גריי מאטר ג, פסיקת הלכה, נימוק פסקי הלכהGray Matter III, Halachic Process, Beit Din Explaining Decisions
א׳
1In the Western world judges are expected to offer reasoned decisions for their rulings, which can be reviewed by an appellate court. They thereby publicly demonstrate that their decisions were not made arbitrarily, but rather were the result of a well-thought out and well-founded approach. This practice is a hallmark of a democratic government, a system in which leaders are subject to scrutiny, and transparency in leadership is very much expected.
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2In this chapter, we will discuss the halachic attitude toward a beit din revealing the logic behind its rulings. We shall discuss the classic sources in this regard as well as the practices of contemporary batei din in both Israel and the United States.
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3Sanhedrin 29a – No Explanation Required
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4Chazal do not require a dayan (rabbinic judge) to explain the reasons for his decisions. The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 3:7) presents the procedure for a beit din issuing its decision: “The most prominent of the judges announces, ‘Mr. so-and-so, you have prevailed, and Mr. so-and–so, you are liable.’” No mention is made of a requirement for the beit din to offer explanations for its decision. In fact, the Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 19:2) states that when one of the litigants requests a written decision, the beit din writes, “So-and-so came with so-and-so his fellow litigant before beit din, and it emerged from their words that so-and-so was victorious and so-and-so was liable.” No mention is made of a requirement to explain the decision.
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5Sanhedrin 31b and Bava Metzia 69 – Two Possible Exceptions
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6Despite the absence of any general requirement for a beit din to explain its decision, the Gemara addresses two exceptional situations in which it is expected that a beit din offer reasons for its decision. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 31b) speaks of two belligerent litigants who are fighting as to where their dispute should be adjudicated. One litigant insists that the local beit din decide the matter, while the other demands that the case be brought to the “mekom hava’ad” for adjudication. Rashi (ibid. s.v. Hatokeif) explains that the mekom hava’ad is an assemblage of many eminent Torah scholars.
ז׳
7The Gemara states that the local beit din may coerce the litigant to arbitrate the matter therein. The Gemara concludes that if the party that wished to go to the mekom hava’ad asks that the local beit din present the reasons for its decision, the beit din writes and delivers it to him. Tosafot (ad. loc. s.v. V’im) state that a litigant enjoys the right to demand an explanation of the decision only if he was coerced to litigate his case in the local beit din. The written decision enables him to bring the decision to the mekom hava’ad or a beit din gadol (rabbinic court of eminent stature) for review.1See our later chapter regarding the circumstances in which a decision may be appealed and/or reversed. Otherwise, a beit din is not obligated to honor a request for an explanation of its decision.
ח׳
8Another case (Bava Metzia 69a-69b) is interpreted by the first opinion in Tosafot (ibid. 69b s.v. Ki Hai Gavna) as presenting another situation in which beit din should offer a reason for its decision. The Gemara describes a case in which one partner in a business venture divided the profits without the consent of the second partner. Rav Papa ruled that the first partner was entitled to do so. Subsequently, the two men partnered to sell wine, and the second partner divided the wine without the first partner’s consent. Rav Papa ruled that the second partner was not entitled to do this, since he might have not divided the wine fairly.
ט׳
9The second partner complained to Rav Papa that he seemed to always side with the first partner. Rav Papa responded, according to Tosafot’s first interpretation, that in such a situation one must present a reason for his decision, which Rav Papa proceeded to give. Tosafot explain that in such a situation, in which there is a basis for a litigant to suspect the beit din of bias, the beit din should reveal its logic in order to “be clean in the eyes of Hashem and Israel” (Bemidbar 32:22). The Sema (14:23) clarifies, though, that this applies only if there is a reasonable basis for the charge of bias, as there was in Rav Papa’s case.2A second opinion in Tosafot, however, does not interpret Rav Papa in a manner that requires a beit din to clarify its grounds in such a case.
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10Shulchan Aruch, Rama and Sema
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11The Rishonim and Acharonim offer different approaches towards beit din revealing the rationale for its judgment, with some authorities expanding the obligation to present reasoning and others limiting it. The Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 14:1 and 4) codifies both the passage from Sanhedrin 31b (requiring explanation in case of coercion to litigate in the local biet din) and the first opinion in Tosafot (Bava Metzia 69b, requiring the beit din to reveal its logic in cases of suspected biases). The Sema (14:25) adds that even when the beit din is not obligated to disclose its logic, it will do so upon request. This does not seem to constitute an obligation upon beit din, but rather seems to be the appropriate and “righteous” step to take.
י״ב
12The Rama (ad. loc.), however, places three limitations on the obligation for beit din to explain its decision in case of suspicion. First, beit din is not obligated to disclose its logic by a specific time. Rather, whenever it finds the opportunity to do so, it presents its reasoning. Second, the beit din needs merely to write the respective claims of the litigants and the ruling of the beit din, not the reasons for that ruling. Finally, the Rama states that only a lower beit din must explain its reasoning. A beit din gadol need not state its reasoning “because we are not concerned for error, for if we were, there would be no end to the matter.”
י״ג
13The Sema (14:24), though, rules that the second limitation to the case applies only when a litigant seeks to appeal a case to a beit din gadol. An eminent beit din will be able to discern the basis for the ruling based on the facts of the case as presented by the lower beit din without any explanation. He argues that in a case of suspicion, beit din should reveal its logic as well.3We should also note that the Pitchei Teshuvah (C.M. 14:10) cites the Teshuvot Chavot Ya’ir (in the addendum) as strongly questioning this limitation of the Rama.
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14Noda Biy’hudah and Chatam Sofer
ט״ו
15Two major late-seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century authorities, the Noda Biy’hudah and Chatam Sofer, adopt different approaches as to whether beit din should disclose or withhold explanation. The Noda Biy’hudah (2 C.M. 1, cited by the Pitchei Teshuvah C.M. 14:11), in a characteristically brief but powerful responsum, enlarges the obligation by expanding the definition of coercion in this context. He states that as long as a litigant had to be summoned to beit din,4See Gray Matter 2 pp. 179-183 for a discussion of how and when these summonses are sent. he is considered to be coerced, requiring beit din to state the claims and ruling in order to facilitate an appeal with a beit din gadol. He adds that this is necessary, “especially in our generation, when mistakes occur frequently.” He also limits a beit din gadol’s exemption from presenting reasons to a court in which each member is a Rav of eminent stature who is renowned for his Torah scholarship. He concludes the responsum with an exceptionally strong statement: “I do not suspect any Rav will refrain from doing so (revealing his reasoning) unless he knows that in truth he did not judge properly, whether deliberately or negligently, and is arrogant and ashamed to acknowledge the truth that he has erred.”
ט״ז
16The Chatam Sofer (Teshuvot Chatam Sofer C.M. 12, cited by the Pitchei Teshuvah C.M. 14:8), however, seeks to limit the obligation on beit din to disclose its logic. He writes:
י״ז
17Granted, it is appropriate and proper for a dayan to explain his reasoning to remove any suspicion of impropriety. Nevertheless, a litigant is not authorized to make such a demand on a judge, and it is audacious of him to tell the dayan that he suspects him of wrongdoing. If he does make such a demand, the dayan should neither reveal his reasoning nor respond to the charge. Only if the litigant refrains from articulating his suspicion due to reverence and respect for the dayan is it proper for the dayan to take the initiative to explain his reasoning in order to extricate himself from suspicion.
י״ח
18These disparate approaches reflect the tension between two competing goals. On the one hand, beit din pursues truth and seeks to preserve its stellar reputation. On the other hand, we are obligated to revere and respect dayanim. Each approach seeks to achieve a balance in the effort to accomplish both goals.
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19Contemporary Beit Din Practice
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20It seems that the approach limiting the obligation to present reasons prevailed in the age prior to the twentieth century. Rav Gedalia Schwartz told me that it is evident from the responsa literature that in most cases, beit din did not articulate the basis for its ruling. He noted that one only need look at classic works of responsa and notice that the Choshen Mishpat5Choshen Mishpat is the part of Shulchan Aruch that deals with monetary law. sections in these works are much smaller than the other sections.6Teshuvot Avnei Neizer is one example of this phenomenon.
כ״א
21Beginning in the twentieth century, however, things began to change. Sir Herbert Samuel,7Sir Samuel is cited in Professor Eliav Schochetman’s essay on this topic, which appears in Shenaton Hamishpat Ha’ivri (6-7:355). the first high commissioner of the British Mandate over Eretz Yisrael, pressured the Chief Rabbinate to create rabbinic courts of appeal as a prerequisite for the British authorities recognizing the rulings of any beit din. Samuel stressed the need to inspire confidence in beit din among the Jewish population. The Chief Rabbis at the time of the establishment of Medinat Yisrael, Rav Yitzchak Herzog and Rav Ben-Zion Uzziel, responded very positively to this request. Rav Uzziel writes (Teshuvot Mishpetei Uzziel C.M. 1):
כ״ב
22There is a greater obligation in our times [for beit din to disclose its reasons], since civil courts explain their rulings with proofs to their decisions, and this enhances their reputations in the eyes of the people. Why should we not act similarly to inspire confidence in the eyes of the nation?…It is appropriate for all beit din decisions, except for conventional and simple cases, to present a summary of the respective arguments of the litigants and the reason for the decision in order to provide the opportunity for appellate court review and to teach Torah law to the nation.8According to this approach, reasons should be given even for pesharah and pesharah krovah l’din (equity and compromise) decisions, since these rulings also should not be made arbitrarily, as explained in Gray Matter 2 pp. 193-200.
כ״ג
23Rav Herzog (cited in Professor Eliav Shochetman’s Seder Hadin p. 370) writes that even the Beit Din Hagadol (the Israeli Supreme Rabbinical Court) should write the basis for its decision, “in order to set an example for others and, besides, this practice has manifold benefits.”9Indeed, some Israeli rabbinic court decisions have been printed and published in a collection entitled Piskei Din Rabbaniyim. This series is greatly respected and is a major contribution to the responsa literature.
כ״ד
24In practice, however, many Israeli dayanim do not heed the call of Rav Herzog and Rav Uzziel, following instead the traditional system of refraining from offering an explanation for their rulings. Indeed, Professor Shochetman (ad. loc.) writes, “The facts show that in many cases, dayanim do not include reasons for the decisions they issue.”10Professor Shochetman published this assessment in 1988.
כ״ה
25In 1999, responding to the situation described by Professor Shochetman, Rav Tzvi Yehudah Ben Yaakov, a member of the Haifa rabbinic court, renewed the call for batei din to elucidate the reasons for their decisions. He writes (Techumin 19:234): “In our times, one may assume that all dayanim are suspected by the religious public and certainly by the secular public….The broader community suspects that dayanim do not investigate matters thoroughly and rule simply based on impressions and arbitrary reasoning.”
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26Conclusion – The Practice in America
כ״ז
27Rav Ben Yaakov’s call has been heeded among some dayanim who recognize the need for beit din to inspire confidence in the community so that people will choose beit din as the venue to resolve disputes instead of using civil courts, which violates a severe prohibition.11See Gray Matter 2 pp. 164-178 for a discussion of the parameters of this prohibition. Indeed, a number of American dayanim routinely write explanations of their rulings. It should be noted, though, that sometimes it is in the best interest of both parties for the dayanim to refrain from explaining their decision. Thus, the Beth Din of America’s protocols do not include a requirement that dayanim present the reasons for their verdicts.12The American Arbitration Association (a leading organization of arbitrators in the United States) advises arbitrators in certain types of cases to refrain from explaining the basis for their decisions. They recommend this both to ensure expediency and to avoid frivolous attempts to have the ruling reversed by civil court (communication from the American Arbitration Association). If the parties notify the beit din before the hearing that they desire an elucidation of the reasoning behind the decision, the beit din will likely agree to that request.