מעמד האשה ביהדות, האשה כאדםJewish Women in Time and Torah, ii Woman as a Person
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1“For thou art a holy nation to the Eternal One, your God.” Rabbi Elwazar explained, “Men as well as women.” (Yerushalmi, Kiddushim 1, 7)
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21. TORAH IDEALS AND TEACHING
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3The examples discussed in the previous chapter are an indication that the aspect of the wife’s duties that brought her status closest to that of a servant was gradually disregarded. The more positive and appreciative opinions and practices undoubtedly indicate that woman’s status gradually changed to something far different from the more primitive position granted her in the original man-made and mandominated society. We are no longer dealing with an early, unavoidably Torah-tolerated status, but with a transformation to a Torah-directed, Torah-required status based on Torah teaching. The teaching represents a radical rejection of the original male-determined and male-dominated position of women.
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4We shall quote some of the principles of the teaching. Rabbi Eleazar said: “Any man who has no wife is not a man, for it says in the Torah: ‘Male and female He created them and called their name Adam.’”1Yevamot 63a, citing Genesis 3:2. Man and woman together are a complete Adam. Rabbi Helbo said: “One should always be especially careful [to safeguard] the honor of one’s wife, for the blessing in one’s house is found only by the merit of one’s wife.” About honoring one’s wife it is also said: “He who loves his wife as himself and honors her more than himself – of him does the Torah say, ‘and you will know that there is peace in your home, etc.’”2Yevamot 62b. In the same context, we also find the saying: “He who has no wife lives without joy, without blessing, without the goodness of life, [and finally] without life.” This statement assumes that the wife is treated as expressed in the previous sayings. According to the Jerusalem Talmud, on the occasion of one’s marriage all one’s sins are forgiven.3Bikkurim 1:5. In the same vein Rabbi Alexander taught: “Anyone whose wife dies during his life, the world itself is darkened for him.”4Menahot 22. Rav Samuel ben Nahman said: “Everything can be replaced; but for the wife of one’s youth there is no replacement.” It was also taught: “A man dies only for his wife; and a woman, only for her husband.”5Ibid., 22b. It was further taught: “A person whose wife dies is forbidden to remarry until the passing of three festivals, so that he will be without any joy during that period and will not forget the love of his wife.”6Tosafot to Mo’ed Katan 23a. For all these teachings proofs are quoted from verses in the Torah.
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5The evaluation of the woman’s importance has significant halakhic consequences. We may start with the halakhic determination of certain questions pertaining to the wife’s obligations. If a wife refuses a husband’s request that she nurse her child, and it is her family’s custom not to breast-feed, we rule in her favor. However, what is the law when it is her way to breast-feed but not so in his family? After whose custom is one to decide? For the decision that according to her husband’s wont she is free from this obligation, two reasons are given. First, by her marriage she rises to the social and material status of her husband, but never descends from her own status. This principle is based on the midrashic interpretation of two words in the Torah that describe the status of a married woman – be’ulat ba’al,7Genesis 20:3. which is interpreted in this way. Second, according to Rabbi Eleazar, the decision is based on the biblical words about the nature of Eve, of whom it is said that “she was the mother of all the living” (i.e., all human beings). The words mean that the woman was given “for life and not for suffering.”8Ketubot 61a. There is little doubt that these reasons, which qualify and limit the wife’s original obligation, are a breakthrough towards a new determination of the woman’s status. For instance, the principle that a wife rises to her husband’s status obliges him to maintain her according to his financial capacity.9E.g., Maimonides, Ishut 11:12. Whereas it was originally said that preserving the man’s life takes precedence over preserving the woman’s, it was later determined that if a man dies, and the possessions he leaves are sufficient for his sons and daughters, the sons become the heirs and the daughters are supported from the father’s possessions. If the possessions are not sufficient for both the sons and the daughters, however, then the daughters are the ones that inherit and the sons have to support themselves by begging.10Bava Batra 139b. In the same spirit it was declared that if two orphans, one a male and the other a female, have to be supported by charity funds, the female orphan is to be provided for first, and the male only afterwards; because it is the way of a man to go begging, but it is not the way of a woman to do so. The same preference is given to the female orphan when two orphans have to be married off. The female is married off first, and then the male, since a woman feels more shame at being unmarried than does a man.11Ketubot 67b. There is one halakhah in which these two earlier principles are disregarded. We have quoted the law that if a son’s father and mother both ask him for a glass of water, he has to offer it to his father first, then to his mother; for he and his mother both have the duty to honor the father. The halakhah we will quote seems to overrule this law as the one that, in matters of sustenance, the male is to be given preference over the woman. According to Tractate Horayot,12Fol. 13. if a person is in captivity together with his father and his Torah teacher, and all three need to be ransomed, then he comes before his teacher, and his teacher before his father. But if his mother is also held captive, then she is to be given preference over all of them. Surely, in captivity, the danger to the woman is more serious than the danger to the men, but if sustaining a male alive is our duty, this would seem all the more reason to ransom the male captive before the female. Similarly, if we must honor a father by handing him a glass of water first, how much more important would it be to honor him by giving him preference over the mother where his life might be in jeopardy! Clearly, this reflects Judaism as taught and prescribed, and not just Judaism in its toleration of ancient customs.
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6One may judge the status of women as mothers by the following examples. When Rabbi Judah ha-Nasi, the editor of the Mishnah, sensed that his death was approaching, he said: “I need my sons.” When his sons entered, he said to them: “Take extreme care regarding the honor of your mother.”13Ketubot 103a. Of Rabbi Joseph it is told that when he heard the footsteps of his mother, he said: “I shall stand before the Shekhinah [divine presence] that has arrived.”14Kiddushin 31a.
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72. HALAKHIC INNOVATIONS
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8The halakhic consequences of this teaching were revolutionary and far-reaching. According to Torah law, a father has the power to give his minor daughter (up to the age of twelve years and six months) in marriage to whomever he pleases. But the Rabbis taught that it is not right to do so, and commanded that the father wait until the child is mature enough to say: “This is the one I wish to marry.” Tosafot explains that because of the uncertainties of a galut existence we cannot afford to wait until our daughters are of age to marry, since we may not be able to provide their dowries at that time.15Tosafot, Kiddushin 41a, s.v. keshehi; for the ruling in the case of the father’s death, see, e.g., Yevamot 107b. This comment is significant because it also explains the reason for the original law. The father was permitted to give a minor daughter in marriage because conditions were such that a female child obtained a degree of protection through marriage that she would not have in the home of her parents. For a very similar reason the rule was later established that in the event of the father’s death, his authority in this matter passes to the child’s mother and brothers.
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9Legally, a man has the right to appoint a representative to act for him in performing the marriage ceremony of Kiddushin. Rav, one of the leading Talmud teachers in Babylon, ruled that one must not do so unless previously acquainted with the intended bride. One should not do so because it is written: “And thou shalt love your neighbor as yourself.” Without having previously known the bride, he might find that he would be unable to love her.16Kiddushin 41a. The same command of the Torah is also used in order to forbid sexual relations between husband and wife in the daylight, for in the light of day the husband might discover bodily blemishes on his wife that would estrange him from her.17Niddah 17a.
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10Rules were introduced in order to limit the power of the husband over his wife. Legally a husband had the right to divorce his wife whenever it pleased him to do so. In order to curb the willfulness of husbands, the ketubah (marriage contract) was introduced. It requires that a husband who wants to divorce his wife must pay her two hundred silver coins, a sum not readily available to most husbands. According to the accepted Talmudic view, the ketubah was instituted so that “it shall not be easy in his eyes [i.e., the husband’s] to divorce her.”18Kiddushin 11a. A similar restriction was also placed on the grounds for divorce. In the Mishnah we find that Bet Hillel and Rabbi Akiva offer rather surprising explanations to justify a husband’s divorcing his wife. According to the House of Hillel, the husband may divorce her if “she has burnt his food.” Rabbi Akiva maintains that the husband’s finding another woman “more pleasing” is sufficient reason for a divorce. Strangely enough, both teachers find proof for these opinions in the Torah itself. One may take comfort from the fact that Bet Shammai interprets the relevant biblical passage as saying that “a husband should not divorce his wife unless he finds her violating sexual morality.”19Gittin 90a. It is important to note that even though the opinions of Bet Hillel are usually accepted as valid as against the teaching of Bet Shammai, in this case the Halakhah is according to Bet Shammai.20Maimonides, Gerushin 2:27.
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11Even more remarkable are the halakhic innovations that were introduced in order to protect the wife from becoming an agunah, i.e., a woman not divorced and thus bound to her husband and yet in fact having no husband to live with. We shall list a number of such cases. According to the law of the Torah, the husband is required to pay the scribe for writing the get (divorce document). Referring to the Mishnah, the Gemara explains: “However, these days we do not do it that way. The rabbis have ‘thrown this obligation upon the wife [i.e., she has to pay the scribe], to make sure that he [the husband] does not abandon her because he refuses to pay for the writing of the divorce document.”21Bava Batra 167a. How serious a matter this was may be judged from the words of Rabbi Hisda, who said: “I really could invalidate all the gittin.”22Gittin 20a. Since he does not give any reason for this statement, the possibility is discussed that he would do so because it was not the husband who had paid for the writing of the get but the wife. This idea is rejected on the grounds of the principle of hefker bet din hefker; i.e., if the authorized rabbinical court expropriates someone’s property, it becomes hefker (ownerless), and anyone may take possession of it. Thus, the money that the wife pays is as if the husband himself had paid it. This is done in the vital interest of the wife.23Ibid. After some time, the original biblical law was restored and the husband had to pay the fee to the scribe.24See Magid Mishnah, Gerushin 2:4.
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12Even more radical were the innovations in matters of testimony. According to the Mishnah, when witnesses to a divorce are unable to read, one reads the get to them and then they sign it. Similarly, when the witnesses cannot sign their names, one outlines the letters of their names on clean paper, and they fill in the outlines with ink. Adds Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel: “Only in regard to the divorce document are such practices permitted, but in all other kinds of documents, only witnesses who are able to read and write are accepted to testify.” Rabbi Eleazar explains that the testimony of illiterate witnesses was allowed so that the daughters of Israel would not become agunot. The reason, of course, is that a husband in a hurry to leave his domicile, for some reason or other, and unable to find a fully qualified witness, may simply abandon his wife without a divorce.25Gittin 19b.
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13Numerous other halakhic deviations from some of the basic laws of the Torah were introduced in order to prevent women from becoming agunot. Apparently, divorces occurred so often that scribes would keep a supply of the general impersonal text of a get on hand for immediate use when needed. The Mishnah declared that scribes who did so must leave place for the husband’s name, the wife’s name, and the time of the anticipated divorce until the get was actually requested by the husband.26Ibid. 26a. The Talmud adds that this was because the Torah says: ““He should write it [the get] for her”; the husband has to arrange the writing of the get, addressed to his wife’s name.27Ibid. 26b. This, however, requires further explanation. There are two entirely divergent opinions for the significance of the testimony. Rabbi Meir teaches that the signatures of the witnesses are decisive for the divorce, whereas Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the witnesses’ testimony that the get was actually handed to the wife establishes its validity. According to Rabbi Meir, even the toref, the essential part of the get, with the names of the parties and the time, could be written in advance, since the witnesses only testify to their signatures. But why was it ruled that the toref part of the get could not be prepared in advance? Because there may occasionally be a quarrel between husband and wife, and if gittin are too easily available, and required only the signatures of the two witnesses to be valid, the husband, in his anger, may hastily divorce his wife. According to Rabbi Eliezer, even the nonessential part of the get should not be prepared in advance. The witnesses’ testimony to the handing over of the entire document is decisive; but if the text was written in advance, it was not handed over specifically to the wife. Nevertheless, it was permitted to prepare the toref in advance, for it might happen that the husband might be in a hurry to leave, and if it was difficult to find a scribe immediately, he would leave her without a divorce and she would be an agunah.
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14Great leniency was practiced in the case of testimony about the death of a husband. According to the Halakhah, a fact is established if two witnesses attest to it from their own personal knowledge and not from what they have learned from another person; women and slaves (whether male or female) are not admitted as witnesses. However, when a husband’s whereabouts are unknown, all the testimonial requirements are disregarded. Testimony that he is dead is accepted even “from one witness, though his testimony is based on what he heard from another man; or even from one woman who learned about it from another woman, or from another slave (male or female).” The final discussion in the Talmud concludes with the words: “In order to prevent the woman from becoming an agunah, the rabbis were lenient,”28Yevamot 99a. i.e., they did not insist on the strictness of the law. Most illuminating and original is the explanation of Maimonides as to how the rabbis could depart from the generally binding laws of the Torah on this matter:
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15The Torah insisted on two witnesses and on the other requirements of the acceptable testimony only in cases where one is completely dependent on the mouth of the witnesses and on their testifying from their own knowledge. For instance, where they testify that one murdered the other, or lent some money to the other. But in matters in which the clarification of the truth does not depend completely on the verbal testimony of this witness, and, in addition, the witness would be unable to excuse himself when in the end it can be proved that his testimony was untrue – for instance, one testifies that someone is dead (i.e., and the person reappears) – the Torah did not insist that the testimony meet all the strict requirements. It would be rather far-fetched to suspect that the witness testified falsely. Therefore, the rabbis were lenient in this matter and believed even one witness testifying on what he has heard from the mouth of a slave, a woman, etc., so that the daughters of Israel should not become agunot.29Maimonides, Gerushin 13, end.
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16Even more far-reaching are the innovations designed to limit the husband’s power in matters of divorce so as to protect the wife in a situation where, in all fairness, she should not be forced to remain married to him. As is well known, a husband cannot be compelled to grant his wife a divorce; it must be given of his free will. Yet the Mishnah rules that there are certain cases “when we compel him [i.e., to give the get and divorce his wife] until he says: ‘Yes, I am willing!’”30Ketubot 77a. The examples given are: if the husband suffers from shekhin (severe boils and inflammation of the skin) or from a sickness of the nose (or the mouth, according to another opinion) that emits a bad odor, or if he follows a profession (e.g., tanning) that causes his body to smell intolerably. In such cases, the wife may say that she cannot endure her husband’s condition and is unable to live with him. It is not our intention to enter into a discussion of the difference of opinion between Rabbi Meir and the sages about the specific cases to which this law applies. It is important to realize that at times a wife could indeed not be expected to continue to live with her husband. The rabbis’ solution was to compel the husband until he declared that he was willing to divorce his wife freely. Of course, this requires an explanation: how can an enforced act be freely undertaken? Maimonides offers a most original philosophical-psychological explanation,31Gerushin 2:20. though other interpretations are also possible. It is important to understand that the rabbis faced a serious moral problem – and they had the courage to find a solution. The reason seems to be that the laws of kiddushin do not represent the entire Torah. Apart from the right of the husband over divorce, there is another commandment, even more comprehensive and compelling: “And thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” It could not be disregarded. There was a conflict between two laws of the Torah. A solution had to be found, and it was found. Its promulgation required a great deal of courage and a deep sense of rabbinical responsibility.
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17Even more surprising was the treatment of the moredet (rebellious woman), i.e., a woman who declares that she is unable to continue married life with her husband. Maimonides formulates the case in this manner: “A woman who refuses to have intercourse with her husband is called moredet [rebellious]. One asks her for her reason. If she says, ‘I dislike him and am unable to have sexual relations with him freely,’ one compels the husband to divorce her. She is not like a prisoner to live with one whom she detests.”32Ishut 14:8. This is the case closest to the modern concept of incompatibility. Many of the classical authorities, like Rashi and the Rashbam agree with Maimonides’ interpretation of the relevant passage in the Talmud; others especially the Rashba, violently disagree with him. According to the Rashba, and those who follow his line of reasoning, such a law would make it possible for the woman to form a liaison with another man and then demand that her husband be compelled to divorce her. This objection is met by Tosafot’s comment that the wife’s assertion that she cannot continue to live with her husband is accepted “only in cases when her statement is found to have basis in the actual present situation.”33Ketubot 63b, s.v. aval amra. Important too is the opinion of the Rif to the effect that even though it is not the Talmudic rule to compel the husband to divorce his wife, in such cases “nowadays this is how we decide this matter in the metivta [Talmudic academy]: If the woman appears and says, ‘I do not want this husband; arrange a get for me,’ he should give her a get immediately.”34Ibid. This was indeed the practice for nearly five hundred years in the Babylonian yeshivot. Most noteworthy is the decision of the Tashbaz that “if, as we saw, according to the Mishnah the husband is obligated to divorce his wife when, because of his body odor, she cannot be expected to live with him, the same law should be applied to any other case where the wife understandably cannot endure marriage with him.” His final conclusion is “that in matters of shalom bayit [household peace], everything depends on proper understanding of the situation, and therefore in situations of this kind the rule prevails that the dayan (rabbinical judge) has to decide in accordance with what his own eyes see.”35Response, sec. 8. A detailed discussion of the entire subject will be found in my Ha-Halakhah Kohah ve-Tafkidah, 2nd ed., 5768, pp. 182–193.
י״ח
18Most surprising is the Talmudic decision to protect the vital interests of the wife, when need be, by dissolving the marriage retroactively, without any divorce document. The woman is then treated as if she had never been married before. The subject originates in a mishnah. Let us assume that the husband authorized a shaliah (representative) to act for him by delivering a get into the hands of his wife. Afterwards he goes to a Beth Din and declares that he withdraws the authorization he gave to his shaliah and nullifies the get. But he is unable to communicate his withdrawal to the shaliah, who goes ahead and delivers the get to the wife, as he was asked to do. The wife, of course, now believes that she is divorced and free to remarry. If she does so, however, the consequences might be catastrophic, since in fact she is not divorced but is still legally married to her first husband. The second marriage is invalid and must be terminated. The children, if any, are mamzerim (bastards) and are excluded from the community. According to the law, she cannot ever return to her legal husband. In order to avoid such a possibility, Rabban Gamliel the Elder, head of the rabbinical court, instituted the law that a husband was not permitted to invalidate a get delivered by a shaliah without informing the shaliah and the wife, “for the sake of improving the world.” However, what happens when a husband disobeys this takkanah, and does withdraw the authorization and invalidates the get? Rabbi Judah ha-Nasi maintains that the nullification of the get by the husband is valid (in spite of all the possible consequences). But Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says: “The husband’s withdrawal is not valid. The get retains its legal power. The wife does become divorced.” Otherwise, “what would be the value of the authority of the rabbinical court?” The Talmud asks the obvious question: “According to biblical law, the husband has the power to invalidate a get, even without the knowledge of his wife, before it reaches his wife. In other words, according to the Torah this woman is still married to her husband. The sages assert the validity of the get and declare her to be divorced against the biblical ruling, only because the authority of the rabbinical court would be degraded. How is that possible?” To which a most original and courageous reply is given: “Everyone who espouses a wife does so in accordance with the initially determined rules, in accordance with the rabbinically established conditions. Therefore, if a man violates those conditions, the rabbis have the authority, retroactively, to nullify the act of the marriage.”36Gittin 33a; also, e.g., Yevamot 90b and Gittin 73a. An extensive discussion of this subject will be found in my Tenai be-Nissu’in u-ve-Get.
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19The extent to which the sages in the Talmud were concerned about the wife’s vital interests may be understood from the following story: A childless woman (after ten years of marriage) came before Rav Nahman asking for a get and the payment provided in the ketubah in the event of a divorce. Rav Nahman told her that since she was demanding the divorce, her husband did not have to pay her; she had no valid reason to request a divorce because unlike her husband, she was not commanded by the Torah to “procreate and multiply.” The woman replied that she needed “a cane [to lean on] in her old age and a spade for her burial.”37Yevamot 65b. In other words, she needed children to support and provide for her in old age and to take care of her burial. The rabbi decided that in such a case “we certainly compel the husband” to meet his wife’s demand. Certainly, by Rav Nahman’s time the rather primitive status which the Torah had tolerated – the view that that woman was primarily a male-servicing sex object – had been radically changed. The human dignity of women had been greatly established by means of the halakhic institutions and innovations discussed above.
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20Inheritance
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21Clearly, the laws of inheritance could not be maintained in their original form. Originally, the biblical rules were promulgated in response to the complaint of the daughters of Zelophehad (see above). They were told that their complaint was justified, but were commanded to marry men of their own tribe “so that the estates given to the tribes may not be transferred from one tribe to another. As for the children of Israel – everyone should hold on to the estate of his father.”38Numbers 36:6–7. This ruling was based on social and economic considerations. Nevertheless, it had to be changed, according to the Talmud, after the generation of Zelophehad’s daughters. The rabbis based their rule on a midrashic interpretation of the two words with which the biblical command is introduced: ve-zeh ha-davar, “this is the matter.” This phrase was taken as meaning, “this is the matter only for the present generation,” meaning that the tribes were permitted to intermarry in subsequent generations. The day on which this new ruling was established was the fifteenth of the month of Av, of which Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, “There were no holidays in Israel that were celebrated like the fifteen of Av and the Day of Atonement.”39Ta’anit 26b. Unquestionably, such a reinterpretation of the words zeh ha-davar is extremely weak. We assume that the rule arose from the experience of the people. In actual practice, it became impossible to maintain the marital separation between the twelve tribes. Gradually, all the other laws of inheritance were adjusted either to practical requirements or in keeping with the restored female dignity in the society.
כ״ב
22Another takkanah (regulation) departing from the original law of inheritance was introduced because conditions made it necessary. According to biblical law, a husband inherits the dowry of his wife, and when the father of a family dies, his sons inherit his property, which is shared out among all of them. In a polygamous society, this meant that part of the dowry of one wife ultimately passed over into the hands of the sons of another wife. Therefore, fathers were not inclined to provide an adequate dowry for their daughters, who remained unmarried as a result. In order to prevent this, the rabbis introduced a revised marriage contract, known as ketubat benin dikhrin, providing that if the wife died, her dowry would be given only to her own sons, and the rest of the father’s property was to be divided among all his sons. In essence, this reform was a departure from Torah law, even though the rabbis of the Talmud found a biblical reason for it in the Torah’s rule that a father should make an effort to marry off his daughter.40Ketubot 52b. What is truly significant here is that time-conditioned circumstances made it necessary to introduce an innovation that in fact was a change in the biblical law of inheritance.
כ״ג
23Another rule of inheritance caused a great deal of discomfort: the law that the husband inherits his wife but she does not inherit from him. The first limitation of the law was introduced with the decision that if a wife’s father insists prior to the marriage that the husband shall not inherit his daughter’s dowry and whatever else he bestows upon her, his condition is valid and the husband does not inherit his wife’s property. Similarly, if the wife’s father gave her some property after the marriage, on the condition that her husband have no share in it and not inherit it, his condition is respected.41Gittin 77a, Nazir 24b.
כ״ד
24Another problem arose in a case where the wife died shortly after the marriage. Why should the husband inherit her property? After all, her father gave it to her for her use. If this occurred within a year of the marriage, Rabbenu Tam ruled, the dowry should be returned to her father. Toward the end of his life, however, it appears that Rabbenu Tam changed his mind in this matter. Nevertheless, the haga’hah (note) attached to the Rosh quotes:
כ״ה
25I have found written by Rabbenu Tam that he placed a herem [ban] on the Jews of France and Lombardy, and they agreed with him, that if the wife dies within a year of her marriage, whatever is left of her dowry and her jewelry should be returned to those who gave them to her or to her heirs. Other communities introduced the rule that if one of the couple should die within two years of their marriage without leaving any offspring, half of the dowry should be returned to the heirs of the departed.42Ketubot 47.
כ״ו
26Even more significant was the takkanah of the community of Toledo, specifying that if the wife died during the lifetime of the husband, “and there are healthy offspring, whether a son or a daughter … whatever is left of her property, the husband should share it – half and half – with that offspring. When she leaves no surviving descendant, all her remaining property belongs to her husband and to those who have a right to inherit her (by family relationship). The husband should hand over half of what he would normally inherit according to biblical law, to the one who has the first claim on her inheritance.”43Tur, Even ha-Ezer 118, beginning. Elsewhere the Tur emphasizes that since all sorts of practices exist, everything is to be decided in accordance with the accepted rules in the various communities.44Ibid., chap. 57. Even more explicit is the Rivash: “In matters concerning the husband’s right to inherit his wife, every community has its own rules or practices. Everyone who marries without making any conditions does so in agreement with the acknowledged takkanah or minhag prevailing in that community.”45Responsa, no. 64. The Rivash refers to Maimonides for support.
כ״ז
27What these new regulations mean is, in essence, a departure from the original law that kol mah she-kanah ishah kanah ba-alah, i.e., whatever a wife acquires is acquired by her husband, and whatever remains of her dowry he inherits. The changes became necessary as an act of fairness and justice consequent upon the personal status that the woman acquired in changed condition and under the influence of Torah teaching.
כ״ח
28Summing up the results of our study thus far, we have discovered the developing status of women as it passed through two different levels: the Torah-tolerated one and the Torah-guided and Torah-instructed one. On the first and lowest level, in the early man-built and manmaintained society, woman is not recognized as possessing her own personality. At this stage she is merely an impersonal adjunct to the male. It is the Torah-teaching that recognizes her in her own personal existence and establishes her human dignity in a world in which she has her own vitally important place because of her own life-related nature. Only on the impersonal level can there be a rule permitting the husband to say to his sick wife, “Here is your ketubah, heal yourself with its monetary value or else I will divorce you,” when he sees that her medical bills would cause him great monetary loss.46Maimonides, Ishut 14:18, as above. Only when a wife is the property of her husband, acquired because of the services she can perform, can such a regulation be legally justified. On the other hand, on the level of woman’s Torah-directed personal status, such a rule would violate fundamental ethical principles of the Torah. Our problem today is that the Torah-directed personal status has not as yet completely overcome some elements that have survived from the earlier period. Nothing shows this more convincingly than the way in which Maimonides combined some essential features of the personal and the impersonal status. We have learned of the rabbinical command to love one’s wife as oneself and honor her more than oneself. We also noted the wife’s duty to look up to her husband as to a prince and take care of all his needs. This is the formulation of Maimonides:
כ״ט
29And thus have our sages commanded that a man should honor his wife more than himself and love her as himself … And thus have they also commanded the wife that she honor her husband “more than enough,” that the fear of him should be upon her, and that all her work should be done in accordance with his instruction; he should be in her eyes like a prince or a king who may act as he desires; she should also remove from before him everything that is hateful to him, etc.47Ishut 15:19–20.
ל׳
30It is difficult to understand why Maimonides did not see the contradiction between these two commands. How can a husband who loves and honors his wife, as indicated, want her to fear him, to look up to him as if he were a prince simply because he happens to be her husband, and to remove from his presence everything that might displease him? The truth is that the two principles are mutually exclusive: either you love your wife as yourself and honor her more than yourself, or you demand that she regards you as her lord and master, and serves you accordingly.
