly sealed shut, Rav Moshe explains that they invalidate the tevilah because water will not even touch the outer surface of the lips themselves. This surface is a regular part of the body, so, unlike a beit hasetarim, it must actually touch the water, rather than sufficing with the theoretical ability to touch water.

כ״ט

29Rav Moshe thus concludes that a pad placed somewhat deeply within the ear canal is merely a barrier to water entering the ear, but it is not attached to the ear. Hence, it does not prevent the ear canal from being “capable of coming into contact with water.” Based on his line of reasoning, Rav Moshe (Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:104) claims that, fundamentally, contact lenses do not constitute a chatzitzah, although he requires removing them, when possible, to eliminate any doubt.¹⁴The eye’s inside is a beit hasetarim, so the lenses, which are the same type of chatzitzah as cotton, do not invalidate the tevilah. Rav Yitzchak Yaakov Weisz (Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 6:89) rejects Rav Moshe’s position, as he prohibits immersing with contact lenses or artificial eyes. Also see Nishmat Avraham (vol. 4 p. 109), where Dr. Avraham discusses the case of someone who forgot to remove contact lenses prior to tevilah, and Shiurei Sheivet Halevi (198:7:2).

ל׳

30Dr. Yisrael Bramma (Techumin 5:275-279) suggests a different approach to the problem. In most situations that the ear canal must be kept dry, surgery can repair the eardrum. He claims that this procedure entails minimal risk - far less than the ongoing danger of having an ear that cannot get wet - and can improve the woman’s hearing while removing a major safeik (halachic doubt). In cases where the ear’s damage is too severe for this minor surgery, Dr. Bramma suggests placing antibacterial drops in the ear before and after the tevilah in order to prevent infection. He adds that a woman must consult her rabbi and doctor for guidance regarding how to handle these more severe situations.

ל״א

31Casts

ל״ב

32Casts present one of the most difficult chatzitzah problems. Dr. Avraham (Nishmat Avraham, Yoreh Deah 198:4) writes that one should try to have a cast removed before tevilah. Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg told me that he agrees with this assertion.

ל״ג

33If removing the cast is not possible, Rav Eliezer Waldenberg (Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 4:9) rules that it is not considered a chatzitzah. He reasons that it does not cover a majority of the body, and one does not object to its presence (mi’ut v’eino makpid) since it is necessary for medical purposes. Even though most people would find a cast “objectionable” and would want it to be removed, they realize its importance and therefore accept its presence. The Rama (Y.D. 198:17) explains, “A shocheit or butcher whose hands are soiled with blood is not considered to have a chatzitzah on him, since most people in those fields do not object to the presence of blood on their hands.” A similar argument can be made concerning those who are wearing casts.

ל״ד

34On the other hand, Rav Frank (Teshuvot Har Tzvi, Yoreh Deah 165) cites the Sidrei Taharah’s claim that if a woman fundamentally would not want a particular foreign object on her body, it is considered objectionable even if she presently wishes to leave it on herself for medical reasons. Thus it follows that a cast should constitute a chatzitzah, as people normally would object to a cast’s presence, if not for its medical function. This argument is based on the Shulchan Aruch’s ruling (198:10) that plaster on a wound constitutes a chatzitzah.

ל״ה

35However, other Acharonim interpret the Shulchan Aruch’s ruling differently. The K’tav Sofer (Y.D. 1:91) claims that the plaster constitutes a chatzitzah only because it is removed occasionally in order to inspect the wound. On the other hand, if a cast is going to be in place for a considerable amount of time, then it is possible to say that it is not a chatzitzah.¹⁵Although the K’tav Sofer presents this reasoning, he concludes his responsum by refusing to actually permit immersing in a cast, noting that he read of three other poskim who consider casts to be chatzitzot. See Badei Hashulchan (198:87 and Bei’urim s.v. Chotzetzet) for a review of the two interpretations of the Shulchan Aruch. Rav Frank concludes that one should avoid immersion while wearing a cast, but he permits doing so in cases of great difficulty.¹⁶Also see Shiurei Sheivet Halevi (198:10:2), who is inclined to prohibit immersing with a cast except in extreme cases and after consulting with a competent rabbi. The issue of casts remains very sensitive, so an eminent Rav must be consulted in situations where a cast cannot be removed.

ל״ו

36In practice, one other critical factor exists regarding casts. Rav Gidon Weitzman has informed me that more modern casts have been developed that allow water to reach the skin underneath without damaging the cast. Therefore, before a woman has a cast attached to herself, she should consult a competent rabbi and her doctor in order to arrange for a cast that will pose the fewest possible halachic problems.

ל״ז

37Splinters

ל״ח

38The Mishnah (Mikvaot 10:8; codified in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 198:11) rules that a splinter constitutes a chatzitzah only if it is visible. If it remains beneath the skin, and it cannot be seen, then it is not a chatzitzah, as it is balua (absorbed within the body). The Tur (Y.D. 198) and Taz (Y.D. 198:15) note that even if the splinter can be seen through a thin layer of skin, it ceases to be a chatzitzah once the skin covers it completely.

ל״ט

39Conclusion

מ׳

40In the matters of nidah it is tempting to rule strictly “just to be on the safe side.” Rav Mordechai Willig reports that he heard directly from Rav Moshe Feinstein that it is forbidden to rule strictly on issues of nidah “just to be safe,” because stringency in this area presents a barrier to the mitzvot of onah (a husband’s conjugal responsibilities) and peru urevu (procreation). On the other hand, one cannot simply rule leniently without adequate support from halachic sources. Highly competent rabbis, therefore, must be consulted when these complex issues arise.

מ״א

41Part II: Teeth and Fingernails

מ״ב

42Continuing our discussion of the laws of chatzitzot, we now discuss how they apply to dental fillings, braces, and fingernails. The status of dental work, especially temporary work, within the laws of chatzitzot has generated considerable debate.¹For a summary of many different types of dental work that may raise concern for chatzitzot, see Shiurei Sheivet Halevi (198:24:2) and Nishmat Avraham (Yoreh Deah pp. 129-134).

מ״ג

43Permanent Fillings

מ״ד

44The Chochmat Adam (119:18) presents an extraordinarily stringent ruling by asserting that even a permanent filling constitutes a chatzitzah. Rav Yaakov Ettlinger (Teshuvot Binyan Tziyon, Chadashot 57) advises to act strictly in accordance with the Chochmat Adam’s view, although he adds that one should not castigate those who do not treat it as a chatzitzah. These two poskim reason that the woman would not have wanted the filling if not for her mouth’s medical needs. Hence, the filling constitutes a chatzitzah on a rabbinic level, just like any item whose presence on a minority of the body is objectionable (see previous chapter).

מ״ה

45Almost all authorities have rejected this ruling,²For a full listing of these authorities, see Nishmat Avraham (Yoreh Deah p. 130). and they present a number of reasons to be lenient. The Maharsham (1:79) argues that it is nearly impossible for a woman to remove the filling herself, without the help of a dentist, so the filling can thus be considered a permanent feature of her body. Accordingly, the filling is not a chatzitzah. Moreover, the filling does serve a non-medical purpose, since its removal would disfigure the woman’s teeth, so it surely should not be a chatzitzah. Moreover, there is considerable room to be lenient in this case since it might be a situation of trei derabanan (an intersection of two rabbinic enactments).³See Teshuvot Chatam Sofer (Y.D. 192) and Teshuvot Imrei Yosher (2:112). If a filling is a chatzitzah at all, it is on a rabbinic level, since it does not cover most of the body (see the previous chapter). Additionally, some Rishonim (Ramban, Rashba, and Ritva to Kiddushin 25a) believe that a chatzitzah in a beit hasetarim (such as the mouth; see previous chapter) constitutes only a rabbinic problem.

מ״ו

46Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:97) represents the consensus view in his explanation of why a permanent filling does not constitute a chatzitzah. He points out that the only time a foreign object constitutes a chatzitzah is when one minds its presence. Rav Moshe reasons that someone is thought to mind the presence of an object when it prevents him from performing a certain task, or if it causes pain or cosmetic disfiguration. A bandage on a wound is considered a chatzitzah because, had it not been for medical considerations, no reasonable person would want the bandage attached to his body. Consequently, as soon as the wound is healed, the bandage will be removed. However, once someone has a cavity in his tooth due to decay, he will not be disturbed by the presence of a permanent filling in his mouth. After all, the filling enables the person to chew better and to drink with ease, and it improves his appearance.

מ״ז

47Rav Moshe writes that it is the accepted practice of even the most scrupulous individuals to be lenient on this issue. He speculates that the Chochmat Adam was stringent only regarding primitive fillings that were necessary to prevent tooth loss without allowing for chewing in a comfortable manner. However, there is no reason to consider today’s permanent fillings to be chatzitzot, so even the most halachically meticulous individual can feel comfortable following the lenient approach.⁴Nevertheless, if a dentist decides that he must remove a permanent filling for some reason, such as an illness, it might present a problem; see Mar’eh Kohein (p. 118 note 47), citing Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv.

מ״ח

48Temporary Fillings

מ״ט

49Temporary fillings present a serious problem for tevilah (immersion). They cannot simply be considered part of the body because they are meant to be removed from it. Rav Yechiel Michel Tukachinsky (Taharat Yisrael 15:28-29) rules that temporary fillings do indeed constitute chatzitzot, and several other authorities agree with his view (see Nishmat Avraham, Yoreh Deah p. 131). Rav Meir Arik (Teshuvot Imrei Yosher 2:112) leans towards their position, explaining that one should not seek out leniencies when the woman merely needs to delay her immersion a short time, until the fillings are removed.⁵Rav Arik addresses a situation where a woman would need to delay her immersion by two weeks in order to have her filling removed. He does not specify the parameters of a “short” time.

נ׳

50Many authorities, including Rav Moshe (ibid.) and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Teshuvot Har Tzvi, Y.D. 169), rule leniently. One might think that temporary dental work should be similar to tightly fitting rings, which are considered to be chatzitzot if one removes them while kneading dough (see Taz, Yoreh Deah 198:23).⁶See Rav Binyomin Forst’s The Laws of Niddah (2:301-303) for a complete discussion of the status of rings as chatzitzot. This case seems to indicate that an object constitutes a chatzitzah if one intends to remove it. Rav Moshe (based on Pitchei Teshuvah, Y.D. 198:1), however, distinguishes between a ring and temporary dental work. He argues that people remove their rings whenever they wish to knead dough, whereas dental work is meant to remain in place until the dentist removes it.

נ״א

51Rav Tzvi Pesach and Rav Moshe offer a second reason that temporary fillings are not chatzitzot. They argue that since the woman intends to replace the temporary fillings with permanent ones, it is clear that she does not object to their presence.⁷Also see Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv’s Kovetz Teshuvot (90).

נ״ב

52Rav Feivel Cohen (Badei Hashulchan 198:179) adopts a middle approach. He believes that if the dental work is intended to remain in place for at least thirty days after the immersion, then a woman may leave it in during the immersion.⁸The significance of thirty days comes from the laws of tying knots on Shabbat, as was explained in the previous chapter. One should consult a Rav for guidance concerning this issue.

נ״ג

53Braces

נ״ד

54Rav Moshe (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:96) suggests that tight braces are definitely considered chatzitzot if they serve only a cosmetic purpose, such as straightening the teeth. If, however, they prevent teeth from falling out, they are possibly not a chatzitzah.⁹Dr. Avraham S. Avraham (Nishmat Avraham, Yoreh Deah p. 134) reports hearing from a dentist that concern always exists that teeth will be damaged if they are not straightened, so braces always serve a medical purpose, even if a particular woman only desires them for cosmetic purposes. In such a case, the braces can be seen as part of the teeth, since they are fundamentally crucial for dental health and development.¹⁰Our discussion addresses only whether the braces themselves constitute a chatzitzah. Rav Shmuel Wosner (Teshuvot Sheivet Halevi 2:98:8 and 5:117) notes that one must also make sure to clean the braces thoroughly, or else pieces of food might get stuck in the braces and constitute a chatzitzah. Rav Binyomin Forst (The Laws of Niddah 2:315) notes that several methods exist for properly cleaning braces, such as proxy brushes and hydro-irrigation devices. He writes that this concept parallels the law that a pregnant non-Jewish woman’s tevilah for the purpose of conversion takes effect on the fetus, as well (Yevamot 78a-b). The Gemara explains that the mother’s body is not considered a chatzitzah between the water and the fetus because the fetus naturally develops in its mother’s womb.

נ״ה

55Rav Feivel Cohen (Badei Hashulchan 198:179) rules that braces do not constitute a chatzitzah if they will be in place for more than thirty days after her immersion, just as he rules regarding fillings.¹¹Also see Teshuvot Sheivet Halevi (2:98:9), who permits any braces that a non-professional cannot remove, whether their function is medical or cosmetic. In practice, though, Rav Binyomin Forst (The Laws of Niddah 2:135) notes that the technology of braces has changed slightly since many of these rulings were issued. Nowadays, small elastic ties are usually changed every month, so their impermanence could create a problem of a chatzitzah. A woman, therefore, should consult her rabbi and dentist before installing braces, in order to find the best possible option.

נ״ו

56Fingernails

נ״ז

57Both the Shulchan Aruch and the Rama (Y.D. 198:18-20) record the practice to cut fingernails and toenails prior to immersing in the mikvah. This custom developed due to concern about dirt beneath the fingernails, which is sometimes considered a chatzitzah.¹²The Shach (198:25) also cites concern that a long fingernail may itself constitute a chatzitzah because the woman intends to cut it off, so it cannot be considered a part of the body. See Taz (198:21) for a critique of this reason.

נ״ח

58This issue frequently arises in today’s society, where many women grow their nails quite long.¹³If a woman has false fingernails, which can be removed only by a professional manicurist, then Rav Gidon Weitzman (personal communication) notes that she must consult her rabbi to determine whether they constitute a chatzitzah. Rav Chaim Ozer Grodinski (Teshuvot Achiezer 3:33:1) discusses this issue. He reasons that most women do not consider the presence of the nails to be objectionable, so nails should not constitute a chatzitzah. Nevertheless, Rav Chaim Ozer concludes that women should be encouraged to cut their nails before tevilah:

נ״ט

59I have not found an explicit source among the Acharonim to permit [women to forgo the custom of cutting their fingernails before immersion], and concern exists for future disasters [if women will invalidate their immersions by failing to clean their long nails properly]. Therefore [rabbis] cannot explicitly permit [immersion without first cutting long nails], although [they] should instruct the mikvah’s supervisors not to rebuke those women who refuse to cut their manicured nails.¹⁴Rav Chaim Ozer’s ruling has become accepted; see Badei Hashulchan (198:18 Bei’urim s.v. Ulefi) and Teshuvot Yabia Omer (Y.D. 2:13). See Techumin 19:102-112 for a discussion of when a rabbi should make concessions to those who do not fully observe Halachah.

ס׳

60Conclusion

ס״א

61This concludes our discussion of the rules of chatzitzah and tevilah. We hope that our discussion will motivate people to study these laws carefully and to consult with their rabbis whenever questions arise. As Rav Binyomin Forst writes, “One should never attempt to solve a chatzitzah problem without consulting a competent Rav” (The Laws of Niddah 2:277).