השקפת העולם המדעית והדתית ד׳The Scientific and the Religious World View 4
א׳
1Unity and Continuity
ב׳
2Some of the age-old problems of epistemology have remained unresolved to this day, because their solution was attempted exclusively within the frame of reference of the object world, without due consideration for the subject and by ignoring the ultimate ground of reality, which is common to subject and object.
ג׳
3At the dawn of modern philosophy Descartes raised the question as to the reality of the external world. Since the world is given to us in sense perceptions and since these are often misleading or illusory, how can one be sure of the external world? Perhaps what we call the world, exists only in human imagination? While Descartes’ solution of the problem is rejected, most thinkers attempt to shrug the problem off. To imagine that the universe existed only in the consciousness of a single individual, as required by consistent solipsism, is absurd. It is unacceptable. Yet, the mere disinclination to entertain a doubt because it is disagreeable to us is no solution. Indeed, there is no solution to the problem as long as we attempt to “objectify” all reality. Only if we are willing to acknowledge the subject in its full ontological authenticity may Descartes’ problem be solved. Man, the person, fulfills his essential nature in search for meaning. Within the religious world view, by relating himself to the divine world ground, he becomes aware of purpose and responsibility as modes of personal existence. There is something to be realized, something that ought to be. But the concept of the “Ought” cannot arise in a solipsistic universe, in which the whole of reality exists only in the imagination of a single individual. The “Ought”, which is as inseparable from the subject realm as the “Is” is from that of the object, points to another or to some other form of reality outside the subject. In the utter loneliness of solipsism, responsibility, purpose, meaning are inconceivable. In responsibility and conscience the world itself is given to man as real. It may be called the ontological irony of human existence that as long as man refuses to acknowledge the subject aspect of reality, he cannot prove that the whole of the universe may not be mere imagination in the consciousness of a subject that, according to the premise, is a mere object in disguise.
ד׳
4Among the basic presuppositions of the scientific method are the concepts of unity and continuity in nature. Without them no laws may be formulated and no predictions made. Yet, both concepts are epistemologically most questionable.
ה׳
5Modern science formulates its laws on the strength of the validity of the principle of induction. When a certain function has been established in a sufficient number of cases it is assumed to conform to a “law”. The general rule is induced from the specific occasions. This, however, may only be done on the assumption that what happens on numerous occasions will happen always. But why? Surely, this is a conclusion not based on experience or observation. “Always” may neither be experienced or experimented with. The conclusion derives from the presupposition of unity in nature. It is assumed that nature functions according to a uniform pattern. The assumption, however, can never be proved by the method of induction. It is the presupposition about which induction proves nothing. How serious the problem is one may appreciate better, if one contemplates the ramification of the problem of continuity in nature. It was David Hume who raised the issue most disturbingly. No past experience by itself justifies the assumption that the order discovered in nature in the past will continue in the future. There is no experience of the future. Not even Kant, who confessed that Hume’s questioning woke him from his “dogmatic slumbers”, ever really answered Hume’s criticism. The concept of statistical laws offers no solution either. It too must assume the metaphysical principle of unity and continuity. Though the orderliness is conceived as being of a statistical nature only, it requires the presupposition that what has been established in a small corner of possible experience is valid in general. It also affirms that the same orderliness that has been observed in the past will remain in effect in the future too, an assumption which cannot be supported by any statistical data since there are no statistics of the future. Whitehead correctly maintains that the principle of induction, the very core of the scientific method, is “the despair of the philosophers”. It is based completely on a metaphysical assumption that cannot be validated either logically or experimentally.
ו׳
6It is, however, rather remarkable that notwithstanding “the despair of the philosophers” the assumptions are justified by their results. The method of induction does work. Predictions of the future based on general laws normally do come true. The philosopher’s despair may be resolved by realizing that the solution to the problem was sought in a realm where it could not be found, in that of the object. Mere objects just are and their pure object essence is utterly indifferent either toward order or chaos. Order and law belong essentially in the subject realm. The object, as such, can well do without them. The original mode of the existence of the object world is Tohu va’Bohu (chaos). Only the subject is not conceivable in a state of Tohu va’Bohu. Only in the realm of the subject, of the Personal, are law, order, and unity no mere presuppositions but actual modes of Being. The object can just be; the subject is law, order, and unity or else it cannot be.
ז׳
7The same applies to the principle of continuity. It is not a principle of the object realm. Continuity, as experienced is inseparable from consciousness. Continuity too is a mode of personal existence. The object has no sense of time. It does not endure, except in relationship to a subject. By itself, the object has neither a past, nor a future. It is what it is at every instant of its existence, in its completeness and “perfection” confined on all sides by the instant. It has no memory of the past nor expectations of the future. Only plan and purpose, meaning and goal will thread instants of experience into an enduring sequence. Only the subject continues. The object is “timeless”; it exists below the threshold of time.
ח׳
8However, the subject can neither exist nor function in a state of Tohu va’Bohu; yet it exists and has to function in the midst of the object world. To plan, to hope, to seek the realization of meaning are modes of personal existence, but they take place in the midst of an object world. That the subject may be, there must be room for planning and purposeful action within the domain of the object. This requires a measure of orderliness, of an expectation of tomorrow within the object realm itself. This is not mere logic. The ontological essence of the subject includes within itself the ontological reference to an external realm, which, though object, yet is “aware” of the subject. The existential reality of the subject includes the “subject-awareness” of the object world. It is ontologically given with the givenness of the subject. To that extent the realm of the object itself becomes “subjectified”. The object is appointed to the subject as the subject is appointed to the object. However, since both subject and object are not further reducible in their ontological authenticity, since neither the subject emerged from the object nor the object from the subject, their being appointed to each other has to be sought in the common world ground of the divine will of purposeful creation. Only if we connect the subject and the object to their common divine world ground may unity and continuity in the realm of the object be expected as the requirement of meaning and purpose that seek their realization by means of the subject.
ט׳
9__________
Rabbi Dr. Eliezer Berkovits is chairman of the Jewish Philosophy Department in the Hebrew Theological College of the Jewish University of America, Skokie, Illinois.
Rabbi Dr. Eliezer Berkovits is chairman of the Jewish Philosophy Department in the Hebrew Theological College of the Jewish University of America, Skokie, Illinois.
י׳
10This article is based on a lecture given by Dr. Berkovits at the 1963 A.O.J.S. National Convention.