על החוקים לפרטיהם, ספר ג ט״וOn the Special Laws, Book III 15
א׳
1[83] The term murder or manslaughter is used to signify the act of one who has killed a human being, but in real truth that act is a sacrilege, and the worst of sacrileges; seeing that of all the treasures which the universe has in its store there is none more sacred and godlike than man, the glorious cast of a glorious image, shaped according to the pattern of the archetypal form of the Word.
ב׳
2[84] It follows necessarily that the murderer must be regarded as an offender against piety and holiness, both of which are violated in the highest degree by his action. For his merciless conduct he must be put to death, though indeed it is a thousand deaths that he deserves instead of the one which he suffers, because his punishment being necessarily single cannot grow into a plurality in which death has no place. And there is no hardship if he suffers the same as he has done;
ג׳
3[85] and yet how can it be called the same when the times, the actions, the motives and the persons are different? Is it not the fact that the unprovoked wrong comes earlier and the punishment for it later; that murder is entirely lawless and the punishment for murder entirely lawful; that the slayer has satisfied his desire with the blood which he purposed to shed while his victim, being removed from the scene, can neither retaliate nor feel the pleasure which retaliation gives; that the former can work his will single-handed and as sole agent, while to the latter any counter-stroke is only possible if his friends and kinsmen in pity for his misfortune make his cause their own?
ד׳
4[86] If anyone threatens the life of another with a sword, even though he does not actually kill him, he must be held guilty of murder in intention, although the fulfilment has not kept pace with the purpose. The same should be the lot of anyone who craftily lies in wait, and, though not daring to attack outright, plots and schemes to shed blood treacherously, for he too is under the curse in his soul at least even though his hands are innocent as yet.
ה׳
5[87] For just as not only those who fight battles by sea or land, but also those who have made preparations for either and planted their engines to command our harbours and walls are judged by us to be our enemies, even though there is no engagement as yet, so too in my opinion should we regard as murderers, not merely those who have slain but also those whose every action aims at destroying life either openly or secretly, even though they have not carried out the crime.
ו׳
6[88] And if through cowardice or effrontery, two antagonistic but equally culpable emotions, they venture to take refuge in the temple, hoping to obtain an asylum there, they must be prevented from entering; and if they manage to slink in, they must be handed over for execution with a declaration to the effect that the holy place does not provide asylum for the unholy. Everyone whose actions are irremediable is an enemy of God, and the actions of murderers are irremediable, as are also the calamities which the murdered have sustained.
ז׳
7[89] If those who have committed no sin are forbidden access to the sanctuary, until they have bathed and purged themselves with purifying water according to the customary rites, is it fitting that the sacred building should be the resort and abode of men labouring under the curse of ineffaceable crimes, the pollution of which no length of time will wash away—men who would not be admitted into the dwelling-houses of decent people who take any thought for what the law of holiness permits or forbids?